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 With the explosive development of the critical services network systems and Internet, 
the need for networks security systems have become even critical with the 
enlargement of information technology in everyday life. Intrusion Prevention System 
(IPS) provides an in-line mechanism focus on identifying and blocking malicious 
network activity in real time. This thesis presents new intrusion prevention and self-
healing system (SH) for critical services network security. The design features of the 
proposed system are inspired by the human immune system, integrated with pattern 
recognition nonlinear classification algorithm and machine learning. Firstly, the 
current intrusions preventions systems, biological innate and adaptive immune 
systems, autonomic computing and self-healing mechanisms are studied and 
analyzed. The importance of intrusion prevention system recommends that artificial 
immune systems (AIS) should incorporate abstraction models from innate, adaptive 
immune system, pattern recognition, machine learning and self-healing mechanisms 
to present autonomous IPS system with fast and high accurate detection and 
prevention performance and survivability for critical services network system. 
Secondly, specification language, system design, mathematical and computational 
models for IPS and SH system are established, which are based upon nonlinear 
classification, prevention predictability trust, analysis, self-adaptation and self-healing 
algorithms. Finally, the validation of the system carried out by simulation tests, 
measuring, benchmarking and comparative studies. New benchmarking metrics for 
detection capabilities, prevention predictability trust and self-healing reliability are 
introduced as contributions for the IPS and SH system measuring and validation. 
Using the software system, design theories, AIS features, new nonlinear 
classification algorithm, and self-healing system show how the use of presented 
systems can ensure safety for critical services networks and heal the damage caused 
by intrusion. This autonomous system improves the performance of the current 
intrusion prevention system and carries on system continuity by using self-healing 






Perkembangan pesat sistem perkhidmatan rangkaian dan Internet pada hari ini 
memerlukan sistem keselamatan rangkaian yang kritikal dengan kecanggihan 
teknologi maklumat. Sistem Pencegah Intrusi (IPS) menyediakan penyelarasan 
mekanisme bertujuan mengecam dan menyekat aktiviti rangkaian berbahaya secara 
nyata. Tesis ini menyajikan pencegahan intrusinew dan sistem pemulihan sendiri 
(SH) untuk keselamatan rangkaian perkhidmatan yang kritikal. Cadangan rekabentuk 
sistem diilhamkan oleh sistem kekebalan tubuh manusia, diintegrasikan dengan 
algoritma pengenalan pola klasifikasi tidak linier dan mesin pembelajaran. Pertama, 
sistem pencegahan intrusi saat ini, biologi bawaan dan sistem penyesuaian imun, 
pengkomputeran autonomi dan mekanisme pemulihan sendiri dipelajari dan 
dianalisis. Pentingnya IPStelah mengesyorkan sistem kekebalan tubuh buatan (AIS) 
memerlukan model abstraksi dari bawaan, sistem penyesuaian imun, pengenalan pola, 
mesin pembelajaran dan mekanisma pemulihan sendiri untuk mempresentasikan 
sistem autonomi IPS dengan pengesanan yang cepat dan ketepatan yang tinggi dan 
prestasi pencegahan dan ketahanan untuk sistem rangkaian perkhidmatan yang 
kritikal. Kedua, spesifikasi bahasa, sistem rekabentuk, model matematik dan 
pengkomputeran untuk IPS dan sistem SH ditetapkan bersandarkan pada klasifikasi 
tidak linier, kepercayaan pencegahan meramal, analisis, adaptasi diri dan algoritma 
pemulihan sendiri. Akhirnya, pengesahan sistem yang dilakukan oleh ujian simulasi, 
pengukuran, perbandingan dan kajian banding. New perbandingan metrik 
kemampuan pengesanan, kepercayaan pencegahan meramal dan kehandalan 
penyembuhan diri diperkenalkan sebagai sumbangan untuk pengukuran sistem dan 
pengesahan IPS dan SH. 
Penggunaan sistem perisian, teori rekaan, ciri AIS, algoritma klasifikasi new 
tidak linier, dan sistem pemulihan sendiri menunjukkan kegunaan sistem yang 
disajikan memastikan keselamatan rangkaian perkhidmatan yang kritikal dan 
menyembuhkan kerosakan berpunca daripada intrusi. Sistem autonomi ini 
meningkatkan prestasi sistem pencegahan intrusi saat ini dan menjalankan 
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U Union of two sets 
≥ Greater than 
α Iteration number 
𝛽 False negative percent 
𝛿 False positive percent 











A Alert of detection 
ADA Adaptive agent 
AIS Artificial immune system 
ANA Analysis agent 
Anomalyhealmsg Anomaly abnormal behavior  heal message 
AnomalyMsg Anomaly  abnormal behavior  message 
APC Antigen Presenting Cell 
C1 Check the steadiness of the system components 
C2 Check the availability of the system 
CID Capability of Detection 
C-k-NN Cluster k-nearest neighbor 
CTMC Continuous Time Markov Chains  
DA Detection Algorithm 
DC Dendritic cell 
DCA Dendritic cell Algorithm 
DetectionMsg Detection of abnormal behavior  message 
DMG Damage  
DoS Denial of services 
DT Danger Theory 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 




FP False positive 
GMM Gaussian Mixture  
HC Healing Candidate  
HIS Human immune system 
HK Heal Knowledge database 
HSP Heat shock proteins 
I Intrusion 
IDS Intrusion detection system 
IMAAD Immune multiagent active defense 
IPS Intrusion prevention system 
k-NN k-nearest neighbor 
LAN local-area network  
MD Misuse database 
MHC Histo-compatibility complex 
MisusehealMsg Misuse abnormal behavior  heal message 
NBA Network Behavior Analysis 
NN Nearest- Neighbor 
NPV Negative predictive value 
NS Negative selection 
NTP Network Time Protocol 
P Probability of 
PAMP Pathogen-associated molecular proteins 





PPV Positive predictive value 
Probe Surveillance and other probing 
R2L Unauthorized access from a remote machine 
RBF radial basis function 
RC Repair Access 
RecognitionMsg Recognition of the abnormal behavior  message 
Rs Repair time 
SEA Sense agent 
SH Self-healing system 
SHA Self-healing agent 
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol 
SOA Critical Service-oriented architectures 
TLR Toll-like receptor 
TN True negative 
TP True positive 
U2R Unauthorized access to local super user (root) privileges 
WBC White blood cells 














1.1 Thesis Overview  
With the explosive growth of the Network Systems and Internet, and the rise of 
information technology in everyday life, the need for networks security has become 
critical. Meanwhile, the complexity of attacks is on the rise regardless of the beefed-
up security measures. Critical Service Oriented Architectures (SOA) and, more 
specific, Web Critical Services designs are currently being widely used for the 
development of open, large-scale interoperable systems. In those systems, 
performance, security and trustability are challenging research issues. Intrusion 
Prevention Systems provide an in-line mechanism that focuses on identifying and 
blocking abnormal network activities in real time. 
In network systems in particular those used for critical services, the main security 
danger comes from insider abuse and from external intrusions. Two broad approaches 
exist to tackle this problem: anomaly detection and misuse detection. An anomaly 
detection system is qualified only on examples of normal links, and thus has the 
potential to detect novel attacks. However, many anomaly detection systems simply 
report the anomalous activity, rather than analyzing it further in order to report 
higher-level information that is of more use to a security representative. On the other 
hand, misuse detection systems recognize known attack patterns. However, such 
systems cannot be decentralized, and are unable to detect novel attacks, or stop the 
spread of the damage caused by the different malicious activities i.e. prevention 
response. 
Immune System presents valuable metaphor for computer security systems and it 
is an appealing mechanism because firstly, the Human Immune System (HIS) defends 
the body with high level of protection features from pathogens, in a Self–Organized, 
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Robust, Distributed and Diverse manner. Secondly, current security systems are not 
able to handle the dynamic and increasingly complex nature of the computer systems 
and their security needs. Based on this deficiency, Artificial Immune Systems (AISs) 
have been successfully applied to a number of network security problem domains that 
include Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) and 
Anti-malware Systems. However, most of the developed intrusion detection system 
technologies and prevention technologies work fairly well in static systems but have 
certain deficiencies in dynamic systems, such as the lack of self-adaptation, lack of 
robustness and they are mostly centralized in design. Hence, it is necessary to 
construct an effective defense system, which has features of autonomous, self-
adaptability, self-detecting, self-monitoring, and self-healing. Currently the trend is 
towards large and much more dynamically configured systems.  
This research presents a new security system for critical services network based 
on the combination of biological intrusion prevention (IP) and Self-Healing (SH) 
concepts. This system integrates an artificial immune intrusion prevention system for 
network security inspired by the immunology theory known as the danger theory 
(DT), adaptive immune system and pattern recognition classifications. The proposed 
system is inspired by the Human Immune System (HIS), which is applied to the 
autonomous defense system. The inspired IPS mechanisms look at the danger model 
and its application to activate malicious behavior defense in order to create a fully 
decentralized model. The developed Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) analyzes the 
behavior of network system processes and critical data in network traffic to detect 
harmful events. The detection of damages caused by different types of abnormal 
events or attack features is used to trigger the Self-Healing (SH) mechanism. This 
system is to be autonomous and enhances the fault repair and the system recovery. 
The main features of the biological immune system adopted by this new IPS are 
the features of two interacting subsystems: the innate and adaptive immune systems. 
While the reality of an innate immune system has long been obvious, it has little 
impact on the design of AISs [1]-[4]. AISs, to date, have largely been inspired by 
adaptive immune system. Scientists described the adaptive immune system as a 
system capable of specific recognition and remembrance of pathogen, while the 
innate immune system is characterized mainly as the first line of defense and rapid-
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response system against pathogens. Based on the understanding of how both of these 
systems function, this research mapped a number of features to IPS design; at the 
same time the Intrusion Prevention System is enhanced by Self-Healing mechanism. 
These features provide a general structural framework in designing a new biological 
IPS generation, in general. These features are: Autonomy, Self-Repair, Distributed, 
Self-Organized, Lightweight, Multilayered, Adaptability, Diverse, and Disposable 
[5]. The definition of these design features is presented in Appendix A.1. The 
combination of these design features form a robust IPS specification and design with 
optimal performance. 
In 1994, Negative Selection (NS) algorithm was the first AIS algorithm for 
intrusion detection introduced by Forrest et al. [6] that inspired from adaptive immune 
system. It is a loose abstract model of biological negative selection that concentrates 
on the generation of change detectors. Many researchers in [7]-[9] evaluated and 
improved the NS in addressing the problem of network security system, specifically 
concerning intrusion, and detection and prevention of the network system. Despite 
this successful abstraction of negative selection, further analysis showed that there 
were other problems such as scalability, coverage problem and high false positive 
error in detection. The main reason for this drawback is specific pattern matching 
rules using linear algorithm. 
Recent new AIS algorithms for intrusion detection and prevention system were 
based upon the abstraction of Matzinger‟s danger theory Matzinger [10] introduced in 
2002 [11]. Many researchers later followed this work [12]-[16]. The danger theory 
concept for AIS is a fast growing alternative, in addition to negative detection. Even 
though these algorithms have been quite successful at reducing the false positive 
error, the error remains high and need to be reduced further. Firstly, one of the 
disadvantages of these algorithms is their usage of linear detection rules for 
classifications [17], because as an assemblage of linear classifiers, there are severe 
restrictions on the datasets that the algorithm will be able to evaluate. This is made 
inferior by the fact that the gradients of the boundaries are constant, applying still 
further restrictions against the regions in signal space that the algorithm can 
differentiate between normal and abnormal behavior. Secondly, these algorithms have 
deficiencies of low predictability of prevention responses and inline response 
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activities. An intrusion detection and prevention system for critical services networks 
needs fast and accurate response against intelligent and abnormal behaviors. An 
autonomous intelligent IPS system can be achieved by integrating AIS, pattern 
recognition and machine learning.  
Based on this integration, an effective biological IPS is developed to combine 
with self-healing system using autonomous multilayered multiagent system. To 
achieve optimal design features suitable for the environment of critical network 
systems, the system performance is adjusted through autonomous computing tool 
which is multiagent paradigm. The achievement of these design features is the main 
goal in constructing the system modules. 
1.2. Motivation  
Realizing the potential of intrusion and prevention systems as in-line security system, 
many techniques and models have been developed by many researchers. However, 
the network systems continue to be challenged by different types of abnormal 
activities that are spreading rapidly and causing damages in the system components. 
These factors lead to the necessity of developing new system for autonomous 
intrusion prevention and self-healing system that applies central authority that 
generates the defense mechanisms and deploys these to the systems in the field. While 
this strategy works fairly well in static systems, but it faces problems in dynamic and 
diverse network systems.  
The motivation for this work is to investigate: 
 How the functionalities of the human immune system can be used as an 
inspiration to develop a network security system. Human immune system has the 
capability to detect and stop anomaly and misuse of abnormal behavior with different 
integrated mechanisms. 
 How the integration between AIS, pattern recognition and machine learning 
can introduce a new concept of autonomous and high accurate IPS and HIS system. 
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 How biologically inspired techniques coupled with intelligent agents paradigm 
technology can be used efficiently to design future generations of intrusion prevention 
and Self-Healing systems to achieve highly secured computer network systems. 
1.3 Research Problem 
In spite of the vast choices of network security systems, many existing network 
systems are still susceptible to intelligent, dynamic, and successful abnormal 
activities. To face this problem of vulnerabilities in critical network systems, a 
sensible tendency is towards more intelligent, autonomous, adaptable, dynamically 
configurable systems, and fault healing network security systems [18],[19]. 
Meanwhile, the future is likely to belong to ubiquitous systems where the number of 
devices and their diversity exceed the capacity to centrally administer them. 
Furthermore, ubiquitous systems will also include many devices that are not 
connected continuously or they shall dynamically change their status as demonstrated 
in [18]. Obviously, there is an urgent need for a network security system to address 
these issues. This research looks at a model of computer immune system and its 
application to intrusion prevention system combined with self-healing system, which 
shall create an autonomous system using autonomic computer techniques and tool 
[19]. 
1.4 Research Questions 
In this thesis, we attempt to provide answers to these questions: 
1. Are the mechanisms of Human Immune System a good metaphor for 
intrusion prevention system as a network security system? 
2.  Is it possible to detect, prevent, and heal the computer intrusions using the 
artificial immune system based on danger theory and adaptive immune system with 
minimum false alerts? 
3. Is intelligent multiagent paradigm a suitable tool to build autonomous 
intrusion prevention and self-healing system? 
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1.5 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to develop a security system for critical network 
services by building an intrusion prevention system inspired by human immune 
system features, and one that is capable of implementing a healing system to recover 
the damages caused by abnormal behavior using self-healing model. The work has 
been divided into specific areas that aim to accomplish the following goals: 
1. To develop an autonomous mechanism for intrusion prevention system that is 
effective for anomaly detection and prevention, based on artificial immune system. 
2. To design a network security system that combines the intrusion prevention 
system with self-healing mechanism. 
3. To simulate the model for efficiency and robustness, and compare and contrast 
it with existing security models. 
1.6   Research Scope 
This research deliberates on enhancing the performance of intrusion prevention 
system especially in reducing the false alerts: false positive and false negative errors. 
False positive detects normal behavior as abnormal, while false negative detects 
abnormal behavior as normal. These errors in detection cause huge damages and 
losses, particularly in network system for critical services such as Banking network 
systems, E-commerce and Internet Service providers, Health Care systems, Military 
network system, Security systems and Governmental Organizations. The scope of this 
research  is to develop an integrated solution to improve the performance and security 
of network systems for critical services  based on the use of an autonomic framework 
exploited to auto-configure and to auto-tune the system, guaranteeing high 






1.7 Research Contributions 
1. A system that responds effectively to new abnormal activities without human 
intervention which would significantly improve the security and optimize the 
performance of network systems used by critical services. 
2. A robust multilayered security system that reduces false alerts and errors in 
detecting and preventing abnormal activities. 
3. New non-classification algorithms for hybrid intrusion prevention system with 
capabilities to detect and prevent anomaly, and misuse of abnormal activities. The 
classifications algorithms use the features of k-N-N means cluster and Gaussian 
mixtures. These algorithms have been proven as: 
 Having high detection accuracy and prevention predictability. 
 Fast in training and testing. 
 Requiring small training data. 
4. Network systems with enhanced survivalability, which results from the 
combination of intrusion prevention system and self-healing mechanism. 
5.  The introduction of a specification language for IPS and SH system. 
6.  A new Conceptual Framework for AIS development. 
7. The introduction of new metrics for prevention predictability trust, detection 
capability and self-healing.  
1.8 Research Methodology and Activities  
The main research objectives are realizable by taking it into the following research 
methodology and activities: 
1. Analysis of the biological IPS and self-healing system according to the 
following  activities: 
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 Analyze the components, properties and features of the human 
immune system architectures, and identify the mechanisms that we 
wish to duplicate in order to apply the hallmark features of the 
immune system. Find and define the different types of 
defenselessness and abnormal behaviors. 
 Study the immune intrusion detection system, intrusion prevention 
system, self-healing system and autonomic computer system using 
multi-agent system. 
 Study the immune intrusion detection system, intrusion prevention 
system, self-healing system and intelligent agent applications in 
autonomous network security. 
 Analyze the Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) for network 
security. Find similarities and differences between IPS and human 
immune system.  
 Construct an analytical model for developing AIS system using the 
conceptual frame work for AIS and layered framework for 
engineering AIS 
 Construct abstract models of the IPS and SH using Multi agent 
system paradigm. 
2. Create specification language for the biologically inspired IPS and SH 
systems: 
 Using the set theory and Z-notation to specify the roles, functions 
and responsibilities of each agent.  
3. Create and verify the theoretical design: 
 Build a theoretical flow of the agent design and verify it using Petri 
nets. 
 Verify the logical and computational models. 
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4. Create new mathematical and computational models: 
 Build the mathematical and computational model. 
 Construct the algorithms for the detection, prevention, and healing 
systems as inspired by human immune system mechanism. 
5. Simulate the proposed system using Matlab software: 
 Simulate the system using different scenarios and diverse standard 
dataset. 
 Evaluate the model reliability using traditional and new metrics. 
Compare and contrast it with the contemporary models. 
The flow of research activities are presented in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1: The Flow of the Research Activities 
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1.9 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis is structured in chapters. The first chapter introduces the whole research in 
addition to a brief background on all the concepts involved in this work, motivation of 
the new approach, the problem statement, research question, objectives, and scope of 
research, contributions, research methodology, and relevant research activities. 
Chapter two provides an overview of critical services network, intrusion prevention 
system, human immune system, autonomic computing, self-healing system and 
covered many Related works. An analysis of the proposed system is introduced in 
chapter three. The IPS design specification, logic computational of the system is 
discussed in chapter four. Chapter five describes the mathematical model and system 
algorithm. Chapter six covers discussions on the evaluation and measurement of 
system, and the experiments and dataset used to verify the model. In chapter seven, 
new metrics for prevention predictability and self-healing system are introduced, 
comparison studies are carried out, and the results are discussed. Finally, conclusion 
and recommendations for future work are included in chapter eight. 
1.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the research problems, objectives, motivation, scope, 
methodologies and activities. The main problem in network security system for 
critical services is how to challenge the intelligent abnormal behavior activities. The 
aim of this research to develop an abstract system inspired from human immune 
system, integrated with algorithms for autonomous intrusion prevention system to 
reduce false errors in detection and prevention response. A self-healing mechanism is 















2.1 Chapter Overview 
As a network security system developer, building new technologies for intrusion 
detection prevention system to ensure the security of critical services, it is essential to 
have an obvious understanding of why we need network security systems; what are 
network for critical services; security needs of critical services; IPS requirements, 
features, methods and techniques. Since we are developing a new IPS inspired from 
human immune system combined with a healing mechanism, it is also necessary to 
have a clear view of the human immune system from a biological perspective. 
Moreover, we need to discover the nature and mechanisms of the immune system. 
The area of immunology mechanisms is very interesting and rich for research, 
inspiration and modeling computer security systems. The entirety and wealth of these 
mechanisms, put together, will be extremely resourceful for network security systems 
developers. 
The aims of this chapter are, first to introduce and review the current technologies 
of intrusion prevention system (IPS), roles, capabilities and high performance 
requirements for the system. Secondly, the structure, roles, and functions of human 
immune system are described. Thirdly, some artificial immune systems that have 
been developed are explored and discussed, followed by definitions and mechanisms 
of self-healing system. Finally, some related works are explored and discussed.  
2.2 The Needs of Network Security Systems  
Although network design, development and usage are critical to computing, they have 
become one of the main infrastructures in any organizations, and are being used 
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intensively in our daily activities. Recently, these systems have been subjected to 
diverse criminal activities. In 2009, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) 
reported that for the first time ever, income from cybercrime had exceeded drug 
trafficking as the most profitable illegal global business, evaluated at taking in more 
than $1 billion annually in profits. Separate hackers and groups insecurely tie 
themselves together into an organized criminal hierarchy where common goals are 
achieved through a reward system. In the first half of 2009, IBM reported that, 
abnormal behavior links on websites increased by 508%. Much of the malware 
spreading is accomplished by organized cybercrime networks. Meanwhile abnormal 
behaviors by insiders were listed as the top threat for 2009. With the downturn in the 
economy, it was no surprise that many desperate and discontented employees 
attempted to exploit the companies and organizations they currently or previously 
worked for. Here are just a few of the 2009 stories mentioned in [22]: 
 An employee in Bank of New York Mellon was on identity theft charges. He 
was charged with grand larceny, identity theft, and money laundering after stealing 
and using New York Mellon employee information. He opened phony bank and 
brokerage accounts where he deposited stolen money. 
 Another employee accessed a system a year after he was no longer an 
employee at United Way. He deleted files and deactivated the voicemail system. 
 An employee in T-Mobilean Company stole customer data and sold them to a 
data broker who one at a time sold the data to T-Mobile competitors. It was 
comprised of millions of records that contained treasured information such as account 
expiration date, so competitors could target those customers at the time they may look 
for a new provider. 
 After sequences of arguments with executives and shareholders, the 
previously YouSendIt co-founder and CEO left the company and later implemented a 
denial-of-service attack against YouSendIt systems. 
One can notice from these very few examples the urgent requirements and needs 




2.3 Network for Critical Services  
Critical services networks are complex physical and interconnected-based systems 
that form the lifeline of modern global society, and their trustworthy and secure 
operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic strength. 
Many researchers have identified telecommunications, electric power systems, natural 
gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, government 
services, and emergency services, as the critical services. The networks of these 
services providers transfer critical information that are highly interdependent among 
themselves, and hence, a disruption in one network or a part of a network will have 
cascading effects on other parts of the network. The disruption could be due to 
synthetic abnormal behavior events, such as physical destructions or intrusions into 
network systems. Identifying, understanding, and analyzing such interdependencies 
among network systems pose significant challenges. These challenges are greatly 
magnified by the expanse of the global network and complexity of individual 
network, and the nature of coupling among them. Figure 2.1 shows an abstract view 
of the critical services networks. In the figure, one can notice that much critical 
information can be transferred between the end users with the use of diverse type of 
communication devices and technologies connected with the network systems. 
Internet and global network systems are highly dynamic and varieties of 
communication networks are interconnected to provide different critical services. 
These services need security, monitoring, and control. 
 
Figure 2.1: Abstract View of Critical Services Network System 
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These communication networks are closely associated with the supervisory control 
and data acquisition systems in the network. One of the primary concerns has been 
the issue of large-scale fault events, and their impact on the overall performance and 
stability of network systems [23]. Various incidents of abnormal activities in the 
recent past have indicated the extent to which the network system are vulnerable and 
the urgent need to protect them against intelligent intrusions and faults. One of these 
appealing security systems is intrusion prevention system. IPS can be resided as the 
first defending system in the network. The performance of such system must be 
optimized to ensure high classification between normal and abnormal activities. In 
critical services networks, IPS must function as the main and significant defense 
system to provide secure services. Figure 2.2 explains how an IPS can be resided to 
accomplish highly secured network system for critical services. 
 




2.4. Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems 
Intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) were invented to resolve ambiguities in passive 
network monitoring by placing detection and prevention systems in-line. A 
considerable integration and improvement in intrusion detection, deep data packet 
inspection-based on stateful firewall and prevention technologies, would allow IP 
systems to make access control decisions based on applications necessity rather than 
internet protocol (IP) address or ports as traditional firewalls have been doing.  
Meanwhile, IPS systems were originally a factual conservatory of intrusion detection 
systems (IDS). IDS  is a software system designed to identify the threats to computer 
networks and systems and monitors in-line, but no response is taken as in IPS where  
IPS is able  to respond  defensively to prevent the attackers from successfully creating 
harmful and abnormal activities. An IPS serves secondarily at the host level to 
prevent potentially malicious activity. It monitors network and system activities for 
malicious or abnormal behavior, and reacts in real-time to block or prevent those 
activities. For high performance and effectiveness, an IPS must provide a full array of 
safeguard against discovered and undiscovered attacks, offer high accuracy by 
enabling a low rate of false positive and false negative errors of detection and has 
high-speed response for prevention (When an IDS and IPS incorrectly identify benign 
activity as being malicious, a false positive would have occurred. When an IDS and 
IPS fail to identify malicious activity, a false negative would have occurred [24]). 
Moreover, professional IPS must introduce minimal degradation of network 
performance and have low latency rates [25]. IPS is a security system that preserves 
network integrity, availability and confidentiality from diverse types of intrusions. 
Table 2.1 details the types of intrusions, their target and defenselessness that can be 








Table 2.1: Network Defenselessness Controlled By IDS and IPS 
Intention Defenselessness 
Programming flaws Addressing error, buffer overflow, malicious type 
code, malicious code: (virus, worm, Trojan horse), 
and parameter modification code.  
Confidentiality Cookie, traffic flow analysis. 
Precursors to attack Port scan, reconnaissance, operating system 
application and finger printing. 
Availability DNS attack, protocol flow and connection flooding. 
Integrity Protocol flow, website defacement, protocol flow 
and DNS attack. 
  
Many aspects have to be considered when developing IPS system such as: which 
IPS methodology must be followed, the technologies that can be used to develop IPS, 
and the capabilities required or a particular IPS being developed. These aspects of IPS 
are presented as in Figure 2.3. In the next section, detailed explanations of these 
criteria and aspects are given.  
 
Figure 2.3: Aspects of IPS Systems 
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2.4.1 IPS Detection Methodologies 
Throughout the years, network security system developers have introduced IP System 
using three common detection methodologies: misuse detection, novel or anomaly 
detection and stateful protocol analysis [26], [27]. In the next sections, we will discuss 
the various aspects of these methodologies. 
2.4.1.1 Misuse Detection Methodology 
The main feature of misuse detection methodology is to examine network data packet 
sequences for known abnormal activities. Misuse detection is the process of 
comparing signatures against observed events to identify possible occurrences, 
typically through some form of pattern-matching algorithms. Misuse detection is very 
effective at detecting known malicious activities with quite low false positive error 
rate, but largely ineffective at detecting previously unknown malicious activities 
[28],[ 29].  
2.4.1.2 Anomaly Detection Methodology 
Anomaly detection methodology bases its decisions on a profile of normal network or 
system behavior. Any event that does not conform to this profile is considered 
anomalous or novel [21], [26], [30], [31]. The major benefit of anomaly-based 
detection methods is that they can be very effective at detecting previously unknown 
malicious activities. An IPS using anomaly-based detection has profiles that represent 
the normal behavior of such things as users, hosts, network connections, or 
applications. The profiles are built up by monitoring the characteristics of typical 
activity over a period. The IPS then uses statistical methods to compare the 
characteristics of current activity to thresholds related to the profile, such as detecting 
when a web activity is consuming a significantly more bandwidth than expected and 




2.4.1.3 Stateful Protocol Analysis Methodology 
The method of comparing prearranged outlines of normally accepted definitions of 
considerate protocol action for each protocol condition against observed events to 
identify deviations is known as Stateful protocol analysis methodology. Stateful 
protocol analysis relies on common outlines that specify how a particular protocol 
must and must not work, which is dissimilar to anomaly-based detection that uses 
host or network-specific profiles. Stateful protocol analysis method has some major 
drawbacks such that it is very resource-intensive due to the complexity the analysis 
and overhead involved in performing state tracking for many simultaneous sessions. 
Another serious drawback is that it cannot detect attacks that do not violate the 
characteristics of generally acceptable protocol behavior [32], [33]. 
To capture the functionality of new IPS, the methodologies required for high 
secure network system must be specified. This need to know, which information has 
to be monitor and what the major objectives of the new develop IPS system. 
2.4.2 IP System Technologies 
A review of existing IPS detection methodologies has shown that in order to capture 
the functionality of new IPS, the methodologies required for high security network 
system must be specified. This requires the knowledge of which information that 
needs monitoring and what are the major objectives to develop new IPS. This section 
will discuss the technologies used by IPS. 
With respect to residency, IPS technologies are usually divided into host-based, 
Network Behavior Analysis (NBA) and network-based technologies which are 
differentiated primarily by the types of events that they can recognize and the 
methodologies that they use to identify possible incidents. Host-based systems reside 
in each host that requires observation, and collect data of suspicious activity that 
might affect the operation of the host system. Network Behavior Analysis examines 
network traffic to identify threats that generate unusual traffic flows, such as DoS 
attacks, scanning, and certain forms of malware. In contrast, network-based IPSs 
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observe the traffic on the network holding the hosts to be defended. Any of the three 
techniques has its own advantages and disadvantages.  
Host-based systems can detect local attacks, benefit appreciation attacks and 
attacks which are encrypted, and are capable to decide if an attempted attack has been 
definitely successful. However, such systems can be rather complicated to deploy and 
administer, especially when the number of hosts requiring protection is huge. In 
addition, host-based systems are unable to detect attacks against several targets of the 
network. While the Network Behavior Analysis, which is usually used for detecting 
special types of threats is unable to cover a wide range of malicious activities. On the 
other hand, network-based systems, even though they are capable of monitoring a 
large number of hosts with relatively little deployment outlay and are able to identify 
attacks to and from multiple hosts. However, are largely incapable to detect whether 
an attempted attack has actually been successful, and are unable to deal with local or 
encrypted attacks.  
To overcome the shortcomings of those systems, the hybrid systems that include 
and integrate host and network-based elements can offer the best protective 
capabilities. Critical services network systems need such hybrid protection 
capabilities against attacks from multiple sources [20], [27]. The hybrid IPS can be 
resided to monitor both network traffic and each individual host, with different types 
of data monitored to guarantee a multilevel security. Generally, in order to develop an 
IP system that follow one of the methodologies and techniques, developers have to 
specify the major roles, the main security capabilities, the response techniques and the 
requirements of  high performance IP system;  the IPS development specification is as 
shown in Figure 2.4. The main roles, security capabilities, and IP system requirements 




Figure 2.4: Intrusion Prevention System Development Specification 
2.4.2.1 Major Roles of IPS Technologies  
A variety of IPS technologies, in general, performs many major roles in addition to 
observing and examining events to identify undesirable network activity. These main 
roles are: recording information related to observed events, notifying security 
administrators of important observed events and producing reports.  
The first role is registration of information, where the information is usually 
registered locally, and might be sent to separate systems such as security information 
management solutions, and enterprise management systems. The second role is 
notification, known as an alert. It occurs through any of the several available methods, 
including the following: e-mails, pages, messages on the IDS and IPS user interface, 
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) traps, syslog messages, and user-
defined programs and scripts. A warning message characteristically includes only 
basic information regarding an event, such that the administrators need to access the 
IPS for additional information of the event. Lastly, the third role is to provide reports 
that summarize the monitored events or provide details on particular events of 
interest. Some IDS and IPS are dynamic systems that are able to change their security 
profile when a new danger is detected. For example, an IPS might be able to collect 
more detailed information for a particular session after abnormal activity has been 
detected within that session. An IPS might also alter the settings when certain alerts 
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are triggered or what priority should be assigned to subsequent alerts after a particular 
threat is detected [27], [33]-[36].   
Currently, system developers are looking at the implementation of autonomic 
computing concept to minimize interventions by system administrators. In the 
situation of network security system, the time and spread of abnormal behavior is 
critical and any delay in response to abnormal activity may cause huge damages. The 
preference is to have a quick response when abnormal behavior alert is triggered. To 
improve network reliability and ensure system‟s continuity, it is highly desirable that 
the next generation of IPS technologies is capable to deal with abnormal events 
autonomously. 
2.4.2.2 Security Capabilities of IPS Technologies  
Most IDS and IPS technologies can provide a wide variety of security capabilities that 
can be divided into four categories: information gathering, logging, detection, and 
prevention [35], [37]. IPS technologies offer information-gathering capability, such as 
collecting information on hosts or networks by observing the network traffic 
activities. Examples include identification of hosts and operating systems including 
the applications that they use, and general characteristics identification of the 
network.  
Logging is an IPS capability which performs typically extensive logging of data 
related to detected events. The data can be used to confirm the validity of alerts, 
investigate incidents, and correlate events between the IPS and other logging sources. 
Data fields commonly used by IPSs include event date and time, event type, 
importance rating, and preventive action that have been performed. Specific types of 
IPSs log of additional data fields are such as network-based IPSs performing packet 
capture, and host-based IDS and IPS recording user IDs. Generally, logs should be 
stored both locally and centrally to support the integrity and availability of the data. In 
addition, IDS and IPS should have their clocks synchronized using the Network Time 
Protocol (NTP) or through frequent manual adjustments so that their log entries have 
accurate timestamps.  
 22 
 
IPSs offer extensive and broad detection capabilities. Most systems use a combination 
of detection techniques, which generally support detection that is more accurate and 
more flexible in tuning and customization. The types of events detected and the 
typical accuracy of detection vary greatly, depending on the type of IDS and IPS 
technology. Finally, and the most important capability of an IPS is prevention 
capability. Existing IPSs offer a variety of prevention capabilities and the specific 
capabilities vary according to the type of IPS technology used.  
Administrators of IPSs, generally, are allowed to identify the preventive   
measures recommended by the IPS for each type of alert. This includes enabling or 
disabling prevention, as well as specifying which type of preventive action should be 
used [37]. IPS sensors have learning or simulation mode that suppresses all 
preventive actions, and instead indicates when prevention should be performed. This 
allows system administrators to monitor and fine-tune configuration of the prevention 
before enabling the preventive actions, which reduces the risk of inadvertently 
blocking benign activity. By using inspired IPS and training Agent based system, the 
role of administrator is reduced which saves time and increases autonomous reaction 
rate.   
IPSs require at least some tuning and customization to improve their detection 
accuracy, usability, and effectiveness, such as setting the appropriate preventive 
actions to be performed for a particular alert. Technologies vary widely in their tuning 
and customization capabilities. Typically, a more accurate IP system detection can be 
developed from the default configuration, adjusted by a powerful IP system product 
tuning and customization capabilities [38]. In a traditional IPS, code viewing and 
editing are the needed customization features, where some IDS and IPS technologies 
permit administrators to see some or all of the detection-related code. This is usually 
limited to signatures, but some technologies allow administrators to see additional 
codes, such as programs used to perform stateful protocol analysis. Viewing the code 
can help analysts to determine why a particular alert is generated; and is helpful for 
validating alerts and identifying false positives. The ability to edit all detection-related 
code and write new code (e.g. new signatures) is necessary to fully customize certain 
types of detection capabilities. The performance of these systems can be optimized 
and improved with the use of autonomous concept.   
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2.4.2.3 IPS Response Techniques 
There are several response techniques in the IP systems, which can be divided into the 
following classes [25], [27], [37], [39]: 
 IPSs that stop the attack itself. This may be achieved by terminating the 
network connection or user session that is being used for the attack. 
 IPSs that block access to the intended target. The system will block all access 
to the targeted host, service, application, or other resources from the offending user 
account, IP address, or other attacker‟s attribute, 
 IPSs response that change the security environment. The IPS could change the 
configuration of other security controls to disrupt an attack. Firewall, router and 
switch are the common examples of such IPSs where a network device is 
reconfigured to block access from the intruder or to the target, and a host-based 
firewall on a target is altered to block incoming attacks.  
 IPSs that change the content of the attacker information. In this technique, an 
IPS is able to change the content of the attack where the IPS can either remove or 
replace the malicious portions of an attack to make it benign. A simple example is an 
IPS that acts as a proxy and normalizes incoming requests, which means that the 
proxy repackages the payloads of the requests and discards header information. This 
might cause certain attacks to be discarded as part of the normalization process. 
2.4.2.4 IDS and IPS Requirement Features 
To develop improved, effective and high performance IDS and IPS, many researchers 
have identified specific requirements, which are of particular interest because they 
could be satisfied by mechanisms inspired by features of the human immune system 
[3], [5], [40], [41]. The main seven requirements are as follows: 
 Robustness: It should have multiple detection and prevention points with low 
operational failure rates and are resilient to attacks. 
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 Accuracy: It should be able to detect and classify the attacks accurately since 
these are the essential requirements of an IPS. 
 Extendibility: It should be easy and simple to extend the scope of IPS 
monitoring for new hosts regardless of the operating systems. 
 Scalability: It is essential to accomplish reliable scalability to gather and 
analyze the high volume of audit data correctly from distributed hosts. 
 Adaptability: It should adjust over time in order to detect dynamically 
changing network intrusions. 
 Global analysis: In order to detect network intrusions, it should collectively 
monitor multiple events generated on various hosts to integrate sufficient evidence 
and to identify for any correlation between the multiple events. 
 Efficiency: It should be simple and lightweight enough to impose a low 
overhead on the monitored host systems and network. 
 Configurability: It should be able to configure itself easily to the local 
requirements of each host or each network component. Individual hosts in a network 
setting are various. 
 Performance: It should incorporate higher ability and performance features. 
 Using new approaches inspired from nature, particularly the human immune 
system, it is possible to accomplish an IPS having these features. All of the features 
mentioned above form part of HIS features and more significantly HIS autonomously 
applies the security capabilities to protect the human body upon sensing an intrusion. 
In the following sections, we present an overview of HIS mechanism, immune system 
applications to IPSs, HIS models inspired to IDS and artificial immune systems of 





2.5 Overview of Human Immune System  
The human immune system (HIS) is a multifaceted network of organs and cells that is 
an amazing constellation, responsible for protecting the human body against 
extraterrestrial particles. HIS is based on two main integrated and interrelated 
mechanisms: Innate Immune system that is the first line of defense, and Adaptive 
Immune system; both systems have varying number of cells of intelligent behavior. 
However, HIS has a multi-layered architecture, with protection at many levels as 
described in Figure 2.5 [42], [43]. The most elementary layer is the skin, which is the 
first barrier to infection. The second barrier is physiological, where conditions such as 
PH and temperature provide inappropriate living environment for foreign organisms. 
Once pathogens entered the body, they are dealt with by the innate immune system 
and by the acquired immune response system, which is the adaptive immune system. 
The HIS is capable of detecting and eliminating pathogens, i.e. nonself elements, as 
quickly as possible. Moreover, HIS can protect against destructive and earlier hidden 
intruder cells i.e. pathogen active particles. The human immune system mechanisms 
are described by immunologist as one of a multilevel dynamic system of cells, organs 
and circulatory systems [44]. 
 
Figure 2.5: Multilayered Human Immune System 
These creative and diverse mechanisms are suitably valuable for building a security 
system that will be able to protect networks from abnormal activities and intelligent 
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intruders in a similar way. HIS provides the basis for a representation of intrusion 
prevention system consisting of autonomous agents. Figure 2.6 shows a description of 
the HIS multilayered systems of organs, cells, and mechanisms. The next section will 
describe in details the adaptive and innate immune system cells, molecules, tissue 
organ and circulatory system. 
 
Figure 2.6: Human Immune System Organs and Cells 
2.5.1 Adaptive Immune System 
The adaptive immune system is known as a formulation of highly specialized, 
systemic components and direction processes that removes or stops pathogenic 
tackles. The adaptive or as named by many scientist "specific" immune system is 
stimulated by the “NonSpecific” and evolutionarily earlier innate immune system. 
The ability to recognize and remember specific pathogens that generate immunity are 
the main responsibility of the adaptive immune response, including to build up 
stronger attack defense each time a pathogen is encountered. The recognition of 
pathogen for creating pathogen-specific-memory is the main uniqueness of the 
adaptive immune response. 
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Another role of the adaptive immune system is the recognition of particular nonself 
antigens in the presence of self, during the process of antigen presentation. The 
productions of responses are adapted to potentially eliminate specific pathogen 
infected cells and to develop immunological memory, in which each pathogen is 
“remembered” by a signature antibody. These memory cells can be called to quickly 
eliminate a pathogen should subsequent infections occur [44]-[46]. The adaptive 
immune cells are produced in organs referred to as lymphoid organs because they are 
concerned with the growth, development, and deployment of lymphocytes [44]. 
B-cells that maturated in bone marrow and T-cells that maturated in thymus are 
the two major classes of lymphocytes. Therefore, they work according to a principle 
that allows lymphocytes to learn and adapt themselves to specific foreign protein 
structures, and to „„remember‟‟ these structures when necessary. These principles are 
implemented by B-cells. Furthermore, to ensure that at least some of the lymphocytes 
will be able to react to the pathogenic elements, the human body relies on dynamic 
protection via a continual renewal of diverse lymphocyte receptors [45]. The 
mechanisms of B-cell and T-cell work in parallel and decentralized control, and both 
circulate in the human body and react with each other, i.e. self-monitoring with high 
adaptive, dynamic and distributive response. 
A B-cell generates antibodies that differentiates the “nonself" protein called an 
“antigen,” such as a virus, reacts with the antigen, and is eliminated. The B-cell itself 
does not have the capability to eliminate antigens. However, a B-cell has an antibody 
molecule like an antenna on the surface of the cell, and the antibody corresponding to 
the antigen is compounded in large quantities by catching an antigen with the antenna. 
The B-cell is capable of memorizing the distinguished antigen, and generating many 
antibodies in a short time if an antigen is distinguished again. A T-cell distinguishes a 
self-cell that is detected by the B-cell antigen as nonself and eliminates it. A T-cell is 
generated in the thymus where it is strictly educated to discriminate self and nonself. 
Specifically, the T-cell is severely tested within the thymus and it is programmed to 
die. A few T-cells that only distinguish the self are converted into nonself, and do not 
destroy the self itself i.e. has the feature of self-tolerant.  
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When B-cells specify antibodies that recognize and react to stimulation and they bind 
to antigens with a strong affinity, then they are directly activated with the secretion of 
specific antibodies that recognize and react with appropriate antigens. If they bind to 
antigens with weak affinity, they need help or co-stimulation from T-lymphocytes 
called T-helper cells for activation. Forrest et al. [5] conducted research on security 
that focused on the educational function of this thymus. Their research has enabled 
the detection of strange illegal entry “nonself”, without infringing on regular access 
“self” [6]. The second type of T-cells is T-killer cells, which destroy cells that are 
infected by intracellular parasite. T-helpers are needed for the activation of T-killers. 
This matching between antibodies and antigens explains the core of HIS and most of 
the first generation of AIS implementations [3]. The whole architecture of adaptive 
immune system is shown in Figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.7: Architecture of Adaptive Immune System 
2.5.2 Innate Immune System 
The mechanism of the innate immune system will be activated when microorganisms 
or toxins enter an organism. The innate reaction is usually triggered when microbes 
are recognized by pattern identification receptors, which identify components that are 
conserved among broad groups of microorganisms, or when damaged, injured or 
stressed cells send out distress signals, many of which are recognized by the same 
 29 
 
receptors as those that recognize pathogens. Innate immune system responds to 
pathogens, meaning the protection offered by this system is nonspecific. This system 
does not grant long-lasting immunity against a pathogen.  
The innate immune system is the governing system of host defense in most 
organisms. Cells of the innate immune response are mainly Leukocytes. All white 
blood cells (WBC) are known as leukocytes, which are different from other cells of 
the body in that they are not firmly correlated with a particular organ; thus, their 
function is comparable to independent, single-celled organisms. Leukocytes are able 
to move freely, interact, and capture cellular debris, foreign particles, or invading 
microorganisms. Unlike many other cells in the body, most innate immune leukocytes 
cannot divide or reproduce on their own; they are produced by the bone marrow [47]. 
The innate leukocytes include: natural killer cells, mast cells, eosinophils, basophils 
and the phagocytic cells including macrophages, neutrophils and dendritic cells, and 
function within the immune system by identifying and eliminating pathogens that 
might cause infections [48]. 
One of the important innate immune system cells are Dendritic cells (DCs) that 
are identified as Antigen Presenting Cell (APCs), and perform as natural data fusion 
agents. In the human body, DCs do not have the adaptive capability of the 
lymphocytes of the adaptive immune system. However, DCs have a dual role, as trash 
antennas for tissue debris and as controller of the adaptive immune system. DCs are 
present in three statuses of differentiations: immature, semi-mature and mature, which 
determines their exact role [48]. Inflection between the different statuses is dependent 
upon the receiving of signals at the initial or immature status. Overall, there are two 
classes of danger signals; those which are generated endogenously i.e. by the body 
itself, and by exogenous signals which are derived from invading organisms e.g. 
bacteria. Signals that point to damage cause a transition from immature to mature. 
Those signals indicating good health in the monitored tissue cause a transition from 
immature to semi mature. The signals in question are derived from numerous sources, 
including pathogens, from healthy dying cells, from damaged cells and from 
inflammation. Each DC has the capability to combine the relative extent of input 
signals to produce its own set of output signals.  
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The adaptive and innate immune systems are integrated systems. A comparison 
between the innate and adaptive immune system is shown in Table2.2. The biological 
mechanisms discussed in this section are important to this thesis because they provide 
specific details on how cells are structured and interact. The structure, role, and 
involvement of DCs in the overall immune system dynamics show many interesting 
mechanisms that could be modeled for computer security system. The two systems 
complement one another to build an immune system that can distinguish and 
eliminate efficiently the intruder that entered the body, because some kinds of 
immune cells perform their own task while others cooperate with each other. The 
immunity cells of the two systems are reciprocally activated by stimulating each 
other, and powerfully remove cells infected by an antigen, as well as the antigen 
itself. 
Table 2.2: Comparison between Adaptive and Innate Immune System [45] 
Adaptive immune system Innate immune system 
Pathogen and antigen specific 
response. 
Response is nonspecific. 
Delay time between exposure and 
maximal response. 
Exposure leads to immediate maximal 
response. 
Cell-mediated and humoral 
immune response. 
Cell-mediated and humoral immune 
response. 
Experience directs to 
immunological memory. 
No immunological memory. 
2.6 Developed Artificial Immune System  
Artificial immune system (AIS) has been used to solve many problems in different 
domains. In 1986, the combination of immune system and machine learning was first 
published by the researchers in [30] who initiated the field of artificial immune 
system. This was followed by a considerable number of other researches, which 
eventually contributed to the development of AIS. Since then, AIS has been built for a 
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wide range of applications with successful implementation; they include data mining, 
neural network, fraud detection, document classification, and intrusion detection and 
prevention systems. The details are shown in Figure 2.8. AIS approaches have gained 
many successes and accomplishments in many cases.  
AISs can be classified into two different implementation mechanisms: network-
based model and population based model. Currently, an offspring of the combination 
of both to construct a hybrid is also being used. Network based model is based upon 
idiotypic network theory which states that AISs are built on algorithms  that recognize 
that interactions occur between antibodies and antibodies, as well as between 
antibodies and antigens [49]. Population based model utilizes negative selection or 
clonal selection as the technique of producing a population of detectors. Most of AISs 
intrusion detection and prevention systems use the latest model.  
 
Figure 2.8: Implementation and Research Area of Artificial Immune System 
During last two decades, many immune system approaches to IDS and IPS have 
been introduced. There are three major extractions, and accordingly three different 
views: conventional algorithm, the negative selection paradigm, and the danger 
theory. 
Conventional algorithm identifies some traits of the HIS that make it attractive for 
virus detection purposes, and implements them using established algorithms. The 
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designed algorithm is constructed of five major stages, each inspired by the HIS. 
Computer viruses can be extended more speedily than traditional signature-based 
approaches involving manual creation and distribution of signatures, which renders 
the latter as not effective. Therefore, the developed conventional algorithm is focused 
on automatic detection of computer viruses and worms. The developers are interested 
in creating a system that is able to automatically detect and respond to viruses 
Kephart J.O. et al [50].  
J. O. Kephart et al, first proposed a system capable of detecting viruses using 
either fuzzy matching from a pre-existing signature of viruses, or using integrity 
monitoring which monitored key system binaries and data files for changes. Despite 
the modifications that had been performed on subsequences algorithms to resemble an 
immune mechanism in order to improve the reliability, in some cases, it could be 
argued that they did not allow all of the possible features of the immune system to be 
exploited, such as the feature of self-organization or disposability. 
When pathogens, disparaging microorganisms such as viruses or bacteria, enter 
the body, the immune system eliminates them and returns the body to a healthy 
condition. Thus, the purpose of the immune system is often seen as that of a protector 
or defender of the body. Since the immune system reacts to the pathogen “nonself” 
but not to the body “self”, it also seems logical to conclude that the immune system 
provides this protection by discriminating the “self” from the “nonself”. The defense 
mechanism characterized by “self-nonself” discrimination has shaped the basis of the 
majority of immunological models since the middle of the last century, and this view 
of the immune system is still widely accepted by currently immunologists [51].  
Previous models of immunity have been based around the idea that host 
constituents (self) are ignored by the immune system, while other elements: 
pathogens, foreign substances or altered self, are reacted to. Based upon the 
mechanism of discriminating “self” from “nonself”, Forrest et al. [6] proposed a new 
algorithm known as negative selection (NS) algorithm. The algorithm consists of 




In the first phase, it defines “self” in the same way as other anomaly detection 
approaches establish the normal behavior patterns of a monitored system. It identifies 
the profiled normal patterns as “self” patterns. In the second phase, it generates a 
number of random patterns that are compared to each self-pattern defined in the first 
phase. If any randomly generated pattern matches a self-pattern, this pattern fails to 
become a detector and thus it is removed. Otherwise, it becomes a detector pattern 
and monitors subsequent profiled patterns in the monitored system. During the 
monitoring stage, if a detector pattern matches any newly profiled pattern, then a new 
anomaly is considered to have occurred in the monitored system.  
Negative selection algorithm is most popular; it has diverse features in solving 
IDS problems, particularly for anomaly detection. However, there are two drawbacks 
to utilizing the NS algorithm, namely scalability and coverage, and these are the main 
barriers to its success as effective IDS [3]. When negative selection algorithm was 
applied to a large and complex data search, it suffered from problem of generating 
excessive number of false positives [43]. Even though efforts have been made to 
solve this problem, however, still other unresolved issues are preventing the NS 
algorithm from being effective IDS. Following Forrest, many researchers working on 
the “self” and “nonself” concept have developed different algorithms, for examples in 
[8], [52]-[55]. 
Danger theory is a different immunology theory for IDS and IPS. The particular 
characteristic that makes this model different from other immune theories is that 
according to the danger theory immune response is triggered by unusual deaths of 
self-cells. Danger theory (DT) recommends that foreign intruders, which are 
dangerous, will encourage the generation of cellular molecules (danger signals) and 
initiating cellular stress or cell distress (dies by necrotic or abnormal death). 
Pathogens, which have damaged the body cell, sends danger signal to the Dendritic 
Cells (DCs) or Antigen Presenting Cells (APCs). Harmony is their ability to activate 
APCs and thus drive an immune response; antigen is swallowed from the extracellular 
environment by DCs in their immature state and then processed internally [11]. 
 During processing, antigen is fragmented and attached to main histo-
compatibility complex (MHC) molecules. This MHC antigen complex is then 
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presented under definite conditions on the surface of the DCs. As well as extracting 
antigen from their surroundings, DCs also have receptors, which respond to a range of 
other signaling molecules in their environment. Certain molecules, such as 
lipopolysaccharide, collectively termed pathogen-associated molecular proteins 
(PAMPs) are common to the entire classes of pathogens and bind with toll-like 
receptors (TLRs) on the surface of DCs. While other groups of molecules, termed as 
danger signals, such as heat shock proteins (HSPs), are associated with damage to 
host tissue or unregulated necrotic cell death and bind with receptors on DCs. In 
addition, there is another class of molecules related to inflammation which is called 
endotoxin, or lipopolysaccharide (LPS). This substance is present in the outer 
covering of some types of bacteria; also, it interacts with receptor families present on 
the surface of DCs. The current maturation state of the DC is determined through the 
combination of these complex signaling networks [56] which can be considered as 
input signals. DCs themselves secrete cell-to-cell signaling molecules called 
cytokines, which control the state of other cell types. The number and strength of DC 
cytokine output depends on its current maturation state. 
The proposal presented by Aickelin and Cayzer [11] to DT model has encouraged 
many AIS, mainly computer security developers, to discover the potentials of danger 
theory [10], [57], [58]. Our literature review has shown that to date only a few efforts 
have been made on this new idea. We look for a concrete base for future research and 
application to AIS based on DT. Our system uses the danger theory as for inspiration 
to intrusion prevention system integrated with adaptive immune system mechanisms, 
mainly T-cell and B-cell mechanisms.  
2.7. Self – Healing System 
The majority of attacks on computing systems occur rapidly enough to discourage 
manual defense or repair. It appears, therefore, that defense systems must include a 
high degree of autonomy of repairing attack damages. Recent advances have been 
directed to an emerging interest in self-healing software as a solution to this problem 
[59]-[61]. Self-healing mechanism represents a system with the ability to observe, 
find, diagnose and act in response to system breakdown. Self-healing applications 
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must be able to examine system failures, evaluate restrictions inflicted by system 
environment, and apply suitable adjustments. In order to autonomously discover 
system malfunctions or possible expected collapses, it is necessary to know the 
expected system behavior. 
 
Figure 2.9: General Architecture of a Self-healing System [59] 
Autonomic systems must have knowledge of their own behavior in order to 
determine if the behavior is reliable and expected in relation to the environment. In 
new environments or in diverse scenarios, new system behaviors can be observed, and 
the knowledge module must evolve with the environment. Moreover, the self-healing 
framework enhances the incessant and autonomous monitoring, diagnosis, repair, and 
remediation of software fault. Applying self-healing properties to network systems 
could present a way to alter the current fault finding in network systems subjected to 
various attacks. Many researches of self-healing modeling and techniques have been 
introduced in [62]-[65].  
Figure 2.9 shows the general architecture of a self-healing system. When an 
abnormal behavior is detected, the system enters a self-diagnosis mode that aims to 
categorize the fault and extracts as much information as possible with respect to its 
source, symptoms, and collision on the system. Once these are recognized, the system 
tries to adapt itself by generating candidate fixes, which are tested to find the best 
mark state.  
Generally, such architecture is composed of two high-level elements: the software 
service, which integrity and availability we are interested in improving; and the 
elements of the system that perform the monitoring, diagnosis and healing. The self-
healing components can be viewed as a form of middleware and must cover four 
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aspects: fault-model or fault hypothesis, system-response, system-completeness and 
design-context.  
A fault-model of self-healing system functions to identify what faults or failure to 
be self-healed including fault duration, fault source such as operational errors, 
defective system requirements or implementation errors…etc. System-response 
embraces the characteristics of fault detection, degree of degradation, fault response 
and an attempt to recovery action or compensation for a fault. Absolute restitution of 
functionality may not always be possible for a self-healing system after a fault. Such 
ability is limited by built-in redundancy in self-healing system.   
The system-completeness feature deals with actuality of knowledge perimeters, 
incompleteness in patterns and designs thereof. It also deals with the problem of 
system self-knowledge and system evolution. Meanwhile, system design concentrates 
on the problems of abstraction level, component-level homogeneity, system linearity, 
system-scope, pre-deterministic behaviors, and user involvement aspects [66], [67].  
Self-healing systems have been developed primarily as a result of the lacks of other 
techniques, whether in separation or combination, to present an adequate solution to 
the problem of software reliability. In particular, self-healing techniques attempt to hit 
equilibrium between reliability, assurance, and performance; where performance 
generally is an inverse relationship to the first two. 
The main difference between self-healing, and the traditional fault-tolerant 
architectures and techniques are that, the former aims to identify and remove the 
origin cause of the fault, while the latter generally only brings the system to a state 
from which it can resume execution. Thus, while fault-tolerant systems can be viewed 
as primarily geared for rarely occurring failures [61], self-healing architecture is 
combined to complement IPS for more autonomous damage repair and system 
survivability.  
2.8 Agents and Autonomous Computing 
Autonomic systems are characteristically distributed, complex, and concurrent 
systems, comprised of multiple interacting autonomic elements that often exhibit 
 37 
 
emergent behavior. The design and development of such systems is a non-trivial task 
that by definition requires specific software engineering approaches, including the use 
of specialized modeling techniques. An agent is a computer program that acts 
autonomously on behalf of a person or organization. Agents can be immobile, where 
they execute only on the system where it has begun implementation; or mobile, where 
it can be in motion to a remote system for implementation [68]. The main 
characteristics of agents are: 
 Intelligence: it is the capability to acclimatize to status taken by the dynamics 
of the system. 
 Cooperative behavior: it is the ability to contribute information among agents 
and/or discuss a common policy. This encompasses events that lead to an overall 
adequate performance. 
 Autonomy: it allows agents to implement tasks without users‟ interaction. An 
agent displays autonomous behavior if it is able to complete an assigned task by 
suitably choosing a strategy from a set of probable strategies. 
An agent in an autonomic system is proactive, and possesses social ability. For 
decentralized autonomous cooperative IPS and self-healing system, we use the benefit 
of those agents; this allows for exploitation of the intrinsic properties of the intrusion 
prevention and self-healing solution space and of applications in the intended 
implementation environment.  
2.9 Related Works 
It is quite necessary to conduct a thorough research and bring forward a realistic 
solution for coordinated intrusions since they have already become the major threat to 
the security of network systems. However, at present there are only a few published 
works that directly address this problem. Nevertheless, several approaches for 
intrusion detection system that are based on ideas of the human immune system and 
agent paradigm have been developed.  
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Morton S. in [69] presented the idea of danger model to autonomic defense systems. 
Danger model of computer immune system and its application to attack defense, 
create a fully decentralized model. The main models are co-stimulation using both 
indications of an attack (knowledge-based or behavior based) with indication of real 
danger or damage. Using these two detection models enables the probability of an 
autoimmune feedback in the active defense network to be reduced.  
 Morton also looked at the characteristics of malware that are most important 
because they cause damages. He defined the vector characteristics for some given 
types of malwares. The article discussed the limitation of digital immune system and 
the performance of discrimination between “self” and “nonself”, and the significance  
of using danger theory model, which relies on danger signals from injured cell to 
activate the immune cells (T-cell) and thereby the appropriates B-cells to eliminate 
the antigen. Concept of ”self “ and “nonself” is still contained in the danger model, 
albeit in diminished role.  
Danger theory assumes that the immune system uses both the sense of self and the 
immunological memory i.e. it inherits the concept of signature aging, but combines 
with the danger signals in a new form of co-stimulation in order to respond to the 
threat. The author realized that co-stimulation through a signal that identifies the 
threat as dangerous is required to confirm an attack. He used trust danger sensor to be 
false positive free by design, and to deliver specific information about the attack to 
confirm its authenticity. The single sensor provides two signals: one for general 
detection and one for specific evidence. The model proposed by Morton did not deal 
with password-guessing attack specifically. 
All together, the model has been successful to produce a system defense that 
avoids most drawbacks of central analysis and deployment, and at the same time, it is 
able to deal with problems of autoimmunity, if sensors are correctly designed and 
deployed. However, the model still needs to be implemented at larger scale to validate 
the applicability of the danger model in autonomic network defense.  
In [70] the research has outlined a comprehensive workflow for the model with 
the use of agents and commercial off-the-shelf products to work together to counter 
malware. The new idea in this work is in providing a self-healing system that is 
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outside the software architectural descriptive handling (while avoiding the 
weaknesses of the current models); which utilizes the achievements of the market 
security products to provide a complete self-healing package from malware in a 
controlled environment. The research has provided the ground for a complete 
implementation of a product which can handle programs considered untrustworthy. 
The agent uses techniques such as sandboxing, processing priority and bandwidth 
control to quarantine the malicious code and prevent it from spreading. 
Another model of network intrusion detection based on artificial immune system 
and mobile agent paradigms was presented by Azzedine. B and Renato B .M [71]. 
The structure of the model is based upon registries signature analysis using both 
syslog-ng and logcheckunix tool. The tasks of monitoring, distributing intrusion 
detection workload, storing relevant information, and ensuring data persistence and 
reactivity are carried out by the mobile agents to improve the security of complex 
computer communication networks, which represent the leukocytes of an artificial 
immune system.  
The presented model is a real time based intrusion detection and communication. 
It is host based and adopts the anomaly detection paradigm. The intrusion detection 
tasks are distributed among a number of computer hosts in order to improve accuracy, 
and thereby allowing the implementation of distributed detection scheme. The IDS 
system generates three groups of data according to the type of network intrusion 
detection: attacks, security violations, and security events. The system is based upon 
the anomaly detection paradigm while it continuously monitors activity registries. It 
has both passive and active post detection behavior.  
The system uses mobile agents which are dependent only on their execution 
environments and can be designed as an integral component of an intrusion detection 
system. They have task oriented functions and can be updated dynamically. The 
results showed that the average anomalous event percentage is around 8.5%. The 
average false positive was 80.82% and the true positive was 19.8%.  
A scalable system that makes use of automated worm detection and intrusion 
prevention to stop the spread of computer viruses and internet worms using extensible 
hardware components distributed throughout a network is described in [72]. The 
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contribution of their work is in the management and configuration of large numbers 
of distributed and extensible IPSs which, decreases the rate at which worms and 
viruses spread. They implemented active network management software and 
extensible hardware systems that can work together in order to protect high-speed 
networks from fast outbreaks of new internet worm and viruses. Their system can be 
used to stop an attack and prevent a worm from spreading; this type of protection can 
be provided with minimal impact on overall network performance.  
Robert L. Fanelli presented a hybrid model for network intrusion detection that 
combines artificial immune system methods with conservative information security 
methods [73]. The Network Threat recognition with Immune Inspired Anomaly 
Detection or NetTRIIAD model incorporates misuse-based intrusion detection and 
network monitoring applications into an innate immune capability inspired by the 
immunological Danger Model. NetTRIIAD demonstrates recital improvements over a 
conventional, misuse based network intrusion detection system. The NetTRIIAD 
model builds upon trusted information security tools, preserving their effectiveness 
while providing improved performance with the addition of immune inspired 
components. The positive predictive value of the model was 0.65 which is an 
improvement from the current widely used intrusion detection system SNORT which 
is 0.38. The model also has improved in reducing the percentage of the false positive 
events. 
 The present work looks for extending NetTRIIAD to move beyond threat 
recognition and include automated threat response, which would be a step closer 
towards a computer immune system and would benefit from the improved positive 
predictive value. The features in a NetTRIIAD antigen contain sufficient information 
to create firewall rules to block or shape the associated traffic. Such work could 
extend the adaptive immune metaphor beyond T-cell activation, adding elements 
inspired by B-cells and antibody production. Improvements to the danger model 
signal generators, possibly to examine additional external data sources, could gather 
better evidence of threats and improve detection. Similarly, a mechanism for accurate 
reactions to “dangerous self”, suggested by the Danger Model, would permit 
NetTRIIAD to recognize threats hidden in „normal‟ network traffic. This can be 
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possible by using the danger theory as a basis; including a prevention mechanism and 
implementing only misuse detection methodology. 
Authors in [74] presented a model of network security based upon the theory of 
artificial immune system. The concepts and formal definitions of immune cells are 
given, and dynamic evaluative equations for self, antigen, immune tolerance, mature-
lymphocyte lifecycle and immune memory, and the hierarchical and distributed 
management framework are used to provide an effective solution for network 
intrusion. Furthermore, the inspiration of dynamic immunological observation phase 
is applied for enhancing the self-learning ability to adapt continuously to a variety of 
environments. Their model has the features of real-time processing that provides a 
promising solution for network surveillance. Agent paradigm is used to implement the 
model, but no response is taken to prevent or heal the intrusion harmful behaviors. 
In [75], the author put forward the design and implementation of an agent-based 
system, constructed using Java Agent Development Framework (JADE), in which the 
agent‟s main task is detecting vulnerabilities and exposures. Each agent can exchange 
knowledge with others in order to determine if certain suspicious situations are 
actually part of an attack; this procedure allows them to warn each other about 
possible threats. In this system, the external source of vulnerabilities is used to keep 
the agent system updated, The Internet Categorization of Attacks Toolkit (ICAT) 
Meta base, where a search index of vulnerabilities in computerized systems, is used 
by the authors. The ICAT binds the users to the diverse public databases of 
vulnerabilities as well as patch sites, thus allowing us to find and to repair the existing 
vulnerabilities in a given system. ICAT is not a proper database of vulnerabilities, but 
an index pointing to some reports of vulnerabilities as well as the information about 
patches currently available. The system uses agent platforms allocated through the 
network to scan and interact with each host. The information collected by each agent 
is then used to build a common knowledge base. The model did not include any 
mapping from the immune system techniques. 
Begnum and Burgess [76] introduced a design for an immune inspired intrusion 
detection system that combines cfengine and PH. They were motivated by the need to 
offer a better, decentralized feedback mechanism for the pH system, and enhanced 
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detection capabilities for cfengine, as well as the necessity to accumulate more 
detailed data for extended research. By integrating the signals from both systems, they 
wished to provide a more robust, accurate and scalable anomaly detection system. 
Their approach is to combine the two systems that aim the possibility of using the 
pH/cfengine combination to provide an automated reaction method, one that is able to 
destroy abnormal processes. 
A hybrid IDS that combines pure anomaly detection with the provision of higher-
level information about the detected anomalies is proposed in [77]. The key feature 
and novelty of their system is the use of separate components for anomaly detection 
and attack classification. Detection is about recognizing that a connection is 
anomalous, while classification is about determining the broad attack type of the 
connection. The advantage of using separate components is that in the first stage, the 
system is able to perform pure anomaly detection. This approach should be contrasted 
with the misuse based approach that looks for signatures of known attacks, since such 
systems cannot detect attacks for which a signature is not present. The attack 
detection rate in their approach is on anomaly attacks only, since the use of anomaly 
detection may provide a further advantage against such attacks. Finally, the technique 
by Simon T. P and Jun. H did not include any technique for prevention or healing of 
intrusion abnormal activities. 
A distributed intrusion detection system by Wong [68] is a self-monitoring system 
to identify corrupted intrusion detection system. One way of self-monitoring in IDS is 
to verify each other. Mobile agents can do this using an immunity-based diagnostic 
method modeled on idiotypic network theory. In simulations, the credibility of a 
normal intrusion detection system remains near 1, while it will fall to about 0 for 
corrupted intrusion detection system, thus enabling identification of the latter. He also 
confirmed what effects some parameters have on the diagnostic capability. Wong has 
shown that the most noteworthy advantage of the multiagent paradigm is its ability to 
scale and adapt to the properties of the decentralized autonomous cooperative system 
(DACS). Through dynamic changes in behavior of individual agents or the agent 
population at large, an agent-based DACS will be able to sustain constant 
performance under a variety of possibly adverse conditions. 
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Alexander Krizhanovsky presented an approach to an Intrusion Prevention System 
(IPS), encouraged by the Danger Theory of immunology and tried to solve this 
problem by analyzing more sources of information [12]. His work showed how to link 
the entities which contribute in the interactions described by this theory with 
components of the operating system for synthesizing of IPS. He also introduced a 
technique inspired by the clonal selection mechanism of the HIS  which links the 
anomaly behavior of system processes with received network traffic, and able to  
generate new signatures of network intrusions on the fly. His work was too simple 
heuristically, which needs significant improvements. Also, it is not so clear as how to 
observe processes created by the suspended running of programs via atd (run jobs 
queued for later execution in linux) and family. His model, also, did not include the 
healing mechanism.  
The researchers in [78], [79] presented a detection system that detects abnormal 
behavior nodes in a mobile ad-hoc network based on AIS model. Their AIS integrates 
adaptive-based negative selection with an innate detection mechanisms inspired by 
the danger model. Danger signals, in their studies, are dreadful conditions in network 
communication quality computed by the whole of packet defeat, are used to specify 
normal antigen for use during negative selection training phase and as a co-
stimulatory signal to trigger adaptive immune cells. They assessed their AIS on a 
network simulation, which generated confident results and indicated that their danger 
signal was powerful to reduce the number of false positive rates to 0.001-0.003.   
Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA), which is based on the observed function of 
natural DCs, was initially presented in [13], [80], [81].The purpose of DCA is to 
correlate disparate data-stream in the form of antigens and signals, and to label groups 
of identical antigens as „normal‟ or anomalous. This algorithm is population based 
with each „cell‟ expressed as an agent. The DCA presents how anomalous a group of 
antigens is, not simply if a datum is anomalous or not. This is accomplished by 
associating a time series of input signals with a group of antigens. The signals used 
are prenormalized and preclassified data sources, which imitate the behavior of the 
system being monitored. The co-occurrence of antigen and high/low signal values 
forms the basis of classification for the antigen data [4]. The DCA has greater 
confidence on the signal processing aspect by using multiple signal models. DCA 
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uses expert knowledge to assign input signals to the appropriate category. The DCA 
also achieves anomaly detection with a comparatively low rate of false positive 
errors. DCA needs investigation methods for automated signals selection and other 
time-dependent data. 
The Toll- like receptor „TLR‟ algorithm is based on two populations of interacting 
cells namely DCs and T-cells. DCs implemented in TLR collect antigens from 
antigen store, and process signals. In TLR, DCs are created as immature detectors and 
sample signals, and antigens for a finite period. If DC receives a signal during antigen 
collection, it is termed as mature, and conversely, DCs that did not detect the presence 
of a signal are termed as semi mature. Once a DC life is complete, the cell is 
transferred to a „lymph node‟ in which it is compared against a population of T- cells. 
The same representation as the antigen, presented by the DC population specifically 
T-cells, are entrusted to sensors known as “receptors”. The T-cell receptor is 
responsible for the matching and interaction with DCs generated during the training 
phase. T-cells have two states: activated if a matching antigen is presented by mature 
DC, or deleted if a matching antigen is presented by a semi-mature DCs. If the 
populations of T cells are activated, anomalies are detected. The signal used in TLR 
are referred to as danger signals, implying signals which may represent „damage‟. 
TLR has been exposed to give an improved performance over negative selection. This 
incorporates a marked reduction in false positive errors in contrast to a pure negative 
selection-based approach. The core features of TLR is its requirement for training 
data  performed  on multiple types of cell agent which appears to add an extra element 
of tolerance to the generation of false positive errors. However, training data can be 
difficult to collect. Both algorithms contain the concept of „tissue‟. Both carry out a 
kind of temporal association between signals and antigens, and both consist of DCs 
performing a computational task [56], [80]. 
S. Liu et al. [82] introduced an immune multi-agent active defense model for 
network intrusion. The model presented has gained some of the IDPS design features. 
First, the model has self-learning feature where the model can detect the memory 
mechanisms of both known and unknown attacks. Second, a multi-layer feature that 
gives the notion that a vaccine has been captured, and the active defense is achieved 
in different layers and nodes. Third, the real-time defense feature where the model 
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can quantitatively assess the danger status faced by the network. Finally, a robust 
feature that the model uses as distributed architecture, so that the attack on a single 
node cannot influent the others. The results obtained show that this model changes the 
isolated and inactive status in traditional network security models. It is a worthy 
solution to founding dynamic defense for the network security. 
2.10 Chapter Summary 
The critical services, intrusion prevention system, human immune system, self-
healing system and multiagent concepts and mechanisms have been studied and 
analyzed. In this review, we have discussed the security needs of critical services 
networks. High performance of IPS can be a desirable security system for critical 
services networks, which can be accomplished by fulfilling the requirements of IPS 
design features. Meanwhile, the IPS must be distributed as a hybrid system i.e. host-
based and network system. This hybrid system must integrate the anomaly and misuse 
methodologies of IPS. The mechanisms and features of HIS have been studied and 
HIS has been found to have good metaphor mechanism for IPS and for meeting the 
criteria mentioned earlier. The self-healing mechanism is discussed as an 
enhancement feature of the system to recover from harmful events. The study of 
multiagent system has provided direction towards accomplishing the criteria of 
autonomous and decentralized IPS, and self-healing system. Finally, the related works 
of other developers and researchers have also been studied and discussed. Those 
related works cover different aspects of IPS, AIS, and self-healing algorithms, 
mechanism, techniques, and point of views to HIS. Based on this discussion, the 
analysis, abstract model and specification for the proposed system are established in 











BIOLOGICAL INSPIRED INTRUSION PREVENTION AND  
SELF-HEALING SYSTEM (BIIPSS) ANALYSIS AND ABSTRACTION 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter investigates and analyzes the abstraction model of the IPS and self- 
healing system. This investigation and abstract derivation are later used in designing 
an efficient IPS and self-healing system. In this work, we are following the derivation 
model used in artificial immune system proposed by [83]. In order to construct and 
derive a biological abstract model of the IPS, first, analysis of the IPS techniques and 
methodologies is required in order to specify the appropriate methodology and 
technique. 
Secondly, we have to select which immune mechanisms are suitable for achieving 
the requirements of high performance IPS. This is followed by the features that need 
to be mapped from the human immune system to IPS, before arriving at a new 
conceptual framework for developing a new artificial immune system. Then, the 
model for IPS and self-healing system is developed using the new abstract artificial 
immune system. 
3.2Comparison between IPS Techniques and IPS Methodologies 
In chapter two, we have defined the techniques and methodologies that are currently 
being implemented in IPSs. To build a robust IPS, we make a comparison between 
the techniques and methodologies for IPS detection and prevention. The comparisons 
between IPS techniques are shown in appendix A.2. As shown in the TableA.1, there 
are three different techniques: host-based, network-based and network behavior 
analysis. The comparisons have been made based upon four criteria: the monitored 
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information, components required by each technique, security capabilities and 
management techniques. In Table A.2 Appendix A.2, we compare the methodologies 
of IPS system based on effectiveness, methods and limitations. 
To achieve the design features mentioned in chapter 1, we built our model based 
on the criteria that combine host based and network based techniques into a hybrid 
IPS. By using hybrid techniques, we manage to capture high security capabilities and 
cover the scalability design feature. Meanwhile, misuse detection and anomaly based 
detection methodologies are applied by default when immune system features are 
mapped to IPS; this contributes to reducing the false alert, which is one of the main 
objectives of this study. Throughout this chapter, we will discuss how we determine 
the technology and methodology that are suitable for validation of the search 
objectives. 
3.3 Derivations of Abstraction Model for IPS and SH 
The derivation of the abstract model follows the proposed conceptual framework for 
artificial immune system presented in [83] and Susan Stepeny et al. [84]. The authors 
in [84] have suggested that bio inspired algorithms to be built and analyzed in the 
perspective of a multidisciplinary conceptual framework that presents biological 
models and well-analyzed principles. Figure 3.1 shows a probable arrangement for 
such a conceptual framework. 
In the framework, the probe like inspection and experiment are used to afford a 
sight of the complex biological system. A straightforward abstract representation 
model of the biology can be built and authenticated using this sight.  
 
Figure 3.1: A Conceptual Framework for Biologically Inspired Algorithms [84 ]  
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From these biological models, we build and authenticate the analytical computational 
framework. Authentication may use mathematical analysis, benchmarking and 
engineering demonstrators. These frameworks provide the principle for designing and 
analyzing bio-inspired algorithms applicable to non-biological problems. To follow 
these frameworks, many questions in the research area have been suggested based 
upon the design features that are thought to affect complex behavior of the proposed 
system in general. These areas are related to Candidness, Diversity, Interaction, 
Structure and Scale (CDISS). Now we can briefly make a relationship between the 
design features and the CDISS.  
Candidness:  The communication between the immune system and the host is of 
one carriage system in a dynamic equilibrium coupled to an ever-changing 
environment. This biological feature is related to the design features: autonomy and 
self-organizing. This is mapped to distribution feature of the proposed IPS as a hybrid 
system i.e. host-based and network-based, and they can apply self-organizing design 
feature when using agents. As mentioned in section 2.5.2, chapter 2, this feature is 
mapped from the innate immune system that presents the mechanisms for controlling 
dynamic allocation of resources among of population of the agent‟s design feature i.e. 
distribution. 
Diversity: The type and state of the human immune cell and receptor cell are 
diverse. The innate and adaptive immune systems have different sets of cells to guide 
the stimulation of distinct groups of functionally similar agents. The proposed IPS 
design feature: diversity and light weight.  
Interaction: The innate and adaptive immune systems show how computation is 
largely communication, with immunity arising from cytokine network of signaling 
interaction between intercommunicating tissue cells. Both immune cells are specialist 
to access different informational levels. IPS design features: multilayered, 
adaptability, and self- organizing. 
Structure: The innate immune system is composed of distinct subsystems. 
Function similarities can be seen between the innate and adaptive immune 
subsystems. At the same time, they are composed of interacting populations of human 
agents. Cells differentiation pathway provide an even more fine grained division of 
cells into types. IPS design features: self-organizing, distribution, and self-repair. 
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Scale: A diverse population of huge number of cells is the main feature of the 
immune system. One of the challenges in developing AISs is the need to simulate 
large population of agents. The utilization of emergent properties from different 
population of large numbers of simple agents, rather than a smaller number of more 
complex agents, along with distributed and parallel architectures for AISs may 
provide a way forward [85], [86]:IPS design features: distribution and diversity. 
Many researchers have made some great efforts to define a general AIS 
engineering framework; in [85] the authors presented a general framework for 
engineering AISs. The description of this framework is shown in Figure 3.2. The 
application domain manipulates the representation of the AIS. They recommended  
shape-space representation, where the problem domain  basically stands for  different 
patterns  named antigens which the AIS cooperates with using its own set of patterns 
termed antibodies. The extent of relationship between antigens and antibodies is 
assessed using a number of different possible affinity measures. Immune algorithms, 
using this problem representation, model specific immune mechanisms which control 
the production of antibodies. AIS solutions can be built in for the application domain 
by following the three steps: engineering framework of representation, affinity 
measures and immune algorithms.  
 
Figure 3.2: Layered Framework for Engineering AIS [85] 
To develop the abstract IPS and SH model, we follow the steps detailed in Figure 
3.3. The steps outlined in this figure implement integration between the conceptual 
framework and framework of engineering AIS. From this integration, we aim to 
present a new conceptual framework for AIS. The abstract metaphor model is then 
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established. The design specification and algorithms of the model that will be 
discussed in the next chapter will complement the abstract representation of the 
system. 
 
Figure 3.3: Development of Abstract Model of IPS and SH 
3.4 Why Abstract and Engineering Frameworks 
When starting to analyze the inspiration of IPS and SH from the human immune 
system to obtain the abstract model, we realize that it is important to find a standard 
framework for abstracting immune inspired computational metaphor. This necessity 
has motivated many researchers to follow and develop a conceptual framework for 
AIS. In our study, we follow most of the conceptual framework described by [84], 
[80]; in addition, we also introduce some improvements to the framework due to 
some reasons which are discussed below.  
A multidisciplinary field: The AIS is a multidisciplinary field that needs the 
knowledge of computer science, mathematics, physics, biology, immunology, and 
other inspiring fields. Therefore, the research in this area is comparatively difficult 
and has been rather slow to develop. It requires repeated learning cycles at various 
stages. Therefore, it is important to know the sequences of the research in hand 
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through an appropriate framework. This will be useful in the search for fundamental 
multidisciplinary knowledge and minimize idleness along the way in AIS research. 
Inexpert computational model: Artificial immune system is a relatively new 
branch of application in the field of computation. At present, this area is suffering 
from the lack of obvious guidelines for abstracting descriptions; therefore, the growth 
of the field is relatively slow. We believe that certain distinguished aspects of 
experienced frameworks for abstracting AIS descriptions can be integrated to get a 
good general framework. Our framework might be considered a useful contribution in 
this regard. This framework might be capable of providing guidelines to future 
developers of AIS. 
Pass up the unnecessary: During this study and research investigation, we have 
discovered that it is actually complicated to maintain stability of multidisciplinary 
knowledge in one model. At one time, we find ourselves tending more on biology, 
while at other times more on computation and less consideration of mathematical 
derivation. We reduce this gap between biology and computing by introducing a new 
framework that puts computational model in consideration. 
Important requirements: Considering that what we are looking for is important 
i.e. the aim of the model and requirements, we will have to concentrate on the 
boundaries of the multidisciplinary knowledge that are closer to the metaphor. A 
high-quality framework must underline what is necessary of high quality metaphor 
through related knowledge in multidisciplinary areas. Therefore, an appropriate 
framework will guide us to concentrate on the most urgent requirements for 
abstracting the metaphor. 
Prefect control of framework development: It is quite inadequate to control and 
manage things without having prior experience in the field. We have developed a 
framework that improves the research process management and control. It should also 
be helpful for abstracting more than one metaphor at a time. This dictates the 
scalability of the framework. 
Systematic development and faster inspiration: Due to improvements in the 
process of abstraction through framework guidelines, we expect a good metaphor in 
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relatively less time. A good metaphor will need less alteration efforts subsequently. 
This will save the researcher‟s time. This might also result in a number of good 
metaphors from are searcher or team of researchers. The framework must provide a 
way of knowledge and experience sharing. This kind of knowledge sharing is vital for 
the growth of multidisciplinary research like AIS. We have spent a significant amount 
of time for AIS metaphor abstraction. This framework will help avoid a reinvention of 
the wheel through knowledge sharing. 
Developing the area of AIS science: To develop new framework is a contribution 
for AIS science. Any developers can obtain their own new experience through the 
newty of this framework. Our work is expected to give new impact in AIS research.  
The foregoing discussions are the motivation for this research and for contributing 
the proposed framework. In the next section, we will demonstrate the steps involved 
in developing our new abstract framework. These steps are grouped to introduce a 
new multidisciplinary framework for new AIS applications. 
3. 5 Observation of Biological System 
The first step towards obtain the abstract model is to observe a suitable biological 
system from which we can draw some inspiration for the IPS and SH security 
systems. From an overview of the human immune system presented in chapter 2, we 
concluded that it is possible to achieve the design requirements of IPS and self-
healing system by constructing an abstract model with mechanisms inspired by the 
integration of innate and adaptive immune systems, more specifically dendritic cell, 
T-cell, and B-cell based on danger signal model among these three cells. The three 
mechanisms are analyzed and how they cooperate to defend the human body from the 
aspect of candidness and diverse features mentioned above. For the IPS and SH 
system, we will introduce IPS immune agents that will work in the same manner as  
specific HIS cells defending the human body; the immune agents will be responsible 
for defending critical network systems that must have high security services. Next, we 
study immunology based on the danger theory as the second step towards developing 
the abstract model. 
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3.6 Immunology Based on Danger Theory 
The approach of using Danger Theory is to understand the intrusion detection and 
prevention mechanisms in HIS and to capture the fundamental nature of these 
mechanisms through an abstraction process. In order to construct such immune-
inspired IPS algorithms, the understanding of correlations of signals processed by the 
DCs of innate immune system, which includes characterization of the danger signals, 
is the key prerequisite. In this section, we have summarized the main principles of the 
Danger Theory which is used as the starting point for our work. These principles 
could be used for designing an intrusion prevention system. In the model, we have 
concentrated on the three mechanisms: DCs, T-cells and B-cells, which are 
considered as the key agents within the Danger Theory. In sections 2.5.2 and 2.6, we 
have discussed how the DCs in the innate immune system receive and input signals. 
Table 3.1summarizes the definitions and causes of these signals [15], [80], [81]. 
Table 3.1: Signals Definition in Innate Immune System 
Signal Definition 
Safe A result of normal cell death i.e. death for regulatory 
reasons. 
Danger A consequence of unintended necrotic cell death. The 




Pathogen - associated molecular proteins(PAMP), an 
indication of an anomalous state detectable by DCs. 
Protein expressed exclusively by bacteria. 
Inflammation The outcome of injury which amplifies the above three 
signals but is insufficient to stimulate DCs alone. 
 
DCs collect the antigens whilst being exposed to environmental signal molecules 
by cell death and other events. The combination of signals determines the interaction 
with T-cells. T-cells process the information handed over by DCs and they are either 
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 being cloned or die subsequently. Meanwhile, by using receptors on their surface, B-
cells combine to antigens (they identify antigens) with a strong affinity above the 
threshold (there are two different levels of affinity between epitopes on the antigen 
surface and the receptors of the B-cell, below and above the threshold 
correspondingly). Upon activation, they secrete specific antibodies that distinguish 
and react with the proper antigens. If they bind to antigens with a weak affinity, i.e. 
below the threshold, they need help (co-stimulation) from T-helpers (a kind of T-
cells) for activation. The second type of T-cells, T-killers destroy cells which are 
infected by intracellular parasite. T-helpers are also needed for the activation of T-
killers. T-cells are therefore co-stimulated from both B-cells and DCs [15], [81], [87]-
[89]. We look at the integration between innate and adaptive system as a suitable 
metaphor for creating an autonomous IPS. An overview of the different danger 
signals, which are immune system reaction on pathogens, can be simplified into a 
model with four types of signals as shown in Figure 3.4. Pathogen that has damaged 
the cell sends danger signal zero “PAMP” or “necrotic cell death” to DC or APC 
which may generates two signals: signal one is antigens recognition and signal two is 
co-stimulation confirmation that “this antigen is really dangerous” (danger signal). By 
receiving both signals one and two, the T-helper is activated, but it dies if it receives 
only the first signal. 
 
Figure3.4: Danger Theory Signals Model 
In this model, the T-helper can receive signal one randomly, but APC sends the 
second signal only when it receives signal zero. Whilst B-cells send signal one to T-
helper for activation, if they bind to antigens with a weak affinity i.e. below the 
threshold. The T-helper activates the T-killer by sending a four signal if it recognizes 
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an antigen presents in APC. The T-killer is able to destroy the infected cell. T-helpers 
co-stimulate B-cells if they recognize the antigens sent by B-cell with a weak affinity 
signal three [12], [80].  
To decide the exact state of differentiation, the comparative concentration of 
output signal is used; expressed by the production of two molecules, namely the 
mature and semi-mature output signals. Revelation to PAMPs, danger signals and 
safe signals causes the increased creation of co-stimulatory molecules and a follow-on 
removal from the tissue and migration to a local lymph node. DCs interpret the signal 
information received in the tissue into a context for antigen presentation, i.e. the 
antigen presented in an overall “normal” or “anomalous” context. The antigen 
collected while in the immature phase is expressed on the surface of the DC.  
Meanwhile DCs look for T-Lymphocytes (T-cells) in the lymph node and try to 
bind expressed antigen with the T-cells changeable area receptor. T-cells with a high 
enough affinity for the presented antigen are influenced by the output signals of the 
DC. DCs exposed to mainly PAMPs and danger signals are termed „mature DCs‟; 
they produce mature output signals, which activate the bound T-cells. On the 
contrary, if the DC is exposed to predominantly safe signals, the cell is termed semi-
mature and antigens are presented in a safe context as little damage is evident when 
the antigen is collected.  
The balance between the signals is interpreted via the signal processing and 
correlation ability of these cells. The overall immune system response is based on the 
average systemic maturation status of the whole DC population on a per antigen basis. 
Figure 3.5 shows the input, output, and DC states. The link between IPS and Danger 
Theory can be explained as follows. 
DCs carry out the function of antigen presentation, where distress found on cells 
or tissues are collected by DCs, processed to form antigen and presented to the 
adaptive immune system in combination with context information. The output 




Figure 3.5: Dendritic Cell States and Input-Output Signals 
produced due to the binding between antigens category and receptors. We used this 
mechanism from the innate immune system integrated with T-cell and B-cell to 
provide a new approach to intrusion prevention. Similarly, for DCs functionality, we 
observe the behaviors of network traffic in the form of a system call sequences or 
input data packet, and consider the antigens for the attributes and features  such as 
network protocol headers, and port and socket as good categories with parameters. 
When the attributes, features and parameters are changed i.e. the data are subjected to 
abnormal behavior, then a danger alert is produced and prevention must established. 
Otherwise, the normal behavior is maintained and the network system will continue 
receiving the data packet or system calls. This is mapped from the Danger Theory 
model where the DC produces two signals: danger and safe in two different 
maturation states (mature or immature according to the antigens). For example in the 
“system process” category, each system process has a life span like biological cells; 
the disconnection in a network system could be either normal (like apoptosis, the 
normal death of cells) or abnormal (necrosis processes). Another example is TCP 
sessions, which can also die abnormally and feel distress in the case when a segment 
for an inappropriate port is received. 
For our system, we could identify the biological cell for the category with 
parameters and processes, and antigen for any external input to the category. The 
external input could be network traffic, command line argument or environment 
variables. We can identify the 0 signal i.e. danger as the first sense of deviation from 
specific trained rules, T-helper for process behavior analyzing module or for scanning 
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 the port or socket. Similar to signal activation from T-helper to T-killer (to kill 
pathogen cells), the module with first sense of deviation can generate activation 
signals to prevent intrusions that might stop access to the network system and block 
the network traffic. In Figure 3.6, we compare the similarities between human organ 
and network system for different critical services. 
 
Figure 3.6: Human Body Organ and Network System Components 
The sensitivity of each process category in the system is determined during the 
learning and training period. It is possible to increase the accuracy of intrusion 
detection and prevention by associating received network with categories behavior. If 
we add a direct call or categories flag, and features for any unspecified program to the 
legitimate user signature, false positive alerts will be prevented. Similarly, in many 
cases, by adding rules for accessing any system or connection to the signature, false 
negative alerts can be avoided. 
During the training and rules learning period for network traffic, we have to 
identify the type of signature whether it is normal or dangerous signature. This is one 
of the similarities between HIS and IPS. When there is any activation of danger signal 
i.e. detection of intrusion like T-killer, the intrusion will be prevented immediately by 
the network traffic either by blocking or by disconnecting the network connection. A 
relationship between behavior category and network traffic makes dynamic 
generation of network signatures possible by clonal selection mechanism. For this 
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purpose, we classify danger zone as a combination of network received by observed 
categories and time, during which traffic is monitored.  
This link properties mapped to IPS and SH multiagent system. First, the sense 
agent (DCs), based upon sensing the traffic, will produce signal 0 to the sense module 
(T-killer) to prevent the abnormal behavior, and immediately produces signal 1 to the 
analysis agent (T-helper), which in turn sends out signal 2 to the adaptive agent (B-
cell). Adaptation agent (B-cell) activates clonal selection if it receives signal 3 from 
analysis agent (T-helper). In our research, the adaptive agent will produce another 
signal 2 to the self–healing agent, which keeps continuity of the system by healing the 
failure or damages caused by the intrusion. These mechanisms, mapped from HIS to 
IPS, ensure that the required design features are applied. Table 3.2 shows the mapping 
from human body to IPS and SH system. 
Table 3.2: Mapping between Human Body and Network Systems 
IPS and SH Biological System 
Network  systems Human body 
Hosts Organs 
Security system Immune system 
SEA Agent Dendritic Cell 
Analysis Agent T-helper 
Prevention T-killer 
Adaptive agent B-cell 
Self-healing Agent Cell-regeneration 
Data features Proteins 
Classification features Antigens 
Abnormal behavior Pathogens and damaged cell 
Data classes Signals 
Multi layer IPS and SH system  Multi layer immune system 
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3.7 Autonomic Systems Properties and Approaches 
The proposal for the abstract model is presented in this section. One of our main 
design features and research objectives  is to  develop  an autonomous IPS with SH. 
Autonomic computing is a term first used by IBM in 2001 [89], [90] to describe 
computing systems that were said to be self-managing. Nevertheless, the concept of 
self-management and adaptation in computing systems has been around for some 
time. In the current state-of-the art in autonomic systems, the concept of self-
management is usually set into having four essential properties: self-configuration, 
self- optimization, self-healing and self-protection. 
Autonomic computing arises due to the need to reduce cost and complexity of 
owning and operating an IT infrastructure. A brief description of those properties 
given by J.O. Kephart et al. [19] is presented here.  
• Self-configuration: An autonomic computing system configures itself according 
to high-level goals, i.e. by specifying what is most wanted, but not necessarily how to 
achieve it. This can mean being able to install itself based on the needs of a given 
platform and the user. 
• Self-optimization: An autonomic computing system optimizes its use of 
resources. It may decide to initiate/introduce a change to the system proactively (as 
opposed to reactive behavior) in an attempt to improve performance. 
• Self-healing: An autonomic computing system detects and diagnoses problems. 
The type of problems detected can be interpreted broadly: they can be as low level as 
a bit-error in a memory chip (hardware failure) or as high-level as an erroneous entry 
in a directory service (software problem). However, the significant aspect is that as a 
result of the healing process the system is not further harmed. Fault-tolerance is an 
important characteristic of self-healing. Typically, an autonomic system is said to be 
reactive to failures or early signs of a possible failure. 
• Self-protection: An autonomic system protects itself from malicious attacks but 
also from end users who inadvertently make software changes, e.g. by deleting an 
important file. The system autonomously tunes itself to achieve security privacy, and 
data protection. Thus, security is an important aspect of self-protection, not just in 
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software, but also in hardware. A system may also be able to anticipate security 
breaches and prevent them from occurring in the first place. 
Self-management requires that a system monitors its components (internal 
knowledge) and its environment (external knowledge), so that it can adapt to changes 
that may occur, which may be known changes or unexpected changes where a certain 
amount of artificial intelligence may be required. The approaches to autonomic 
computing system are classified orthogonally into two categories: intelligent 
multiagent systems and architecture design-based autonomic systems. In this 
research, the multiagent architecture is used to achieve the main design feature of our 
proposed bio inspired intrusion prevention and self-healing system. 
Complex autonomic systems that are not composed of a single self-managing 
component can be built using multiagent. Every agent has its own goals, which drive 
its decisions. An agent in an autonomic system is proactive, and possesses social 
ability. The latter can potentially lead to instabilities of the overall system due to 
chain reaction of agents instructing other agents to change behavior. Moreover, it is 
complicated and not easy to define the individual goals of the agents such that the 
desired global goals of the system under development are accomplished [68], [92]. In 
an autonomic system, we want to be able to provide goals in the form of high-level 
notions, and expect the agents themselves to determine what behavior is necessary to 
reach these goals. 
Multiagent system is the proper technique for studying immunology because: 
first, the agent behaviors can straight forwardly incorporate biological facts about 
low-level components, even if they cannot be expressed mathematically. Second, 
information from multiple experiments can be combined into a single simulation, to 
test for consistency across experiments or to identify gaps in our knowledge. Finally, 
the immune system is a multifaceted biological system with many diverse interacting 
mechanisms, and many biologically related values that cannot be measured directly. 
In our model, in order to accomplish an autonomous and decentralized IPS and 
self-healing system, three techniques have been integrated namely DCs, T-cells and 
B-cells mechanisms, which form the intelligent multiagent system. The incorporation 
of agents in IPS allows the features of candidness, diverse, scale and structures to be 
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accomplished. The multiagent system for IPS and SH represents the abstract model 
for engineering framework of AIS. 
3.8 Autonomous IPS and SH Abstract Model 
Following the conceptual frameworks for AIS, we develop an abstract model for 
intrusion prevention and self-healing based on a biological system, namely the human 
immune system. At this stage, we will deduce the abstract model from the 
observations and probings of the organs and cells of HIS from the previous sections. 
As mentioned before, in order to achieve the design features and to accomplish the 
requirements of our new IPS and SH system, the mechanisms of the system are 
inspired from the mechanisms of the Dendritic cell, T-cell and B-cell. The proposed 
model consists of three layers of multiagent system combined with self–healing 
mechanism.  
The model that has been developed can be considered as a hybrid model that 
integrates host-based with network based IPS techniques. The IPS and SH system can 
be resided to monitor both network traffic and each individual host, but the difference 
lies in the type of data monitored. As explained in section 2.4.2, the same model is 
applied to both techniques but using different types of detected input data.  
A host-based IPS monitors the characteristics of a single host and the events 
occurring within that host for suspicious activity. Host-based IPSs provide a variety 
of security capabilities such as logging of data related to detected events. This data 
can be used to settle the validity of alerts, to inspect incidents, and to correlate events 
between the host-based IPS and other logging sources. A network-based IPS monitors 
network traffic by scrutinizing network fragments or devices and analyzing network, 
transport, and application protocols to identify suspicious activity. Network-based 
IPSs typically offer extensive and broad detection capabilities. Most network-based 
IPSs use a combination of signature-based detection, anomaly-based detection, and 




One of the paradigms in autonomous system is multiagent system which, is a self-
governing system. The agents will have a training phase of alert settings to produce 
alerts in principle messages between the agents. These messages can contain the 
features and information about abnormal behavior at the instance of detection. In 
traditional IPS, code viewing and editing are the needed customization features, 
where some IDS and IPS technologies permit administrators to see some or all of the 
detection-related code. This is usually limited to signatures, but some technologies 
allow administrators to see additional codes, such as programs used to perform 
stateful protocol analysis. Viewing the code can help analysts to determine why a 
particular alert is generated, and is helpful for validating alerts and identifying false 
positives.  
The proposed system is designed in such a way that the information is extracted 
autonomously by detection and prevention action taken immediately. Once an event is 
detected, an alert will be sent to an analysis agent in a formulation of agent messages. 
From the information in the message, the analysis agent has to specify whether the 
abnormal activities are either a misuse or an anomaly by searching in the knowledge 
base. All the procedures of getting the information and alerts are performed 
autonomously between the agents. The self-healing component uses the information 
analyzed by the IPS component to specify the damage caused by the intrusion. This 
feature stops the spread of malicious activities and maintains system continuity. The 
cooperation among mechanisms mapped from HIS are effective in the intrusion 
detection prevention, and specification of an intrusion route for the network security 
[93]. 
In Figure 3.7 the abstract design and model components of IPS and self-healing 
system are shown. The main agent components of our IPS model are: sense agent 
(SEA), analysis agent (ANA) and adaptive agent (ADA). Self-healing agent (SHA) is 
incorporated into the IPS as additional enhanced mechanism for self-healing 
purposes. One of the central features of the model is that it needs both expert 




Figure 3.7: IPS and SH Abstract Model 
Each agent in the model performs training on multiple types of input data within a 
specific period. However, with many unsupervised learning systems, training data can 
be difficult to collect.  
 The main aim of the model is building an expert knowledge base that assigns 
input signals and rules to appropriate category. We use two knowledgebase systems, 
one for misuse attack and the other for self-healing purposes. Each agent must 
training using the rule-based system to enable to carry out its role. In order to achieve 
the proactive, self-organizing and autonomous features of the immune system, 
multiagent paradigm is constructed. The main characteristics of agents are: intelligent, 
cooperative and autonomy. In an autonomous multiagent system, every agent has its 
own goals, which drives its decisions. The individual goals of each agent must be 
specified such that the preferred universal goals of the whole system are achieved 
[93]. The developed model has been designed to be applicable as a security check in 
order to prevent malicious attacks such as malware and code-based attacks such as 





3.9 New Conceptual Framework of Artificial Immune System 
Through our development of IPS and SH abstract model, we have integrated 
conceptual frameworks in [84] with layered framework for engineering [85] to 
introduce a new conceptual framework to develop an AIS. Figure 3.8 shows the main 
steps of this conceptual framework for development of AIS system. First, the domain 
of application needs to be specified, for example security system, robotic and 
management information system followed by objectives setting of the system. Next, 
the requirement to achieve these objectives must be established. This is followed by 
investigations and observation of a suitable biological system that would contribute 
towards achieving the objectives. 
After the probing and observations, the differences and similarities between the 
biological and computational systems must be established. These comparisons will be 
the principles in the construction of the abstract model, which needs to be proven 
mathematically. A mathematical model can be easily converted into a computational 
model and algorithm presentation. Finally, the computational model and algorithms 
must be tested and simulated to get the solution that the AIS developer looks for. The 
developer of AIS can repeat and recycle the steps from probing to simulating and 
testing to refine the results until the objectives for the new AIS are accomplished. 
 
Figure 3.8: A New Conceptual Framework for AIS Development 
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3.10 Chapter Summary 
An abstract model for a new intrusion prevention and self-healing system has been 
established in this chapter. The abstract model has been developed by making 
inferences and analyzing two conceptual frameworks developed by previous 
researches in [84],[85].The mechanisms in the abstract model has been developed by 
observing suitable mechanisms of HIS and mapping those mechanisms into the IPS 
and SH system. The features of the IPS and SH system  are derived after analyzing 
and observing the DC, B-cell and T-cell mechanisms, and finding the similarities 
between these mechanisms and the design features required for the IPS and SH 
system. 
Based on the similarities between the desired features of IPS and HIS, an abstract 
model consisting of multilayer agent system combined with SH agent has been 
constructed for the proposed IPS. Each agent has been designed based on the 
inspirations from specific mechanisms from HIS system. Thus, a new conceptual 



















BIIPSS DESIGN SPECIFICATION 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, we continue to follow our conceptual framework to establish the 
design specification for the biological intrusion prevention and self-healing system. In 
the last chapter, we have presented the abstract model of the intrusion prevention and 
self-healing system, which consists of four agents. The design and specification of the 
multiagent system as whole must be constructed to realize the robust IPS and SH 
system. In addition to that, the design and specification of each agent must be 
established so that each agent will be able to function as intended.  
4.2 The IPS and SH Architecture 
The main components of our IPS architecture are: sense detection agent (SEA), 
analysis agent (ANA) and adaptive agent (ADA). The three agents form three 
different function layers, each having specific roles, responsibilities, and interactions. 
In an autonomous multiagent system, every agent has its own goals that drive its 
decisions. The individual goals of each agent must be specified such that the preferred 
universal goals of the whole system can be achieved [68], [93]. In the paradigm of 
agent design, we have to identify the states and transitions of each agent in our 
architecture according to the design logic. This is an essential step in the designing of 
proposed IPS and SH system, which is accomplished by creating our own 
specification language. The derivation of this specification language uses the logic 
design formulation with set theory notation and Z-notation. 
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Specification language is mostly suitable to prove the logic, communication and 
mathematical model for the simulation, and implementation of IPS and SH system as 
autonomous system. 
 
4.3 IPS and SH Specification Language  
The specification language for any system needs: firstly, to apply logic and simple 
mathematics to computing; secondly, to use formulas i.e. symbols and rules; thirdly, 
to gain understanding through analysis rather than experiments i.e. testing; and   
finally, applicable to behavior or specification, structure design or “refinement” 
implementation. Specification language is most useful in projects that are new, 
difficult, or critical. Generally, any specification language is not directly executed, 
instead it describes the system at a much higher level than a programming or 
execution language because the specification is meant to describe the what, not the 
how. A common elementary hypothesis of many specification approaches is that 
programs are modeled as algebraic structures that include a collection of sets of data 
values together with functions over those sets. This level of abstraction is adequate 
with the view that the accuracy of the input/output behavior of a program takes 
precedence over all its other properties. The IPS and SH specifications must be 
focused on a process of enhancement before they can actually be implemented. The 
result of such an enhancement process is an executable algorithm, which is 
formulated either in a programming language, simulation process, or in an executable 
subset of the specification language at hand. Most specification languages: 
 Explicitly describes behavior in terms of a model using well-defined types 
(set, sequences, relations, functions) and defines operations by showing effects on the 
model. 
 Specification includes: type-syntax of object being specified, model-
underlying structure and invariant properties of modeled object, pre/post conditions 
and semantics of operations. 
In the next sub sections, we create the specification language for each agent. First, 
we categorize the roles, function and responsibilities for each agent that will enable 
the agent to attain its goals. This is followed by specifying the notation for each agent. 
These specifications are analyzed and proved using Petri net in section 4.3. The IPS 
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and SH specification language is developed by using a combination of set theory and 
Z-notation.  
All notations of the specification language for the whole system are explained in 
the table of symbol. These specifications are later used for the construction of the IPS 
and SH system with distributed immune agents that have the abilities of self-learning, 
expert knowledge, memory, work autonomously and decartelized learning. 
4.3.1 Specification of SEnse Agent (SEA) 
The main goal of the SEnse agent (SEA) is to prevent the occurrence of abnormal 
behavior in order to ensure the security of critical services network system. In order to 
achieve the goal, the SEA must be able to perform the followings: 
 Dynamically learns and trains to build a generic knowledge about the whole 
network system. In the training period, all features and flags (similar to proteins and 
antigens in HIS) and classes of data, either normal or attack (signal), are defined 
according to the specific scanning criteria. 
 Senses all input to the network system and classifies them according to the 
dataset that SEA has been trained, and then decide whether it is a source of malicious 
activities. The mechanism is analogous to the mechanism performed by dendritic and 
tissue cells to sense or capture the danger signal. 
 Prevents malicious activities upon detection of abnormal behavior. 
 Sends a detection message to ANA. 
From the definition of SEA functions above, we then specify the roles, functions 
and responsibilities of SEA using the specification language that has been developed 
earlier as follows: 
The set of roles (RSEA) of SEA is: 




The set of function (FSEA) of SEA is: 
FSEA ={features and behavior classification, block abnormal behavior}  
The set of responsibilities (PSEA) of SEA is: 
PSEA= {detect malicious activities, send DetectionMsgANA} 
Then we formalize these specifications of SEA with our specification language as 
follows: 
Consider 𝐻 as the set of hosts in a network system defined as: 
𝐻𝑛 ∷= {𝑕1 𝑕2 ,……… . . , |𝑕𝑛 },  
where; 
n is the number of host in the network system and h1, h2 …hn are n hosts. 
Next, we create the first SEA agent,   
∀ 𝑕𝑖 ∈ 𝐻𝑛   ∃  𝑆𝐸𝐴, 
where; 
hi is host i in H  and   i ∈ ℕ, 
where; ℕ is the set of natural numbers. 
Then we configure SEA to the set of features and behavior (BH) for any host 
system. The SEA is trained dynamically to familiarize the dynamic change in the 
behavior of the host system. 
∀ 𝑕𝑖   ∃    𝑏𝑕:𝐵𝐻 𝑏𝑕 ∈  𝐵𝐻𝑛𝑏 ∨ 𝐵𝐻𝑎𝑏  , 
where; 
𝐵𝐻𝑛𝑏 ∷=  𝐵𝐻𝑓 ,∀ 𝑕𝑖 ∈ 𝐻𝑛 , , 
𝐵𝐻𝑓 ∷ 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑒𝑕𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑕 𝑕𝑜𝑠𝑡 
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𝐵𝐻𝑎𝑏 =  𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′ ,∀ 𝑕𝑖 ∈ 𝐻𝑛 ,  
𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′ ∷  𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑙 𝑏𝑒𝑕𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
Then in each host, 
𝑆𝐸𝐴
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛
     𝐵𝐻. 




    DP,    
where; DP ⇔ InputData 
Here, the SEA has to perform one of two events and change the state of the input 
data (DP) into one of these two states: prevention and stop communication or 
continue the connection. If the input data at that instance is denoted by 𝐷𝑃𝑖 , according 
to the data attributes, then SEA will classify the Input Data. The definition of the 
states can be denoted by:   
State1: Prevention and block communication.  
If the attributes of 𝐷𝑃𝑖  is classified as abnormal behavior with functionBHf′ , SEA 
will prevent  𝐷𝑃𝑖 . 
 𝐼𝑓 𝐷𝑃𝑖  ∈ 𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′  , 
SEA 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡
      𝐷𝑃𝑖  
Then SEA blocks the communication (COM). 
SEA 
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘
    𝐶𝑂𝑀 
Finally, SEA sends the detection message to ANA. 
SEA 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑
     DetectionMsg”𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′ " ↑ 𝐴𝑁𝐴 
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State2:: Normal behavior and continue the connection. 
If the attributes of 𝐷𝑃𝑖  is classified as normal behavior with function 𝐵𝐻𝑓  SEA 
will continue receiving 𝐷𝑃𝑖 . 
𝐷𝑃𝑖∈𝐵𝐻𝑓  , 
The communication will continue receiving the input data. 
SEA
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒
       𝐶𝑂𝑀 
By this, the specification of the abstract model of SEnse agent (SEA) is now 
complete. 
4.3.2 Specification of ANalysis Agent (ANA) 
The main goal of the ANalysis agent (ANA) is to analyze the DetectionMsg which 
contains the abnormal behavior function and attributes. It is able to achieve the main 
goal by performing the following functions: 
 Receives DetectionMsg from SEA, and then analyzes the received information 
to extract any malicious signature. 
 Searches for a match of the signature in the misused abnormal behavior 
database. If the signature matches are cord in the database, then it is labeled as 
misused abnormal behavior. In such cases, ANA sends MisusehealMsg to SHA which 
checks the system behavior and if any abnormal activities are detected. Else, ANA 
will consider the abnormal behavior as an anomaly and sends AnomalyMsg to ADA. 
 Updates database records of detected anomalies. ANA waits for 
RecognitionMsg from ADA, which contains the recognition information of the 
anomaly, and then updates the database records. 




Using our specification language, we specify the roles, functions and responsibilities 
of ANA as follows: 
The set of roles (RANA) of the ANalysis agent ANA is: 
RANA= {analyze abnormal behavior} 
The set of functions (FANA) of the ANalysis agent ANA is: 
FANA = {distinguish misuse attack from anomaly attack, analyze attack behavior} 
The set of responsibilities (PANA) of the ANalysis agent ANA is: 
PANA= {receive DetectionMsg from SEA, send AnomalyMsg to ADA agent, 
receive RecognitionMsg  from ADA agent, call self-healing system} 
These formal specifications of ANA using our specification language are as 
follows: 
∀ 𝑕𝑖 ∈ 𝐻𝑛  ∃  𝐴𝑁𝐴 
As ANA receives the DetectionMsg from the SEA, ANA starts to analyze the 
message content and decide whether the abnormal behavior 𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′  is misuse or 
anomaly. ANA has dynamic knowledge base MD of all misuse abnormal behavior 
signatures. This can be denoted as follows:  
𝑀𝐷 ∷= {𝑚𝑎1,… . ,𝑚𝑎𝑛 }   ,  n ∈ ℕ 
where; MD is the set of misuse Abnormal behavior signatures database.  
As ANA receives DetectionMsg, it starts to scan in the MD database and compare 
if the detection message content has been included in the MD. These two events are 
denoted as follows: 
𝐴𝑁𝐴
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒
       𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑀𝑠𝑔"𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′ " ◁ ↓ SEA 
𝐴𝑁𝐴
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑛
    𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑛 "𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′ " 𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝐷  
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As a result of scanning, ANA enters into one of the following states: 
State 1:: Misuse behavior.   
 If ANA identifies the abnormal behavior 𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′ as misuse, ANA then stipulates the 
features of the misuse abnormal behavior and send a MisuehealMsg message to SHA. 
These events are denoted as follows: 
If 𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′  is Misuse abnormal behavior exist in MD,  
𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′  ∃ 𝑀𝐷, 
Then ANA stipulates the features  
𝐴𝑁𝐴
𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑧𝑒
       𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑧𝑒 "𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′ "  
Finally, ANA sends the MisuehealMsg message to SHA. 
𝐴𝑁𝐴
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑
    𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑠𝑔 ↑ 𝑆𝐻𝐴 
State 2::Anomaly abnormal behavior   
If the scanning result shows that the abnormal behavior is not in the knowledge 
base, then ANA specifies the behavior as anomaly and send AnomalyMsg, which 
contains the anomaly behavior features, to ADA. 
If the abnormal behavior 𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′ is an anomaly, i.e. it does not exist in MD, 
𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′  ∄ 𝑀𝐷 
Then, ANA sends anomaly message “AnomalyMsg” to ADA. 
𝐴𝑁𝐴
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑
    𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑀𝑠𝑔 ↑ 𝐴𝐷𝐴 
ANA waits for the recognition message “RecognitionMsg” of the anomaly abnormal 
behavior 𝑁𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′ .  
𝐴𝑁𝐴
𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡





      𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑀𝑠𝑔"𝑁𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′ " ◁ ↓ SEA 
As ANA receives the recognition message with abnormal behavior function, it 
updates the knowledge database MD. 
𝑁𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′ ∷ 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
State 3:: Updates the MD with the anomaly behavior. 
ANA analyzes the new abnormal behavior function and sends a healing message 
“AnomalyhealMsg” to SHA, 
𝐴𝑁𝐴
𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑧𝑒
       𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑧𝑒 "𝑁𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′ "  
ANA denotes the misuse abnormal behavior function. 
𝑀𝐷⨂𝑁𝐵𝐻𝑓 ′  
ANA sends the AnomalyhealMsg to SH agent  
𝐴𝑁𝐴
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑
    𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑠𝑔 ↑ 𝑆𝐻 
4.3.3 Specification of Adaptive Agent (ADA) 
The Adaptive agent ADA is specified to perform the following functions: 
 Receives the AnomalyMsg from ANA and triggers adaptation method to 
address the anomaly behavior. 
 Recognizes and registers the anomaly behavior signature. 
 Sends RecognitionMsg to ANA that identifies the anomaly abnormal behavior 
features and contains information required for knowledge database MD to register the 
anomaly behavior.  
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Based on the functions of the ADA defined above, using our specification language 
we specify the roles, functions and responsibilities of ADA as follow: 
The set of roles (RADA) of the adaptive agent ADA is: 
RADA= {adaptationToanomaly} 
The set of function (FADA) of the adaptive agent ADA is: 
FADA= {recognize anomaly} 
The set of responsibilities (PADA) of the adaptive agent ADA is: 
PADA= {anomalysignature,feedback to analysis agent } 
The specifications of ADA have been formalized using the specification language 
as follows: 
Define ADA in each host, 
∀ 𝑕𝑖 ∈ 𝐻𝑛  ∃  𝐴𝐷𝐴 
As ADA receives AnomalyMsg from ANA, ADA will start the adaptation process on 
the anomaly. 
ADA receives the anomaly message AnomalyhealMsg from ANA, 
𝐴𝐷𝐴
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒
       𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑠𝑔 ↓ 𝑆𝐻 
The features and characteristics of the anomaly abnormal behavior are formulated in 
set FC , 
Let  𝐹𝐶 ∷  𝑓𝑐   ∀  𝐵𝐻𝑎𝑏  ∃ 𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑏   ∧  𝑓𝑐𝑛𝑏 } 
Where; 
𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑏  is charataristics of the abnormal part. 
𝑓𝑐𝑛𝑏  is characteristics of the normal part. 
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    𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑏 ⊘𝑓𝑐𝑛𝑏  
ADA fixes the adaptation process, 
𝐴𝐷𝐴
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡
       𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑏  




        𝐵𝐻𝑎𝑏 ⊃ 𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑏  
As recognition is completed by ADA, ADA sends RecognitionMsg to ANA,  
𝐴𝐷𝐴
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑
    𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑀𝑠𝑔 ↑ 𝐴𝑁𝐴 
4.3.4 Specification of Self-healing Agent (SHA) 
The functions of SHA are the followings: 
 Receives MisusehealMsg and Anomalyhealmsg about harmful malicious 
activities from agent ANA. 
 Diagnoses the system behavior, captures the fault identification, and extracts 
anomaly activities configuration. 
 SHA is expert knowledge and trained to adapt to abnormal activities using the 
mechanism inspired by cell regeneration mechanism. 
 SHA finds a suitable healing component candidate for each fault that can 
repair the specific damages caused by the harmful activities. SHA fixes generation of 
the candidate for testing according to the diagnosis of the damages.  
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 Finally, SHA performs self-testing for the new regenerated damaged 
component and deploys it. 
Based on the above functions of SHA, next we specify the roles, functions and 
responsibilities of SHA using our specification language as follows: 
The set of roles (RSHA) of the self-healing agent (SHA) is: 
RSHA= {self-healing for abnormal activity damages} 
The set of function (FSHA) of the self-healing agent (SHA) is: 
FSHA= {diagnoses, faultadaptation, testing} 
The set of responsibilities (PSHA) of the self-healing agent (SHA) is: 
PSHA= {receive msg, faultidentification, candidatefixgeneratin, deployment} 
Then, these specifications of SHA are formalized with our specification language 
as follows: 
∀ 𝑕𝑖 ∈ 𝐻𝑛  ∃  𝑆𝐻𝐴 
As self-healing agent SHA receives MisusehealMsg or Anomalyhealmsg, 
𝑆𝐻𝐴
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒
       𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑠𝑔 ∨  𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑠𝑔 ↓ 𝑆𝐻 
SHA diagnoses the fault from the messages, 
𝑆𝐻𝐴
𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡
      𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑏  
Then, SHA analyzes and identifies the damaged function, 
𝑆𝐻𝐴
𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒
      𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑏 𝑖 {∀𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑏∃ 𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑏 𝑖  ⊕  𝐷𝑀𝐺} 
SHA fixes the damage DMG, 
𝑆𝐻𝐴
𝐹𝐼𝑋
   𝐷𝑀𝐺 
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SHA has to search in Heal Knowledge database (HK) for the Healing Candidate (HC) 
to fix the damage (DMG). 
SHA searches for the heal component,  
𝑆𝐻𝐴
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐 𝑕
         𝐻𝐾 ∷ {∀𝐷𝑀𝐺 ∈ 𝐻𝐾 ∧  ∃ 𝐻𝐶 ∋ 𝐻𝐾: 𝐷𝑀𝐺 ↔ 𝐻𝐶}, 
SHA selects and fix a heal candidate, 
𝑆𝐻𝐴
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑖𝑥
      𝐹𝑖𝑥 ∷ 𝐷𝑀𝐺 ⋈ 𝐻𝐶, 
SHA tests the fixed candidate heal component, 
𝑆𝐻𝐴
𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡
    𝐻𝐶 == ¬𝐷𝑀𝐺, 
 
Finally, SHA regenerates the tested heal candidate, 
𝑆𝐻𝐴
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
         𝐻𝐶 ⊞ 𝐵𝐻𝑛𝑏  
4.4. Multiagent System Architecture 
Many researchers and developers of autonomic systems have used different 
architectures and methodologies to establish multiagent system for many types of 
applications. The construction of autonomic security systems based on multiagent 
system varies among developers of intrusion detection and prevention systems. 
Different developer use different requirements, architecture and methods. We can 
refer to these references to discover the methods and architectures [71], [94], [95].  
In the previous section concerning abstract architecture model, we have shown 
that an agent behaves with respect to changes in its environment. Continuing with the 
design specification, here we need to establish the design for every agent based on its 
own environment, and this environment is defined by the nature of the agent. The 
environment consists of a set of states S. The agent can undertake a set of actions, A 
and a set of percept, P. The details of these are specified for IPS and self-healing 
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system. We consider a multiagent system as a discrete event system because we focus 
on the interactions among the agents and their environments [95]. 
For each agent, there are specific sets of states (S) for environment, actions (A) 
and precept (P) which has the behavior represented by the function action: 
P A  
And perception function, 
SP   
and deterministic behavior of an environment can be represented by the function, 
env: SAS  
A Petri net base for the abstract model of IPS and SH system is defined as a five-
tuples (P,T,A,W,M0). 
Where; 
P is a finite set of places. 
T is a finite set of transitions. 
A ⊆(P×T) U (T×P) is a set of arcs. 
W: A {1,2,3,…} is a weight function. 
M0: P {1,2,3,..} is the initial marking. 
According to these formulas, a Petri net for the four agents has been built and 
represented graphically, and proven  against three behavior  properties: free of 
deadlock , boundedness  and liveness using linear algebraic. Petri net is a tool for 
proving and analyzing any synchronize, concurrent, and a synchronize system 
mathematically. Communication systems can be analyzed and designed used Petri 
nets. We refer to these references to obtain the final design and analysis of the 
multiagent system of IPS and SH [95], [96]. 
A multiagent system can be analyzed to assess system properties by using Petri net 
model. For example, an  inspection of the reachability graph of a Petri net model can 
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indicate if the model is alive and bounded, while liveness and boundedness properties 
can be assessed using invariant analysis. In our analysis, we use P-invariants, T-
invariants obtained from the incidence matrix, which give information regarding 
token conservation, and transition firing sequences that leave the marking of the net 
unchanged. Petri net design model for each agent i has been constructed according to 
the procedures given in [94], [95] as follows: 
Definitions: 
𝑆𝑖 is defined to be the set of environment states of agent i. 
Where; 
𝑠𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖  be the 𝑗
𝑡𝑕  environment state of agent i. 
The set of actions for agent i is defined to be  𝐴𝑖 . 
where; 
𝑎𝑖𝑘 ∈ 𝐴𝑖  be the 𝑘
𝑡𝑕  action of agent i. 
 
Step1 
For each component of  𝑆𝑖 , place 𝑝𝑖𝑗   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑖𝑗  is labeled. 
For each component of  𝐴𝑖 , action  𝑇𝑖𝑘   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑖𝑗  is labeled. 
 
Step2 
At the instance, the environment function is defined by: 
𝑆𝑖 𝐴𝑖 𝑆𝑖 , 
𝑠𝑖𝑗 𝑎𝑖𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑙 , 
An arc leaving place𝑃𝑖𝑙   and ending 𝑇𝑖𝑘   is added, followed by an arc leaving 









All arcs are labeled with weight 𝑤 = 1 and a token in place represent the initial state 
of the environment is added. 
The combination of all agents in one system is based on their indirect interactions 
i.e. any agent i action will change an environment of state of the agent j. Such 
communication between agents is regarded as a steady event in the final 
comprehensive model of multiagent system. 
To complete the assessment of the system properties: deadlock inspection, 
liveness and boundendss using Petri net model, an analytical model has to be built for 
the multiagent system as follows: 
For each arc from transition 𝑡𝑖  to place 𝑝𝑖 , the weight is: 
𝑎𝑖𝑗
+ = 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) 
For each arc from place 𝑝𝑖  to, the weight is: 
𝑎𝑖𝑗
− = 𝑤(𝑗, 𝑖) 
The incidence matrix A of a Petri net has |T| number of rows and |P| number of 
columns.  
A  P-invariant is a vector that satisfies I x =0                             (4.1) 
T invariant is a vector that satisfies I
T
y
=0                                  (4.2) 
The Petri net model for each agent must prove the following conditions to satisfy 
the properties: deadlock inspection, liveness and boundendss: 
1. For each agent, the Petri net is covered by P-invariant if and only if for each 
place in the net, there exist  a positive P-invariant x such that: 
 𝑥 𝑠 > 0                                                                                                (4.3) 
and 
𝐼𝑥 = 0                                                                                                     (4.4) 
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2. Bound structure of Petri net is captured if it is covered by P-invariants and the 
initial mark 𝑀0 is finite. 
3. For each agent the Petri net is covered by T-invariant if and only if for each 
place in the net, there exist  a positive T-invariant y such that: 
𝑦 𝑡 > 0                                                                                                (4.5) 
and 
𝐼𝑇𝑦 = 0                                                                                                  (4.6) 
4. Petri net is live and bounded if it is covered by T-invariant. 
The above conditions have been captured and proven for each agent in the 
proposed system. The design and analysis of each Petri net agent will be shown in the 
following sections. 
4.4.1 The Design of Sense Agent (SEA) Model 
Set of states= {configure, train, scan, complete prevention} 
S SEA= {s1, s2, s3, s4} 
Set of actions= {configure completed, detect, block, permit, detection message} 
A SEA= {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5} 
Set of percepts={training, detection, prevention, communication with analysis 
agent} 
P SEA= {p1, p2, p3, p4} 
The Petri net model of SEA is shown in Figure 4.1. 
For SEA each j
th
 environment has the state: 
𝑠𝑆𝐸𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐴  
Similarly, A SEA be the set of actions of SEA; 
𝑎𝑆𝐸𝐴𝑘 ∈ 𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐴  
Where, k
th





Figure 4.1: Petri net Model of SEA 
These definitions have been used to build the Petri net sub–model of SEA. The 
incidence matrix for SEA is obtained from the Petri net graph, and both P-invariant 
and T-invariant satisfy the conditions mentioned above. The TSEA and PSEA invariants 








𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3 𝑝4
𝑡1 −1 1 0 0
𝑡2 0 −1 1 0
𝑡3 0 0 −1 1
𝑡4 1 0 −1 0









=  1 1 1  0 ; verify equation 4.5 
𝑦(𝑡)𝑇
𝑆𝐸𝐴
=  0 1 0 0 1 ; verify equation 4.6 
4.4.2 The Design of Analysis Agent (ANA) Model  
Set of states = {configure, monitor, analyze, decide, wait, update} 
S ANA= {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6} 
Set of actions= {configure completed, DetectionMsg, scan, MisusehealMsg, send 
AnomalyMsg,  Receive RecognitionMsg, AnomalyhealMsg, register } 
A ANA= {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7,a8} 
Set of percepts= {monitoring, receiving detection, analyzing, decision, updating, 
triggerheal} 
PANA= {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6} 
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For ANA agent each j
th
 environment has the state: 
𝑠𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝐴𝑁𝐴  
Similarly, AANA be the set of actions of ANA; 
𝑎𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑘 ∈ 𝐴𝐴𝑁𝐴  
where; k
th 
are the actions of ANA. 
 
We use these definitions to build the Petri net sub–model of ANA. The incidence 
matrix for ANA is obtained from the Petri net graph, and both P-invariant and T-
invariant satisfy the conditions mentioned above. The TANA and PANA invariants for 












𝑝1 𝑝2 𝑝3 𝑝 𝑝5 𝑝6
𝑡1 −1 1 0 0 0 0
𝑡2 0 −1 1 0 0 0
𝑡3 0 0 −1 1 1 0
𝑡4 0 0 0 −1 1 0
𝑡5 1 0 0 −1 0 0
𝑡6 0 0 0 0 −1 1
𝑡7 1 0 0 0 0 −1













=  1 1  0 10 1  ; verify equation 4.5 
𝑦(𝑡)𝑇
𝐴𝑁𝐴
=  1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1  ; verify equation 4.6 




Figure 4.2: Petri net Model of ANA 
4.4.3 The Design of Adaptive Agent (ADA) Model 
Set of states = {configure, monitor, adaptation, recognize} 
S ADA= {s1, s2, s3, s4} 
Set of actions={configure completed, received AnomalyMsg, wait, fix adaptation, 
send AnomalyhealMsg } 
A ADA= {a1, a2, a3, a4,a5} 
Set of percepts= {monitoring, adaptation, recognition, sending} 
P ADA= {p1, p2, p3, p4} 
For ADA agent each j
th 
environment has the state: 
𝑠𝐴𝐷𝐴 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐴  
Similarly AADA be the set of actions of ADA, 
𝑎𝐴𝐷𝐴𝑘 ∈ 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐴  
where; k
th 
are the actions of ADA. 
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We use these definitions to build the Petri net sub–model of ADA. The incidence 
matrix for ADA is obtained from the Petri net graph. Both P-invariant and T-invariant 
satisfy the conditions mentioned above. The TADA and PADA invariants for ADA 








𝑝1 𝑝2 𝑝3 𝑝4
𝑡1 −1 1 0 0
𝑡2 1 −1 0 0
𝑡3 0 −1 1 0
𝑡4 0 0 −1 1









=  1 1  0 1  ; verify equation 4.5 
𝑦(𝑡)𝑇
𝐴𝐷𝐴
=  0 1 0 1 0  ; verify equation 4.6 
The Petri net model of ADA is shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3: Petri net Model of ADA 
4.4.4 The Design of Self–healing Agent (SHA) Model 
Set of states= {configure, wait, search, fault diagnosis, fault adaptation, self-test} 
S SHA= {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6} 
Set of actions= {configure complete, received anomaly message, received misuse 
message, fix daignosis, fault identification, candidate fix generation, deployment} 
A SHA= {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7} 
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Set of precepts= {training, receiving, fault identification, fault adaptation, testing, 
deployment} 
P SHA= {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6} 
For SHA agent each j
th
 environment has the state: 
𝑠𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐴  
Similarly, A SHA be the set of actions of SHA; 
𝑎𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑘 ∈ 𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐴  
where; k
th 
are the actions of SHA. 
These definitions have been used to build the Petri net sub–model of the SHA 
agent. The incidence matrix for SHA is obtained from the Petri net graph, and both P-
invariant and T-invariant satisfy the conditions mentioned above. The TSHA invariant 










𝑝1 𝑝2 𝑝3 𝑝4 𝑝5 𝑝6
𝑡1 −1 1 0 0 0 0
𝑡2 0 −1 1 0 0 0
𝑡3 0 −1 1 0 0 0
𝑡4 0 0 −1 1 0 0
𝑡 0 0 0 −1 1 0
𝑡6 0 0 0 0 −1 1











=  0 1 1 1 00  ; verify equation 4.5 
𝑦(𝑡)𝑇
𝑆𝐻𝐴
=  1 1 0 1 1 1 1 ; verify equation 4.6 
The Petri net model of SHA is shown in Figure 4.4. 
The design for each agent has been established. We look for a multiagent system 
where the agents communicate with each other autonomously. In the next section, we 
will present the design of this communication and interaction using the foundation for 





Figure 4.4: Petri net Model of SHA 
4.5 Immune Agents Communication and Interaction 
The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) is an international 
organization that is enthusiastically promoting the development of intelligent agents 
by explicitly developing specifications that support interoperability among agents and 
agent based applications. FIPA semantic agent communication language is required 
for concrete specifications of agents. 
FIPA semantic language is used as the strong basis for developing multiagent 
system models, particularly for models of different technologies, representation of 
models, and programming models more specifically for security systems. It may also 
be essential for concrete specifications, including implementers of agent platforms, 
agent systems, and gateways between agent systems [97].This standard language of 
establishing communication is used to build the interactions and communication 
between the agents in our proposed biological inspired IPS and SH system. Figure 4.5 




Figure 4.5: The Interactions and Communication between Agents 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
The IPS and SH system have been designed as a multiagent system to accomplish the 
first objective of this research i.e. an autonomous IPS and SH system. As the principal 
step in designing the new systems, a new specification language for the IPS and SH 
agents is constructed the roles, functions, responsibilities, events and states of each 
agent have been specified and analyzed using set theory and logic design. The 
analytical and design models have been established using Petri net for each agent in 
the system. The required properties of the agent design have been proven. Finally, 
FIPA semantic language has been used to explore the communication between agents 
in order to construct the communication between them. In the next chapter, the 
mathematical models of IPS and SH will be established, which is an important step 






BIIPSS MATHEMATICAL AND COMPUTATIONAL MODEL 
5.1Chapter Overview 
Danger Theory (DT) integrated with negative selection provides a considerable shift 
in perspective about the main objectives of human immune system (HIS). This 
perspective though controversial among immunologists, may enable artificial immune 
system (AIS) researchers to extract benefits of the theory. To justify the potentials of 
DT for AIS and within the perspective of the conceptual framework of the proposed 
AIS system introduced in chapter 3, computation modeling plays an important role in 
establishing the aspects of the biological intrusion prevention and self-healing system. 
 In this chapter, we present the computational model of IPS and self-healing 
system. This computational model accomplishes the abstract specification and design 
criteria that have been set in the previous chapters i.e. chapters 3 and 4. For each 
agent, we propose an algorithm that should be implemented in order to achieve the 
design features that we look for. The integration of DT in AIS system as proposed in 
this work will give us a significant advantage over AIS based on negative selection 
only. This chapter presents expressive details of the most important stage of the 
framework. The details given in different sections are structured to gradually follow 
the abstract model. Each of the subsequent sections describes different algorithms that 
have been built upon the basic mechanisms of HIS, relevant theoretical background, 
and logical mapping that have been derived in chapter 4. 
5.2 Computational Model of IPS and SH 
The computational model of IPS and SH are established based on the four 
mechanisms as shown Figure 5.1. These algorithms are designed to realize the four 
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main goals of our system:  detection of abnormal behavior, prevention of abnormal 
behavior, adaptation to abnormal behavior, and finally healing of any damages caused 
by intrusion. The subsequent sections explain the four algorithms. 
 
Figure 5.1: The Main Algorithms of IPS and SH System 
5.2.1 Detection Algorithm 
The Detection Algorithm (DA) is mapped from the mechanism of DC and  
represented by SEA, which applies three algorithms to classify the input data in the 
network system as either normal or abnormal behaviors. Julie et al. [15] introduced a 
DCA as mentioned in the literature review and Thomas at el. [17] has discussed the 
geometrical insight of DCA. They explained that in spite of the good result obtained 
by this algorithm in intrusion detection application; there are several limitations of the 
DCA. They found that the DCA is a collection of linear classifiers, which pose severe 
limitation on the datasets assessable by the algorithm. This is made worse by the fact 
that the gradients of the linear boundaries are constant.  
However, it is possible to improve the accuracy of intrusion detection algorithm 
by using non-linear classification methods. The authors explored how the DCA was 
applied using derivation of linear classification and how that affected the accuracy of 
the algorithm. From this point of view, we consider the DC as a classifier, and hence 
we would be able to use an algorithm that applies non-linear classification for 
significant accuracy of detection.  
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The limitation of the DCA has been explored by T. Stibor et al. [17] and Robert O. et 
al. [91]. They discovered that the DCA model has three main limitations: firstly, the 
model assumes that the middle co-stimulatory fragment signal is steady i.e linear; 
secondly, it is only likely to make predictions for a single cell and the model only 
takes into account the signal processing element of the DCA. Finally, attempts to 
explore the antigen-presenting phase have never been made before.  
Feng Gu et al. [95] discussed the integration of Real-Time analysis with DCA. 
They proposed that ideally, the intrusion detection should be performed in real-time 
to continuously detect misused behaviors as soon as they occur since the analysis 
process of DCA is performed offline. The authors proposed a real-time analysis 
component to be integrated in the DCA to improve validation.  
Their original step for improvement is to implement segmentation to the DCA. 
Two segmentation approaches were introduced and tested, namely antigen based 
segmentation (ABS) and time based segmentation (TBS). The outcomes of the 
experiments suggested that implementing segmentation produced different and 
considerably better outcome, when compared to the standard DCA without 
segmentation. Based on their study, we conclude that segmentation is applicable to 
DCA for the purpose of real-time analysis. From these different points of view and 
evaluation of DCA, we are presenting a new algorithm inspired from DC mechanism 
to overcome the deficiency of DCA in order to achieve a more accurate and high 
performance detection. 
Firstly, in our research we present a new non-classification algorithm to intrusion 
detection by introducing SEnse agent (SEA). The newly developed algorithm uses a 
non-linear classification method to classify and detect misused and anomaly abnormal 
behaviors. Secondly, we need to prevail over the existing limitations of DCA and 
implement our detection algorithm in real time without the need of segmentation 
process. 
Our approach takes the advantages of Cluster-k-Nearest-Neighbor, k-means and 
Gaussian mixture methods, which are able to give highly accurate and fast classifier 
detection system that requires less training data. Generally, classification systems 
investigate and categorize the data into known classes; in our case, we have two 
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classes representing normal behavior or abnormal behavior. Each class of data is 
labeled with a known class label. Classification techniques are functional for a wide 
variety of real time applications dealing with large amount of data [26], [99]. Some of 
the applications are: Network intrusion detection, Insurance/Credit card fraud 
detection, Industrial Damage Detection...etc. A review of some classification 
algorithms for intrusion detection is given is the next subsection. 
5.2.2 Classification Algorithms in Intrusion Detection  
Classification technique is defined as a training technique i.e. the technique of 
classifying a group or set of labeled data instances known as training instances and 
then, classifying a test instance into one of the classes using the learnt training model 
testing data [100]-[102]. Classification based intrusion detection techniques operate in 
a similar two-phase fashion. The training phase learns a classifier using the available 
labeled training data, while the testing phase classifies a test instance as normal or 
anomalous using the classifier. In DC, antigens are used to differentiate between 
danger and safe signals, but in our case, we use features of the labeled data used 
during the training phase to classify normal and abnormal behaviors. Similarly, 
protein transformation in DC is mapped to classification of testing data during the 
testing phase. 
 Classification based intrusion detection techniques operate under the general 
assumption that a classifier can distinguish between normal and anomalous classes 
from the learnt feature i.e. similar to antigens stimulation in DC. Based on the labels 
available for training phase, classification based anomaly detection techniques can be 
grouped into two broad types: multiclass and one-class anomaly detection techniques. 
Multiclass anomaly detection techniques assume that the training data contain labeled 
instances belonging to multiple normal classes Stefano et al. [103]. Such anomaly 
detection techniques learn a classifier to distinguish each normal class from the rest of 
the classes. A test instance is identified as anomalous if it is not classified as normal 
by any of the classifiers. Some techniques in this sub-category correlate to confidence 
of the prediction made by the classifier Barbara et al. [104]-[106]. If none of the 
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classifiers is confident in classifying the test instance as normal, the instance is 
declared as anomalous.  
One-class anomaly detection techniques suppose that all training instances have 
only one class label. Such techniques learn a discriminative boundary around the 
normal instances using a one-class classification algorithm, e.g. one-class SVMs, one-
class Kernel Fisher Discriminates [107], [108]. Any test instance that does not fall 
within the learnt boundary is declared as anomalous. There are varieties of intrusion 
detection techniques that use different classification algorithms to build classifiers.  
In [109], [110] are some examples of classification based anomaly detection 
technique using neural network technique. Anomaly detection technique using neural 
networks for multiclass generally works in two stages. First, a neural network is 
trained on the normal training data to learn the different normal classes. Second, each 
test instance is provided as an input to the neural network. If the network accepts the 
test input, it is normal and if the network rejects a test input, it is an anomaly.  
Another technique for anomaly detection is Bayesian Network based, which is 
applied also for multiclass anomaly detection. Bayesian networks estimate the 
subsequent probability of monitoring a class label, given a test data instance. The 
class label with largest subsequent is selected as the expected class for the given test 
instance. The likelihood of monitoring the test instance for a given class, and the class 
probabilities are estimated from the training dataset. The basic technique can be 
generalized to each test instance, and a class label can be assigned to the test instance 
using the cumulative value. Several alternatives for the basic technique have been 
proposed for network intrusion detection [111]-[113]. Anomaly detection for one 
class is applied by using Support Vector Machines. Such techniques use one class 
learning techniques that learn a region containing the training data instances. Kernels, 
such as radial basis function (RBF) kernel, can be used to learn complex regions. For 
each test instance, the basic technique determines if the test instance falls within the 
learnt region. If a test instance falls within the learnt region, it is declared as normal, 
else it is declared as anomalous. Several system developers have used this technique 
[114]-[116], where novelty intrusion detection systems have been accomplished.  
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Rule based anomaly detection is another classification technique that learns rules that 
hold the normal behavior of a system. In such a system, a behavior is regarded as an 
anomaly when a test instance is not covered by any such rule. Rule based techniques 
are different from other techniques since they have been applied in multiclass as well 
as one-class setting. Associations of rule mining based techniques have been used for 
network intrusion detection as in [117]-[120], and for system call intrusion detection 
[121], [122]. 
In this work, the training data are clustered into subclasses where each subclass is 
represented by one data, which contribute to a reduction of the classification time.  
We get the benefits of the Nearest- Neighbor (NN) classification algorithm to classify 
by using representative data. By using this classification method, we are able to 
answer the challenges that most developers have attempted before, which are: 
• How many outliers are there in the data? 
• Fast and accurate real-time detection. 
• Misclassification cost is very high. 
This technique can be applied to multiclass as well as one-class classification. 
5.2.3 Extraction of the Best Features 
Before starting the classification algorithm and clustering of data, an algorithm to 
extract the best and powerful features for the best classification was implemented. 
The extraction algorithm reduces classification time and training time, which increase 
the accuracy of classification and make strong discrimination or classification of the 
data. This algorithm follows a method that depends on the mean and variance of each 
class in the training phase. 
Suppose m1, m2, and m3 are the mean of class1, class2, and class3 respectively, 





(a)Three classes without overlapping (b)Three classes with overlapping 
Figure 5.2: Classes Overlapping 
Figure 5.2 (a) shows that the coefficients of the best features extracted from the 
classes are good for classification process that will lead to increase system‟s accuracy. 
On the other hand, Figure 5.2 (b) is showing that the coefficients extracted from the 
classes are not good for classification process due to overlapping classes that will lead 
to increase the probability of error. To extract the best features, we need to calculate 






                                                                                          (5.1) 
Where ;𝑚𝑇  is total mean, 𝑚𝑖  is class mean, i is index of class, and 𝑛 is the size of 
class “i”. 






                                                                             (5.2) 
Where 𝑥𝑖𝑗  belongs to class‟i’. 
The metric obtained from Figure 5.2 (b) is not efficient for extracting the features 
of intrusion detection dataset due to overlapping classes. Therefore, another metric 








𝑖                                                                   (5.3) 
or 




𝑖                                                             (5.4) 




Now the way to select coefficients of the desired features will be as follows: 
If  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑑 ≤ 1, we delete all coefficients belonging to this column, and the   
coefficients will not be considered; otherwise they will be kept. The details of 
calculating the features extraction are explained in Appendix B. 
5.2.4Classification Analysis 
Classification techniques that use k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) or Gaussian Mixture 
Model (GMM) almost have the common sense that they believe the neighboring data. 
These data are represented as the new pixel vectors, where any new pixel vector for 
example x will be classified to neighboring k-cluster class and the classification will 
be more accurate compared to NN technique [123], [124]. This is because they are 
more competent in overlapping area as these methods take more consideration of 
training data samples that are less numerous.  
In order to reduce the classification time of k-NN technique, we need to cluster 
our space i.e. organizing the training data into subclasses, where each subclass will be 
represented by one datum. According to the number of subclasses, we can select two 
or more representatives. This is followed by applying the classification algorithm NN 
or k-NN using representative data. The data in the subclasses are random, where they 
are relatively close to each other. This procedure of classification is known as cluster-
k-NN (C-k-NN), which is comparable to „variable k‟-NN. 
The estimation the classification times for NN and k-NN respectively are:  
 𝑋 = 𝑂 𝑁 ,                       
𝑋
𝑁
→ 𝐾 𝑎𝑠 𝑁 → ∞ 
 𝑥 = 𝑜 𝑁 ,                        
𝑥
𝑁
→ 0 𝑎𝑠 𝑁 → ∞ 
where; N is the training data size.  
The time of classification is subclass number 𝑚𝑖  dependent, where 𝑚𝑖  is the number 
of subclasses in class 𝐶𝑖 . Therefore, the classification time is reduced by clustering the 
space. Generally, 𝑚𝑖  is a small number that does not depend on the training data size. 
This has been considered in the number of Gaussian functions to estimate a 
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probability density. The estimation of probability density according to GMM method, 
in general, is bounded with respect to the variable N. 
Non-parametric density is commonly estimated by k-NN. The rule used by k-NN 
technique is influential and able to generate highly nonlinear classification even with 
limited data [117]. To classify a pattern x, first we have to find the closed k examples 
in the dataset, and select the predominant class 𝐶𝑖  among those k-neighbors. Problems 
arise if there are two or more predominant classes. One drawback of k-NN is that the 
training data must be stored, and a large amount or processing power required for 
evaluating the density of a new input pattern. However, C-k-NN correct those 
drawback points 
The original C-k-NN classifier is based on the Euclidean distance between a test 
sample x and specified training samples, but in the new C-k-NN we add the following 
metric in order to get a better estimation of density probability: 
𝑑 𝑥, 𝑥𝑖𝑗  =
𝑑𝑒𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑛
𝑠  𝑥 ,𝑥 𝑖 ,𝑗 
𝑛 𝑖 ,𝑗
,∀𝑥∈ 𝑅
𝑑                                                  (5.5) 
where;   
s is a positive number, we note 𝐶𝑖 ,𝑗  ,for all s, 
𝑥𝑖,𝑗  belongs to the subclass j of class i, 
𝑥 𝑖,𝑗 is the representative of𝐶𝑖,𝑗  , 
𝑛𝑖,𝑗= 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑(𝐶𝑖 ,𝑗 )or the variance of the set 𝐶𝑖,𝑗  . 
Figure 5.3 explains how we can distribute the data and find the nearest neighbors 
by calculating the distance as in equation (5.6). In addition, Figure 5.4 shows how the 


















Figure 5.4:Cluster The Data After Estimates The Nearest Neighbors. 
The Gaussian mixture model is used as a parametric method that is classified as a 
semi-parametric density estimation method since it defines a universal class of 
functional forms for the density model. In a mixture model, the probability density 
function is expressed as a linear combination of basic functions [126]. A model with 
M components is explained as a distribution mixture according to equation (5.6). 
𝑃 𝑥 =  𝑃 𝑗 𝑃(𝑥 ∕ 𝑗),𝑀𝑗=1                                                                  (5.6) 
Where; 𝑃 𝑗  are the mixing coefficients and 𝑃 𝑥 𝑗   are the component density 
functions each mixture component is defined by a Gaussian parametric distribution in 
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                                              (5.7) 
The parameters to be estimated are the mixing coefficient 𝑃 𝑗 , covariance matrix 
and mean vector µj. 
In C-k-NN, each Gaussian function 𝑃 𝑗  𝑃  𝑥 𝑗   can be approximated by: 
1
𝑐𝑠𝑡+𝑑(𝑥 ,𝜇 𝑗  )
                                                                   (5.8) 
where; cst is any small number that is added to avoid the division by 0.  
The estimation of the number of subclasses and their representatives for C-k-NN 
(or the number of Gaussian function, M and their means µj for GMM) can be derived 
by k-means cluster. The number of subclasses is needed as input to the k-means 
cluster algorithm. To fix the number of clusters, we iterate the number of clusters 
starting with one and under the following conditions it stops:  
a. All the representative centroids (𝜇𝑖,𝑗 ) have to be closer to their class 𝐶𝑖 ,𝑗  than 
to other classes. This is to reduce misclassification.(i.e. no error in the classification 
of the training data) 
b. The variance of each class𝑣𝑎𝑟, does not reduce significantly in comparison to  
previous iteration. We define the variance of each class as: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟 =  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                                                   (5.9) 




≤ 𝛼,           0.0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1.0                                                         (5.10) 
The criteria for obtaining smooth function of 𝑣𝑎𝑟 with the number of subclasses 
are variable. The best value of ∝ will be considered in the simulation to obtain the 
best accuracy. By this judgment of ∝, we have completed our dictionary for the 




Figure 5.5: Variance in Terms of Number of Cluster “k” 
For each class, 𝐶𝑖  is represented by: 
 𝜇𝑖 ,1, 𝜇𝑖 ,2 ,… . . , 𝜇𝑖𝑚 𝑖  ,          1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑐𝑛                                             (5.11) 
Where; mi is the number of subclasses for class 𝐶𝑖and 𝑐𝑛 is the number of classes. 
To classify a new pattern x, we use k-NN algorithm on the dataset:  
 𝜇𝑖 ,𝑗 : 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑐𝑛, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚𝑖                                                           (5.12) 
By using this technique, we reflect on the minimum rule and assign x to class Ci, 
which is verified by: 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 min
1≤𝑖≤𝑐𝑛
1≤𝑗≤𝑚 𝑖
{𝑑 𝑥,𝑚𝑖 ,𝑗  }                                                               (5.13) 
where;     
arg⁡(𝑑 𝑥,𝑚𝑖,𝑗  = 𝐶𝑖 ,                       ∀  1 ≤ 𝑐𝑛. 
However, the k-means cluster is unstable because the result is dependent on 
random choice of k initial vectors. Therefore, to achieve the stability of k-means 
cluster, we introduce a different initialization for the algorithm, which gives a better 
result than the classic k-means cluster where: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑕𝑚   ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑐  𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑕𝑚                                 (5.14) 
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In the modified algorithm, the significant decrease in the value of 𝑉𝑎𝑟 increases the 
accuracy of the classification. 
5.2.4.1 Classification Method   
Each class 𝐶𝑖  must be clustered to several subclasses and each subclass will be 
represented by its means 𝜇𝑖 ,𝑗 .  
 
𝐶𝑖,𝑗  with  1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚𝑖                                                                            (5.15) 
 
Thus, each cluster seeks to identify a set of groups, which is minimized within the 
group variation and maximized between group variation. 
In order to cluster each class, the k-means cluster is applied. This is followed by 
estimating the number of subclasses for each class and the initial k-vectors to 
initialize the k-means cluster algorithm. To locate the best suitable number of 
subclasses, the iteration is started with 1 and two conditions are specified to stop the 
iteration. These conditions are: 
a. All representatives 𝜇𝑖 ,𝑗 should be closewith respect to the metric d in their 
class 𝐶𝑖 , i.e. if we classify all the representatives 𝜇𝑖 ,𝑗 ,we will find 100%  accuracy. For 
any misclassifications of  𝜇𝑖 ,𝑗 , we have to decrease the parameter α by multiply it by 
the factor ά which is less than 1. 
 
b. The variance  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖  of each class 𝐶𝑖 , does not decrease considerably in 
comparison to the previous iteration. 
∆𝑣𝑎𝑟
𝑣𝑎𝑟
≤ 𝛼 is used as a criterium to check : if there is a decrease or if it is still 









For the initialization of k-means cluster algorithm, in general, the aleatory k-vector 
that fits our class of data is selected. This makes the algorithm unstable in the sense of 
final variance, 
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑖 =  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑖 ,𝑗                                                                                                       
𝑚 𝑖
𝑗=1 (5.16) 
which depends on the initial vector. 
 At this point a logical question is raised, “How to choose the initial vector in 
order to find a minimal variance?” To answer this question, two algorithms are 
presented: near-to-near and near-to-mean, which add significant modifications to the 
related current application. The next section explores the details of these algorithms. 
5.2.4.2 Near-to-near algorithm 
The algorithm first calculates the distance 𝑑 𝑥𝑖,𝑛 ,𝑥𝑖,𝑚  between test samples xi for 
all 𝑥𝑖 ∈  𝐶𝑖then starts to cluster or class the samples into  𝑁𝑖 − 1  subclasses;  
where; 
card(𝐶𝑖)=𝑁 𝑖                                                                                                                             (5.17) 
Then we put the two closest data into the same subclass. 
 




 𝑑 𝑥𝑖,𝑛 ,𝑥𝑖,𝑚  = 𝑑 𝑥𝑖,𝑛0 ,𝑥𝑖,𝑚0 , 
 
The next step is to put other data into separate subclasses, 
𝐶𝑖,𝑗 =  𝑥𝑖,𝑗  ,∀𝑗 ∈  1,…𝑁𝑖 −  𝑛0,𝑚0                                     (5.19) 




 𝑛 ,𝑚 ≠(𝑛0,𝑚0)
 𝑑 𝑥𝑖,𝑛 ,𝑥𝑖,𝑚  = 𝑑 𝑥𝑖,𝑛1 , 𝑥𝑖,𝑚1                                      (5.20) 
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If 𝑥𝑖,𝑛1  and 𝑥𝑖,𝑚1 belong to the same subclass 𝐶𝑖,𝑟 , then this subclass is split into two 
other  subclasses, 
𝐶𝑖,𝑟+1 = 𝐶𝑖 ,𝑟 −  𝑥𝑖,𝑛1 ,𝑥𝑖,𝑚1                                                      (5.21) 
𝐶𝑖,𝑟 =  𝑥𝑖,𝑛1 , 𝑥𝑖,𝑚1                                                                             (5.22) 
If 𝑥𝑖,𝑛1 and 𝑥𝑖,𝑚1 belong to two different subclasses 𝐶𝑖,𝑟1 and 𝐶𝑖 ,𝑟2 respectively. Then 
we put 𝑥𝑖,𝑛1 in subclass 𝐶𝑖 ,𝑟2 , if card(𝐶𝑖,𝑟2 ) >card(𝐶𝑖 ,𝑟1 ). 
And  
if card(𝐶𝑖,𝑟2 ) ≤card(𝐶𝑖,𝑟1 ), then 𝑥𝑖,𝑚1 is put in  (𝐶𝑖,𝑟1 ). 
To use the cardinally of set, the distance between the vector to the set is used as 
d(vector ,mean of set). 
When k-subclass is obtained, the iteration stops and the initial k-vector will be the 
mean value of each class. 
5.2.4.3 Near-to-mean Algorithm 
This algorithm is almost the same as near-to-near algorithm but it deals with the mean 
of subclass 𝐶𝑖 ,𝑟 . 
At the start, the class is split into two subclasses: 
𝐶𝑖,1 =  𝑥𝑖,𝑛0 ,𝑥𝑖,𝑚0                                                                             (5.23) 
𝐶𝑖,2 = {𝑥𝑖,𝑗 | 𝑗 ∉ {𝑛0 ,𝑚0}}                                                                (5.24) 
where; 
     𝑑 𝑥𝑖,𝑛0 , 𝑥𝑖,𝑚0 = min𝑛≠𝑚
 𝑑 𝑥𝑖,𝑛 ,𝑥𝑖,𝑚                                                  (5.25) 
𝐶𝑖  is updated by replacing 𝑥𝑖,𝑛0  and 𝑥𝑖,𝑚0 by their average, i.e. 
𝐶𝑖
1 =  . . ,𝑥𝑖,𝑛0−1 , 𝑠0 ,𝑥𝑖,𝑛0+1 ,… ,𝑥𝑖,𝑚0−1 , 𝑠0, 𝑥𝑖,𝑚0+1 ,… ,               (5.26) 
where;  𝑆0 =





Next 𝑥𝑖,𝑛1   and 𝑥𝑖,𝑚1   are considered such as, 
𝑑 𝑥𝑖,𝑛1 , 𝑥𝑖,𝑚1 = min𝑛≠𝑚  𝑑 𝑥𝑖,𝑛 ,𝑥𝑖,𝑚  𝑑 𝑥𝑖,𝑛 ,𝑥𝑖,𝑚 ≠ 0 , 
 
We replace all data in 𝐶𝑖
1 that are equal to 𝑥𝑖,𝑛1  or 𝑥𝑖,𝑚1  by  𝑠1 which is the mean 
of the union of the two subclasses where  𝑥𝑖,𝑛1   and  𝑥𝑖,𝑚1  belong to 
𝑠1 =
𝐶𝑛1𝑥𝑖 ,𝑛1 +𝐶𝑚1𝑥𝑖 ,𝑚1
𝐶𝑛1 +𝐶𝑚1
 ,                                                                        (5.27) 
where; 𝐶𝑛1  is the number of repetition of 𝑥𝑖,𝑛1 inside 𝐶𝑖
1  and 𝐶𝑚1 is the number of 
repetition of 𝑥𝑖,𝑚1  inside 𝐶𝑖
1 as illustrated in Figure 5.6 where Each cluster has a 
centroid, the mean between each to nearest is estimated, and each two nearest data are 
replaced by their means. 
The algorithm stops once the number of distinct vector inside  𝐶𝑖
𝑟  is equal to k. 
 
Figure 5.6: Near to Mean Algorithm  
These classification algorithms do not require all data to be kept; this one of the 
strong features of these classification algorithms. Instead, they need only the average 
of each subclass. To classify a new data or vector x, we use k-NN algorithm i.e. we 





𝑑 𝑥,𝜇𝑖 ,𝑗  ,                                                                            (5.28) 
where; 𝑎𝑟𝑔
𝑖
𝑑 𝑥, 𝜇𝑖0 ,𝑗0 = 𝑖0 . 
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More examination of the k-NN algorithm is required to find the closest j-examples in 
the dataset and to select the predominant class. The smallest and closest examples in 
the dataset can be captured and the predominant class that has exact k examples can 
be selected. The result of the classification is shown in Figure 5.7 where each class 




Figure 5.7: Class, Subclasses and Representatives Data 
5.3 Prevention Algorithm  
The main role of SEA is to respond to any abnormal behavior in a system by 
preventing the detected abnormal behavior. Many preventive actions can be 
performed to stop the abnormal behavior in the network system. The response 
techniques has been introduced earlier in section 2.4.2.3. Now for more clarification 
in our study, we categorize the response actions into host-based prevention 




5.3.1 Host-based Prevention Capabilities 
The host-based prevention capabilities can be categorized into four categories as 
follows: 
Code Analysis: The code analysis technique can prevent code from being 
executed, including malware and unauthorized applications. 
Network Traffic Analysis: This can stop inward network traffic from being 
processed by the host, and outgoing network traffic from exiting it. This might be 
done to stop network, transport, and application layers attacks, as well as to stop the 
use of unauthorized applications and protocols. Analysis can also identify malicious 
files being downloaded or transferred, and prevents those files from being placed on 
the host. 
Network Traffic Filtering: This category works as a host-based firewall; it can 
stop illegal access and use adequate rule violations. It is effective only for stopping 
activity that is identifiable by IP address and TCP port, UDP port, or ICMP type and 
code. 
File System Monitoring: This prevents files from being accessed, modified, 
replaced, or deleted, which could stop malware installation, including other attacks 
involving inappropriate file access. 
5.3.2 Network-based Prevention Capabilities  
Network-based prevention capabilities can be categorized into three categories: 
monitoring behavior, passive, inline or hybrid i.e. inline and passive [25]. 
5.3.2.1 Passive Only  
Ending the Current TCP Session:  This is will attempt to end an existing TCP session 
by sending TCP rearranged packets to both endpoints. The sensor does this to both 
endpoints by making it to appear to each endpoint that the other endpoint is trying to 
end the connection. The goal is for one of the endpoints to terminate the connection 
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before an attack can succeed. Since this technique is only applicable to TCP, it cannot 
be used for attacks carried in other types of packets, including UDP and ICMP.  
5.3.2.2 Inline Only 
Performing Inline Firewalling:  Most inline IPSs offer firewall capabilities that 
can be used to decline doubtful network activity.  
Throttling Bandwidth Usage: If a specific protocol is being used inappropriately, 
such as for a denial of service (DoS) attack, malware distribution, or peer-to-peer file 
sharing, some inline IPS can set the percentage of network bandwidth that the 
protocol can use. This prevents the action from harmfully affecting the bandwidth 
usage for other resources.  
Altering Malicious Content:  Inline IPS can disinfect part of a packet, which 
means that the malicious content is replaced with benign content, and the disinfected 
packet is then sent to its destination. IPS that acts as a proxy might perform automatic 
normalization of all traffic, such as repackaging application payloads in new packets. 
This has the effect of disinfecting some attacks involving packet headers and some 
application headers, whether or not the IDPS has detected an attack. Some sensors 
can also strip infected attachments from e-mails and remove other discrete pieces of 
malicious content from network traffic.  
5.3.2.3 Both Passive and Inline  
Reconfiguring Other Network Security Devices: IPS can train network security 
devices such as firewalls, routers, and switches to block certain class of activities or 
route it elsewhere. This prevention procedure is useful only for network traffic that 
can be discriminated by packet header characteristics typically recognized by network 
security devices, such as IP addresses and port numbers.  
Running a Third-Party Program or Script:  Some IPS can run a script or 
programwhen certain malicious activity is detected. This could trigger any prevention 
action desired by the administrator. Third-party scripts are most commonly used when 
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the IPS does not support the prevention actions that the administrators want to have 
performed.  
Since we are looking at hybrid intrusion prevention system, we implement our 
simulation of the prevention part according to the occupant of the IPS system. The 
algorithm is designed to switch between different types of prevention categories as 
illustrated in figure 5.8. We can assume that: 
1- 𝐶𝑎𝑏𝑖 , abnormal behavior is returned by the detection algorithm in real time and 
has a vector of feature such that: 
𝐶𝑎𝑏𝑛 =  𝑓𝑎𝑏𝑛   ∀ 𝑛 ≥ 1                                                                      (5.29) 
where; 𝑓𝑎𝑏  is the set of features of an abnormal behavior. 
2- 𝐶𝑛𝑏𝑖   normal behavior is returned by the detection algorithm in real time and 
has a vector of feature such that: 
 𝐶𝑛𝑏𝑛 =  𝑓𝑛𝑏𝑛   ∀ 𝑛 ≥ 1                                                                 (5.30) 
where; 𝑓𝑛𝑏  is the set of features of normal behavior  
Then, the output signal 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝 is examined against the detection results: 
 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 ∷ 𝐶   class identified in communication session. 
   𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 == 𝐶𝑛𝑏𝑖     𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑛, 
  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝 = 1 
 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒, 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 == 𝐶𝑎𝑏𝑖  
Signal::Prevention response 
 𝑒𝑛𝑑.    
 𝑓𝑎𝑏  is different according to which IPS prevention capabilities is specified by 




 Figure 5.8: Prevention Algorithm Categories 
5.4. Analysis Algorithm 
 The main function of analysis agent is to analyze detection message, in terms of 
abnormal behavior, sent by Sense Agent. The analysis agent has a knowledge base of 
all misused abnormal behaviors. When analysis agent receives the danger message, it 
starts searching in the database whether the abnormal behavior context 𝑓𝑎𝑏𝑖  is a 
misused or an anomaly.  
𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 ∷  𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑀𝑠𝑔, 𝑓𝑎𝑏𝑖  𝑤𝑕𝑖𝑐𝑕 Contains the subclass and the representative 
features 
𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑕 𝑖𝑛 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 
𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑏𝑖  ∃ DB [𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑏 ] then,  
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝: : 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑠𝑔,𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑏  
  𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒,    
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝 ∷ 𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑀𝑠𝑔,𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑏 ,𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑠𝑔 
  𝑒𝑛𝑑. 
The analysis agent analyze the features of abnormal behavior to identify whether 
it is a misused abnormal behavior or an anomaly abnormal behavior. If it is a 
misused, the healing system is able to respond easily and within a short time since the 
abnormal behavior activity and damage are known. This is inspired from the immune 
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memory cell where the antigens are matched with antibodies in the B-Cell, and the 
antigens are presented to T-Cell to identify the type of abnormal behavior. 
5.5 Adaptive Algorithm 
When the adaptive agent receives the 𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑀𝑠𝑔, it starts to recognize the 
anomaly abnormal behavior 𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑏  and calculates the distance between the nearest 
normal behavior context 𝑓𝑛𝑏𝑖  and the abnormal behavior context 𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑖  that is given 
by: 
𝑦 𝑓𝑛𝑏𝑖 , 𝑓𝑎𝑏𝑖  =    𝑓𝑛𝑏𝑖 − 𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑖  2
𝑛
𝑖=1                                              (5.31) 
Where; y is the deviation distance from the normal behavior. 
The value of 𝑦 give identification features of the anomaly abnormal 
behavior 𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑏 and allow discrimination of the abnormality from other types. 
Meanwhile, these deviation features are recognized and sent to the analysis agent. 
 
 Figure 5.9: Recognition Features of Abnormal Behavior 
The mechanism of the adaptive agent is mapped from the mechanism of the B-
cell, which produces adaptive antibodies and continues producing antibodies until it 
recognizes the pathogens. A similar mechanism is created for the adaptive agent by 
generating a classification index for each class in the training phase. For example, if 
the abnormal behavior  is classified as denial of service attack of type “smurf “ , then 
it should have an index in the vector of the classes. This step is repeated by ADA 
until the abnormal behavior is fully recognized. The recognition process is simplified 
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in Figure 5.9. ADA agent sends these features and identity of the abnormal behavior 
of the anomaly to ANA agent for updating of the misuse database.  
𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡: :𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑀𝑠𝑔,𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑖  
𝑤𝑕𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 
 𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖  
𝑒𝑛𝑑 
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝 ∷ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑀𝑠𝑔,𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑖  
5.6 Self-healing Algorithm 
The algorithm of self-healing system is implemented if there is any predicted damage 
due to the abnormal behavior. The self-healing process performed by SHA agent 
follows the steps shown in Figure 5.10. 
 
Figure 5.10 Self-healing Algorithm Steps 
The healing system has replicated the actual system components into three typical 
dataset. The first one is to be subjected to periodic scanning to investigate whether 
any damage is found. The scanning is performed by equivalent comparison between 
the first copy of the dataset. If any damage is captured, the equivalent one in the 
copied dataset replaces the damaged component. These steps implement the detection, 
identification diagnosis and repair phases of self-healing algorithm. Secondly, the 
second copy performs equivalent comparison with third copy to verify that no damage 
is found in the two copies. Finally, the dataset of the repaired system component 
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performs another equivalent comparison with the third copy to validate that the 
healing has been performed perfectly.  
As SHA receives the healing request messages from ANA i.e. 
𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑠𝑔  and 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑠𝑔  containing the abnormal behavior, 
characteristics and the damage behavior  analysis, then SHA will start to perform the 
periodic healing process as described above and the algorithm is as follows:  
 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 ∷ 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑠𝑔,𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑏𝑖  
𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 ∷ 𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑠𝑔, 𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑖  
      𝑆𝑌𝑆 = {𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑛 |1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ ∞} 
Where; SYS is the set of system components. 
Replicate 𝑆𝑌𝑆 twice. 
Scan 𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑖  ∨ 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑏𝑖  in the first copy. 
SYS’=DI(𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑖 ∨ 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑏𝑖 ) 
where; 
SYS‟ is the set of damaged system components. 
DI is diagnosis function. 
Search the 𝑅𝑖  in DBheal 
where; 𝑅𝑖  is replacement function and DBheal is healing component in the second copy 
∀ 𝐷𝐼 𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝐵𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙  ∃ 𝑅𝑖: Replace                    // repair state 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑟𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑦, 
 𝑅𝑖 𝑆𝑌𝑆
′ == 𝑆𝑌𝑆 
𝐹𝑖𝑥 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 
Scan in the first copy with third copy to verify adaptation. 
  𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑌𝑆 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑,  
         𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦 
 𝐸𝑙𝑠𝑒,𝑔𝑜 𝑡𝑜 𝐷𝐼 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑛. 
  𝐸𝑛𝑑. 
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In order to perform self-healing, systems should have the ability to modify their own 
behavior in response to changes in their environment and discover alternatives; 
therefore, the healing function is tested until the healed component has adapted to the 
system. The Self-healing technique used is shown in figure 5.11. 
 
Figure 5.11:The self-healing Technique. 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the description and derivation of the intrusion prevention and self-
healing system algorithms has been explored. The basic principles of the intrusion 
detection and prevention systems use machine learning and pattern recognition 
classification. The classification algorithm is based on a new improvement of 
variance of the best feature, k-means cluster and Gaussian mixtures methods. The 
analysis and adaptation algorithms are established, as well as, the intrusion 
identification and recognition step. The self-healing computation and healing 
algorithm are accomplished using equivalent check between replicates of the system 
components datasets. In the following chapter, the system is simulated and the 
algorithms are implemented. The biological intrusion prevention and self-healing 
system will be tested using standard intrusion detection dataset and process behavior 







 BIIPSS VALIDATION  
6.1 Chapter Overview 
In this research, we have developed an application system with specific design 
features mainly autonomous feature, and presented new algorithms for detection, 
prevention and healing mechanisms. To validate this system, we need to measure the 
effectiveness of this new approach in a real environment from the point of views of 
both the developer and user of the application. In security systems, developers 
consider metrics as fundamental for measuring the efficiency and cost of complex 
security controls. Security enhancement begins by identifying the metrics that 
measure various characteristics of security for the endeavor. Security metrics, which 
describe a measure for the security of an entire organization, are quite a new area of 
research. Without commonly established security metrics, it would be very 
complicated to improve the security of network system. In this chapter, we will cover 
validation of the algorithms against the metrics for network security from the 
perspective of IPS and SH model, and present the major technical-operational metrics 
used by large security system developers and researchers. 
6.2Validation Metrics and Measurement 
Managing the security of critical services network system has become a considerable 
issue. As any other procedure, security cannot be managed, if it cannot be measured. 
The need for metrics is important for assessing the current security status, to develop 
operational best practices and for guiding future security research. The issue is 
essential at a time when the researchers and developers need to simulate the 
implementation, and test their models. Metrics emphasize on the main concerns of 
security systems such as: abnormal behaviors, vulnerabilities and risks. Metrics build 
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application area information assets based on either quantitative or qualitative 
measure. The current policies for evaluating or validating IT systems and network 
security are focused on examining the results of security assessments which include 
diffusion testing, vulnerability scanning, and other means of probing defenses for 
weaknesses in security, and on examining the building blocks, processes, and 
controls. Metrics assessable standards observe the effectiveness of aims and 
objectives established for network security system. They measure the implementation 
of security strategy, the effects of security services and the impact of security events 
on the presented security objectives and mission.  
Network security metrics can be obtained at different levels within our developed 
IPS and self-healing system. Detailed metrics, collected at the system and network 
level, can be aggregated and rolled up to progressively higher levels, depending on 
the size and complexity of the implementation area. If measurements are instant 
snapshots of a fussy measurable parameters, then metrics are more complete 
representations, typically comprised of several measurements, baselines, and other 
supporting information that provide context for interpreting the measurements. 
Perfect metrics are objectives oriented and should have the following features: 
precise, measurable, comparable, manageable, repeatable, and time dependent. In this 
chapter, we divide the metrics for the IPS and SH into: detection metrics, prevention 
and adaptation metrics. Self-healing metrics, and IPS and SH combination metrics are 
new which are introduced in the next chapter. The following section explains these 
metrics in details. 
6.3 Detection Metrics 
A fundamental problem in intrusion detection is what metrics can be used to evaluate 
IPS and an intrusion detection system (IDS) in terms of its ability to properly classify 
network data packet events as normal or intrusive. There are two main issues facing 
intrusion detection system: they may possibly raise a huge number of alarms and false 
alarms. Thus, the objective is to decrease the number of false alarms as explained in 
[127], [128]. The lack of a single unified metric makes it difficult to fine-tune and 
evaluate IPS. Traditional metrics are as defined by Guofie et al. [129]: 
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False Negative (FN) rate: The chance there is no alert,⇁ A, when there is an 
intrusion, 𝐼. 
𝐹𝑁 = 𝑃 ⇁ 𝐴 𝐼  
=  𝛽                                                                                           (6.1) 
True Positive (TP) rate: The probability that the IDS outputs an alarm, A, when 
there is an intrusion, 𝐼. 
𝑇𝑃 = 𝑃 𝐴 𝐼  
=  (1 − 𝛽)                                                                                 (6.2) 
False Positive (FP) rate: The probability that the IDS outputs an alarm, A, when 
no intrusion occurs,⇁ I. 
𝐹𝑃 = 𝑃 𝐴 ⇁ 𝐼  
=  𝛿                                                                                           (6.3)                                                                                        
True Negative (TN) rate: The chance there is no alert, ⇁ 𝐴, when there is no 
intrusion, ⇁ 𝐼. 
𝑇𝑁 = 𝑃 ⇁ 𝐴 ⇁ 𝐼   
=  (1 − 𝛿)                                                                                 (6.4) 
Up to date researchers and developers are unable to define a single metric that 
seems sufficient to measure the capability of intrusion detection systems. 
6.4 Prevention Metrics  
An Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) capability requires assembling data packets 
received in real time network connection to restore the original network system 
protocols, rules and flags to gain an awareness of traffic behavior. In order to achieve 
this, a significant amount of processing power must be available. Performance 
measurement of IPS prevention capabilities is complicated by the lack of a standard 
on what intrusions must be caught. Therefore, when evaluating the performance of 
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IPS, a number of metrics need to be considered to evaluate the prevention events. The 
present model defines the prevention metrics according to the design specification as 
follows: 
Positive predictive value (PPV): The probability of a chance that an intrusion 𝐼, is 
present when an IPS outputs an alarm and response, A. 
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑃(𝐼|𝐴)                                                                             (6.5)   
As PPV is higher, this indicates that the prevention response is the correct and 
confident response. 
Negative predictive value (NPV): The probability of a chance that there is no 
intrusion⇁ 𝐼, when an IPS does not output an alarm and response, 𝐴. 
𝑁𝑃 = 𝑃 ⇁ 𝐼 ⇁ 𝐴                                                                  (6.6) 
As NPV is high the permission to continue receiving data is the correct and confident 
response. 
Throughput: The measurement of the amount of data an IPS can process per 
second/Bytes of data. The data can be packaged in one large, or many smaller packets 
meaning that the related measurement of how many small packets can be handled per 
second is a key to reflecting the true throughput value. 
Consider 𝑑𝑎𝑡 is the amount of data that can be measured in bit or byte in each 
prevention process. Then: 
𝑡𝑕𝑟𝑝𝑢𝑡 =  
𝑑𝑎𝑡
𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑏
                                                                           (6.7) 
where;  
𝑡𝑕𝑟𝑝𝑢𝑡  is the throughput. 
𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑏  is the time to process instance of abnormal behavior . 
Concurrent Connections: This value identifies the number of sessions that an IPS 
is able to maintain. 
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Consider the set of abnormal processes in the concurrent sessions is  𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑛 . 
𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑛 =  𝑝𝑎𝑏1 ,𝑝𝑎𝑏2 ,… ,𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑛              1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ ∞ 






                                                                   (6.8)      
where; 𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑝 𝑎𝑏  is the time to process all abnormal behavior  instances. 
Latency: A measurement of the time taken to process a single abnormal behavior 
packet within the system. Here the term latency refers to the delay between detecting 
and preventing abnormal behavior packet. 
Consider the process being 𝑝𝑎𝑏  as the process of a single abnormal behavior, then: 
𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑏 = 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣 − 𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑡      ∀ 𝑝𝑎𝑏  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒                                     (6.9)        
where; 
𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑏  𝑖𝑠 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦; 
𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒; 
𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑡  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒. 
The throughput and concurrent connection metrics, both are affected by the 
prevention time measurement, which is the latency metrics. 
The measurement of latency and concurrent connection metric need real 
implementation of the whole IPS system in the network system, which is out of the 
scope of this research. The latency metric is based on the bandwidth, routing system 
and other network engineering parameters, and the settlement of the networks. At this 
stage of developing and simulating, IPS algorithm has limited scope; only deployment 
of the IPS suggested in this research is able to help the network designer and vendors 
of IPS system to achieve the best for their critical services network. In next chapter 
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introduced two new metrics for prevention predictability trust which can be used to 
evaluate the present system and any developed IPS. 
6.5 Analysis and Adaptation Metric 
The analysis to detect abnormal behavior is to identify whether it a misuse or anomaly 
by scanning the misuse knowledge base. Our metric here is concerning classification 
of the type of abnormal behavior. For the purpose of this research, we define a new 
metric for abnormal behavior analysis which measures the system ability to 
discriminate between misuse and abnormal behavior from the extracted signature 
during the detection process. From chapter 4, when the analysis agent scans a 
detected abnormal behavior, BHf′ , there are two possibilities: either the abnormal 
behavior is already existing in the misuse database or not. Our metric is used to 
measure the scanning accuracy; analysis accuracy is to investigate whether the 
analysis and adaptation have been completely done. This was simulated during the 
test stages according to the algorithm of analysis and adaptation. Using the data 
classification, specific type of abnormal behaviors is represented by j of sub 
classes,  𝐶𝑗
𝑖  and each subclass data has representatives instance of data,𝑃
𝐶𝑗
𝑖 . The 
features of 𝑃
𝐶𝑗
𝑖 is pointed towards the discrimination and adaptation criteria of the 
detected abnormal behaviors. The measurement of the adaption and analysis is the 
error in classifying the right type of abnormal behavior, and can be defined as 𝐶𝑙𝐸𝑅   as 
given by: 
𝐶𝑙𝐸𝑅 =
 number of errors of abnormal behavior  classes
the total number of abnormal behavior  instances 
 
𝐶𝑙𝐸𝑅  is a metric that can be used to measure the analysis and adaption 
performance of the analysis and adaptation agents, and is considered as an additional 
contribution in this research. 
This metric is calculated and measured as the result of the system simulation. The 
next section demonstrates the simulation processes and results. 
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6.6 Validation of the IPS and SH System Algorithms 
To validate the proposed new algorithms, three different datasets were used. The aim 
was to examine if the system is able to detect some abnormal behaviors after its 
training period. The first dataset is a version of the KDD Cup 1999 DARPA intrusion 
detection evaluation dataset generated and managed by MIT Lincoln Labs published 
in [130]. The second is system process dataset collected by University of New 
Mexico (UNM) which was used to test computer immune systems [131]. Finally, the 
self-healing algorithm is simulated using grid network dataset to investigate the 
system behavior in grid network system. The self-healing system result and reliability 
will be discussed in chapter 7. In order to accomplish the validation and performance 
testing of the algorithms, we consider the following limitations: 
1. Due to the complexity of designing a network system for specific critical 
services, the system is tested using standard real time statics datasets, which 
are real trace datasets and are used to validate many algorithms of intrusion 
detection and preventions, and have been used by many researchers. 
2. The measurement of actual prevention response needs real implementation 
and computer engineering design, which are out of the scope of our research 
since we implement software engineering design. The possible solutions of 
prevention are merely our suggestion for consideration by the network 
designer and/or vendor of the critical services who use the system. They must 
test and decide which solution is the best for their services requirements. Due 
to security policy and confidentiality of some critical information, the system 
could not be implemented in the university campus. The healing system is 
simulated using trace data for the system components usage information. Such 
as the information of memory usage, processing time needed and CPU 
consumption time. Although in this work, SH system simulation is static and 
not real time but, the same will happen in the real time; but the difference is 
only how long will be the period to trigger the SH system autonomously, 
which also depends on vendor requirements and network design capabilities.   
The following subsections explain the KDD Cup and UNM datasets, which are used 
in the simulation. 
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6.6.1 MIT Lincoln DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset 
The DARPA KDD Cup Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program was formulated and 
managed by MIT Lincoln Labs. The aim of DARPA was to study and assess research 
in intrusion detection and test the performance of intrusion detection and prevention 
systems. Audited standard set of data is used in the simulation, which is comprised of 
a wide variety of intrusions simulated in a military network environment, was 
provided. The 1999 KDD Cup intrusion detection contest had used a version of this 
dataset, and summarized it into network connections with 41-features per connection 
[130], [132]. This arranged dataset became the benchmark in international knowledge 
discovery and data mining tool competition. The KDD Cup intrusion detection dataset 
is a log connection traffic from MIT Lincoln Labs which contains connection details 
in its network, such as traffic data (tcpdump, inside and outside network traffic), 
Basic Security Module (BSM) audit data, file systems data and many related 
information. Lincoln Labs set up a situation to obtain nine weeks of raw TCP dump 
data for a local-area network (LAN) simulating a typical U.S. Air Force LAN. They 
operated the LAN as if it were a true Air Force environment, but scattered it with 
multiple abnormal behaviors. The original training data were about four gigabytes of 
compressed binary TCP dump format from simulations of network traffic conducted 
in a period of seven weeks. Those simulation data were then processed into 
approximately five million network connection records. Two weeks of test data 
yielded around two million connection records. Abnormal behaviors fall into four 
main classes [133]:  
 DOS- denial-of-service: This class has 6 categories which are smurf, Neptune, 
back, teardrop, pod and land. The algorithms were tested to classify all6 categories. 
 R2L- unauthorized access from a remote machine: This class has 8 categories 
which are warezclient, guess_passwd, warezmaster, imap, ftp_write, multilop, phf, 
and spy. The algorithms were tested to classify 4 of these categories due to the lack of 
training data of the other 4 categories. 
 U2R- unauthorized access to local super user (root) privileges: This class has 
4 categories which are buffer_overflow, rootkit, loadmodule and prel. The algorithms 
were tested to classify all 4 categories. 
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 Probing- surveillance and other probing: This class has 4 categories which are 
satan, ipseewp, portsweep and nmap.  
The process of collecting the dataset resulted in 41 features for each connection 
between the dataflow from source IP address to destination IP address. For each 
connection, the features are clustered into four categories [134]: 
Basic Features: Basic features can be derivatives from packet headers without 
inspecting the payload.  
Content Features: Domain knowledge is used to assess the payload of the 
original TCP packets. This includes features such as the number of failed login 
Attempts.  
 Time-based Traffic Features: Properties that mature over a two second 
temporal window are captured as time based traffic features such as counting the 
number of connections to the same host over the two second interval. 
Host-based Traffic Features: Exploit a historical window assessed over the 
number of connections, in this case 100, instead of time. Host based feature are 
therefore designed to assess attacks, which span intervals longer than two seconds. 
Details of the types, features of the dataset are shown in Appendix D.1. The data 
used in this research are a part of 10% of the whole training data detailed in [133], 
[134]. Each class of data is tested individually and another test is taken for the whole 
class against normal class. It is important to note that the test data are not from the 
same probability distribution as the training data, and they include abnormal behavior 
types not in the training data. Both training and testing data are taken randomly from 
the original dataset. This makes the task more realistic. Some intrusion experts 
consider that most anomaly abnormal behaviors are alternatives of known abnormal 
behaviors, and the "signature" of known abnormal behaviors can be sufficient to catch 
innovative alternative abnormal behaviors. The dataset contains a total of 23 training 
abnormal behavior types. For the purpose of this research, the abnormal behavior data 
have been divided into the four mentioned categories. Each abnormal behavior 
category dataset is classified against normal data using the classification algorithm. 
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6.6.2 Process Behavior Dataset 
The University of New Mexico (UNM) research group of computer immune system 
collected several datasets consisting of system call traces for many processes on SUN 
SPARC stations running unpatched SUNOS 4.1.1 and 4.1.4. These collections of 
datasets are publicly used in processes behavior detection domain, specifically, have 
been used to train and test several process behavior intrusion detection systems [131].  
In UNM datasets, the processes and corresponding system calls were accumulated 
from different types of programs (e.g. programs that run as daemons and those that do 
not), programs that diverge widely in their size and complexity, and different kinds of 
intrusions (buffer overflows, symbolic link attacks, and Trojan programs). In these 
datasets, only those programs that run with privilege have been included, because 
misuse of these programs has the highest possible harm to the system. Some of the 
normal data are "synthetic" and some are "live".  
Synthetic traces are collected in production environments by running an arranged 
script; the program selections are chosen exclusively for the purpose of exercising the 
program, and not to meet any real user's requests. Live normal data are traces of 
programs collected throughout normal usage of a production computer system. In 
various cases, data for the same program have been collected from multiple locations 
and/or multiple versions of the program. Each of these is a dissimilar dataset; normal 
traces from one set can be quite different from those of another. Each trace is a 
sequence of (process id, system call number). System call numbers are stored in the 
order in which it is executed. There is a mapping file that associates the system call 
numbers to the corresponding system call names. The set includes normal traces and 
abnormal traces. Sequence lengths differ because of differences in program 
complexity and because some traces were daemon processes and others were not. The 
samples of each datasets are shown in Appendix D.2.  
To comport the simulations to exam process behavior; sendmail daemon was used 
for studying the classification of normal behavior and to detect anomalous process 
behavior. The syslog intrusions in UNM dataset are simple examples of buffer 
overflows in sendmail. Though patches are currently available for most of the 
vulnerabilities, sendmail and the buffer overflow attacks on Sendmail are worthy 
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examples for simulation result. Sendmail daemon was examined for detection of 
buffer overflow attacks.  
In order to construct a good classifier, we need to gather sufficient amount of 
training data and identify the set of meaningful features. Due to the unavailability of 
enough varieties of intrusion trace data, further simulation runs were conducted using 
datasets with specific arrangement, where the given input sequences of process 
system calls have to be divided into separate classes known as sequence sets. The 
input sequence for each process is converted into frequency components of the system 
calls. The assembling information of neighboring system calls in the input sequence it 
misplaced and only the frequency of each system call in the sequence is conserved. 
Intrusion in this representation is defined according to frequency count of system 
calls. 69 common system call frequencies are used as the classification features. 
6.7 IPS and SH Simulation Results 
In order to regulate the training and test datasets of different categories of abnormal 
behavior, variance features and problem representation on the dynamics of the 
classification and self-healing algorithms, validation of the algorithm is examined 
across a range of different parameter settings. While the classification algorithm 
works efficiently for real time applications, when evaluating the system performance 
over many runs such as examining different dataset categories and testing the effects 
of variations in multiple parameters, simulating the algorithms can be quite time 
consuming. As an example, we have 41 different features in KDD Cup dataset that 
need to be evaluated for the best results. Due to the requirement of intrusion 
prevention for validation against different metrics, the algorithm was run for different 
train and test dataset for the two different standard datasets described in section 6.6.1 
and 6.6.2. For the simulation purpose, matlab2009b software has been used and the 
simulation was run in normal PC. The source code of the main part of simulation 
demonstrated in Appendix E. Each dataset has been trained and tested individually for 
different parameter settings under the different conditions and arrangement of the two 




Features variance: Estimated best feature that gives maximum value of the new 
variance metric which contributes to high classification accuracy. This is mapped 
from HIS when we need to identify the antigen that binds to specific type of pathogen 
molecules, death cells and antigens. 
Sub class number: The number of sub class in each class of data. 
α: The significant decrease in variance. These values have been explained in 
chapter 5 by equation (5.10) as given below. This is mapped to the affinity maturation 
of the dendritic cell when it binds to specific pathogens and migrates to lymphocyte 
nodes to present the antigens to T-cell. 
∆𝑣𝑎𝑟
𝑣𝑎𝑟
≤ 𝛼,                    
   where; 0.0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1.0. 
Size of sub class: The size of data processed in each subclass; represents the 
number of normal behavior and abnormal behavior in each class, this is mapped from 
the immune system; the number of safe signal and danger signal presented by 
dendritic cells. 
Error position: Represents the error position of the classification, i.e. which 
normal data are classified as abnormal and vice versa. 
Number of representative in each sub class: The number of data that can 
represent each class. This is mapped from the number of dendritic cells that can bind 
to the same type of pathogen. 
These parameters and their variations affect the simulation results and system 
reliability. The next subsections discuss the simulation condition, arrangement and 
results. The result is the metrics mentioned in sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4. 
6.7.1 Validation of IPS and SH algorithms Using KDD Cup Datasets 
To test the IPS algorithms, 4 smaller subsets of the KDD cup dataset have been 
created randomly for each abnormal behavior classes with normal data. The ratio 
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between the normal records to the abnormal records is around 5:1 for probe, denial of 
services and R2L classes while for U2R around 2:1. Both trained and tested datasets 
for each individual class have the same ratio. The test for each sub dataset was run 
twice: first, all the features were tested to identify which features will give maximum 
accuracy; secondly, the test was run again with iteration stop at the first feature that 
gives the maximum accuracy. The results of classification are as follows: 
First, the algorithms were applied to denial of services DoS abnormal behavior 
dataset. The simulation produced the results detailed in Table 6.1. The metrics 
mentioned in section 6.2 were calculated.  















99.79 99.86 0.07 0.14 99.93 6 
The maximum accuracy is 99.79% and the result shows very low false positive 
error in detection. As mentioned in section 5.2.4 the accuracy is depending on the best 
features of classification and the value of α. To estimate the features and 
characteristics of each feature, please refer to Appendix D.1. The result demonstrated 
in Table 6.1 shows very low false positive and false negative error rates. 
 
Figure 6.1. Denial of Services Simulation Test - values of  accuracy against   
values of  the best features and α. 
𝛼 ∗ 10−2  
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In the first run of the algorithms using DoS dataset, which includes 6 different 
categories of DoS abnormal behavior, the variation of the accuracy due to the change 
of the features and α is shown in Figure 6.1. Changes in  the accuracy value depends 
on the variances of the features i.e the best of the features, and  according to this the 
values of α. The maximum accuracy is reached at different features. From this result, 
the fast and best feature (4) that gives the maximum accuracy is estimated and this 
value was applied in the second run.  
 
 
Figure 6.2:  Denial of Services Dataset Test-the accuracy values against the best 
features. 
 
In Figure 6.2, the change of accuracy at this specific value of feature is clearly 
shown. In the second run at the best feature, the variation of accuracy due to changes 
in the value of α at the best classification feature is obtained and shown in Figure 6.3. 
Accuracy has range 99.79-99.58% at the best feature (4). 
 
 





























































































Figure 6.4: The Denial of Services Dataset Test-the false positive errors value 
with α. 
α values also has a substantial effects on the values of the false positive and false 
negative. As shown in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. The minimum value of the false positive is 
0.07% at maximum accuracy and feature number (4) and has range 0.07-0.14%. The 























































































































































































99.92 100.00 0.08 0.00 99.92 4 
 
The second simulation test of the algorithms has been applied to probe abnormal 
behavior dataset which includes 4 different probe categories of abnormal behavior. 
Table 6.2 shows that the maximum accuracy is 99.92 % and the result show very low 
false positive errors and 0 false negative errors. The values of true positive and true 
negative are also demonstrated. The variation of accuracy due to the change of the 
features and α is shown in Figure 6.6. The true positive value is 1.0 and the true 
negative value is 0.9992, approaching to (1). These results indicate that there are 
fewer errors in the data classification. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: The Probe Simulation Test - accuracy values against the best 
features and α. 




Figure 6.7: The Probe Simulation Test-the accuracy values with the best 
features. 
 
For the probe simulation test, the change of the accuracy value is dependent on 
the variances of the features i.e. the value of the features and according to this the 
values of α. The maximum accuracy is reached at different features. The first feature 
that gives the fast and maximum accuracy value is feature number (8). In Figure 6.7, 
the change of accuracy with the best features is clearly shown.  
From this result, the best feature that gives the maximum accuracy was estimated 
and applied in the second run. The variation of accuracy due to the change in the 
value of α at the best feature (8) of classification is given in Figure 6.8. Accuracy 






















































































































Figure 6.9: The Probe Simulation Test - the false positive error values against α. 
 
The values of the false positive error at the best feature (8) vary from 0.08 to 2.3% 
at different value of αwhichis clearly shown in Figure 6.9. The values of the false 
negative error at the best feature (8) vary from 0 to 6.99 % at different value of α as is 
given in Figures 6.10.These results show the strength of the system against the 




Figure 6.10: The Probe Simulation Test - the false negative errors value against 
α. 
The third simulation test of the algorithms has been applied to unauthorized 
access from a remote machine R2L abnormal behavior dataset. For the R2L 
simulation test, the dataset is small compared to the previous one. This is due to the 








































































































































































behavior  and abnormal behavior  (5:1) is kept the same. The change of the accuracy 
value is dependent on the variances of the features i.e. the value of the features and 
according to this the values of α.  















99.60 99.6 0.0 0.4 100.0 4 
 
The test results are shown in Table 6.3. From these results, the best feature that 
gives the maximum accuracy was estimated and applied in the second run; this is the 
value of feature number (3) and the maximum accuracy is 99.6%. In Figure 6.11, the 
change of accuracy at this value of feature and α is clearly shown.  
 
 
Figure 6.11: The R2LSimulation Test - accuracy values against the best features 
and α. 




Figure 6.12: The R2L Simulation Test - the accuracy values with the best 
features. 
In this test, 4 categories have been identified with 0 false positive errors at the best 
feature. High error rate in the false negative 0.4% is estimated which must be reduced 
in the future works for classifying R2L categories. 
The variation of accuracy due to changing value of the best classification features 
is given in Figure 6.12. The maximum value is 99.6% and this is the value estimated 
at most features. The first and fast feature is (3). Figure 6.13 shows the change of 
















































































































The values of the false positive error at the best feature (3) are vary from 0 to 1.3 % as 
is clearly shown in Figures 6.14, and this value could not be gained with any AIS 
system for intrusion detection and prevention system. Meanwhile, the value of the 
false negative error is slightly higher than the previous two simulation tests, but still 




Figure 6.14: The R2L Simulation Test - the false positive error values against α. 
 
Figure 6.15 shows the change of values false negative error with the change of α 



































































































































































































The final simulation algorithm test for the KDD Cup classes dataset was applied to 
unauthorized access to local super user (root) privileges U2R abnormal behavior 
dataset.  















100.00 100.0 0.00 0.00 100.00 4 
 
The results obtained from the run at the best features are shown in Table 6.4. The 
maximum accuracy is 100% and the result shows 0 false positive errors and 0 false 
negative errors at the best features. In Figure 6.16, the change of accuracy at this 
value of feature and α is clearly shown. 
 
 
Figure 6.16: U2R Simulation Test - accuracy values against values of the best 
features and α. 
 
         Figure 6.17 shows the best features to gain the maximum accuracy. The value of 
100% accuracy is obtained at most of the different features number. The values of 
𝛼 ∗ 10−2  
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false positive and false negative rate are 0 at the maximum accuracy. These values are 
an indication of the strength of the algorithms in detecting U2R abnormal behavior 
categories which are 4 in this test. 
 
Figure 6.17: U2R Simulation Test -the accuracy values against values of the best 
feature. 
In the second run, the change of accuracy at different values of α is demonstrated 
at Figure 6.18. The values of accuracy vary from 98.1 to 100%at the fast and the best 



































































































Figure 6.19: U2R Simulation Test - the false positive error values against α. 
 
In Figure 6.19, the values of false positive errorvary from 0 to 0.79% at all values 
of αat the best feature; but the values false negative vary from 0 to 1.11% at different 




Figure 6.20: U2R Simulation Test - the false negative errors value against α. 
 
From the obtained results of the four tests, the discussion of the comparative 
study will present in the next chapter. 
6.7.2 Validation of IPS and SH Algorithms Using Process Behavior Dataset 
The IPS and SH algorithms are validated using process behavior dataset. The main 
aim of this simulation is to validate that the system can be implemented at the host 













































































































































































the proposed system is a hybrid and can protect network system, as well as host 
system. As in the first simulation tests, the first run was implemented using the 
sendmail dataset in UNM dataset. The change of accuracy with different system call 
frequency is demonstrated in Figure 6.21. The results obtained are tabulated in Table 
6.5. The maximum accuracy obtained is 98.51%. Compared to the accuracy of 
simulation results obtained using the KDD Cup dataset, the accuracy results obtained 
from this simulation are lower. However, this accuracy is still high compared to the 
accuracy of other systems tested using the process behavior dataset as we will see 
later in the comparative study in chapter 7. Although the slight decrease in accuracy is 
due to insufficient dataset records available for training and testing stages, 
nonetheless the results obtained are much better than the results of previous AIS 
system tested using the same dataset. Figure 6.21 shows the change of accuracy with 
α and the best system call frequencies. 




















Figure 6.21: Process Behavior Simulation Test - accuracy values  against values 
of  system call frequencies and α. 
𝛼 ∗ 10−2 
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Figure 6.22: Process Behavior Simulation Test - accuracy against system call 
frequency. 
 
A second simulation test for process behavior of sendmail was run at the best and 
fast system call number (42) frequency. The change in accuracy at different values of 
α at the best feature is illustrated in Figure 6.23. The values of the accuracy vary from 









































































































Figure 6.24: Process Behavior Simulation Test -the false positive error values 
against α. 
 
Change in the values of the false positive error and false negative error with αat 
the best system call number (42) frequency are shown Figures 6.24 and 6.25 
respectively. The values of false positive error vary from 0 to 8.47% while the values 
of false negative error vary from1.49 to 16.9%. 
 
 
Figure 6.25: Process Behavior Simulation Test - the false negative error values 
against α. 
The result obtained from the five different dataset class tests against the detection 





























































































































































Table 6.6: Results of Detection Metrics for the Five Dataset Classes 
















99.79 99.86 0.07 0.14 99.93 6 
Probe 99.92 100.00 0.08 0.00 99.92 4 
R2L 99.60 99.6 0.0 0.4 100.0 4 
U2R 100.00 100.0 0.00 0.00 100.00 4 
Process Behavior 98.51 98.51 0.00 1.49 100.00 2 
6.7.3 Simulation Results of Prevention and Analysis  
Simulations of the IPS and SH algorithms produce results that can be used to measure 
the performance of prevention, analysis and adaptation tasks. Since this simulation is 
performed statically, the metrics for validating the prevention is limited. Only at this 
stage, the process of the classification time and positive predictive and negative 
predictive and the throughput values can be measured. The next chapter will discuss 
the new metrics for prevention predictability of the system and healing system 
reliability. For the prevention, analysis and adaption, the PP, NP, process mean time, 
throughput and  𝐶𝑙𝐸𝑅  values are calculated for each simulation test. The 𝐶𝑙𝐸𝑅  values 
depend on the error position, sub class representative and subclass number 
parameters. The results of all these metrics are detailed in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. The 
results indicate that prevention response will be taken with high predictive values 
when an intrusion occurs because the values of PP fall in the range between 99.62-
100%. Meanwhile, the values of NP are also high, which means there will not be any 
response when there is no intrusion. The values of NP range from 99.3-100%. These 
results validate our algorithms at the prevention level since these values are equal or 




Table 6.7: Prevention Metrics Results  
Dataset category PPV% NPV% 
Process  
Mean time sec 
Throughput 
Process/sec 
Denial of services 99.62 99. 97 0.000064 15625 
Probe 99.70 100.00 0.000096 10358 
R2L 100.00 99.90 0.00055 1824 
U2R 100.00 100.00 0.00046 21714 
Process behavior  100.00 99.30 0.000039 25631 
 
  The analysis and adaptation errors are very small compared to the amount of 
data processed, and ranged between 0.0-1.17%. In R2L test, the 𝐶𝑙𝐸𝑅  value is high, 
which is due to the very small size of available training dataset. The throughput and 
process time values are significant and show high performance of the system.  
 
Table 6.8: Analysis and Adaptation Error 𝐶𝑙𝐸𝑅  Results 
Dataset Class Analysis and Adaptation Error 
Denial of Services 0.446 % 
Probe 0.00 % 
R2L 1.17 % 
U2R 0.00 % 
Process behavior  0.00 % 
6.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter explores the important and traditional metrics required to validate the 
simulation test of the system algorithms. The limitation and assumptions are clarified. 
The datasets used in the simulation test are identified and discussed. The 
mathematical equation and definition of the required metrics are explained in details. 
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Two standard network intrusion detection and prevention datasets have been used in 
the simulation test i.e. KDD Cup and UNM. The simulation results show that the 
system gives high detection accuracy with high performance in prevention, analysis 
and adaptation. The using of the diverse dataset in simulation tests validate that the 
system is hybrid i.e. can work as host-based or network-based IPS system. 
Meanwhile, the presented system can detect misuse and anomaly abnormal behavior 
with high accuracy and lower false errors. 
The new metric for prevention response trust and how to keep tracking the 
intrusion prevention system with the Self-healing system will be addressed in the next 
chapter. In addition, the results obtained from the simulation tests will be compared 
with the results from other AIS systems for intrusion detection and prevention 























BENCHMARKING AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES 
7.1 Chapter Overview 
The new IPS and self-healing system algorithms need be more reliable than those 
from previous related researches and studies. In this chapter, the results achieved from 
the simulation tests in chapter 6 are discussed using new metrics for detection 
capabilities, predictability trust of the prevention responses and self-healing 
reliability. The comparative studies undertaken in this work are considered from two 
different views. The first view is a quantitative comparison among bio inspired IPS 
systems. System accuracy, false positive and false negative errors are the most 
traditional and important issues in quantitative comparison when developers and 
researchers introduce a new IPS algorithm. The second view is to compare the bio 
inspired IPS and SH design features with other AIS systems for intrusion detection 
and prevention. The combination of SH with IPS, and how it can be used to track a 
network system to ensure the security and survival of network systems for critical 
services are discussed. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of deploying IPS 
strategies are discussed. 
7.2 Capability of Intrusion Detection - New Benchmarking Metric 
In [129], the authors provided an in-depth analysis of existing IPS metrics. In 
addition, they also provided a new information-theoretic analysis of IPS and proposed 
a new metric. They proposed how to examine the intrusion detection process from an 
information-theoretic point of view; they have less ambiguity about the input event 
data given the IPS output data classification. Thus, their new metric is Capability of 
Intrusion Detection CID. CID is the ratio of shared information between IPS input and 
output to the entropy of the input. CID has the most wanted features that: 
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1- It considers all the significant facets of detection capability naturally, i.e. true 
positive rate, false positive rate, false negative rate and positive predictive value. 
2- It logically provides an essential measure of intrusion detection capability. 
3- It is receptive to IPS operation parameters such as true positive rate and false 
positive rate, which can exhibit the effect of delicate changes of an intrusion detection 
and prevention system. 
CID is proposed as a suitable performance measure to make the most of fine-
tuning an IPS. The operation point obtained after fine-tuning is the best that can be 
achieved by IPS in terms of its essential capability to categorize input data. To 
measure and show the effect of CID, numerical examples and experiments of actual 
IPSs on various datasets are established using CID. The optimal operating point for 











Figure 7.1: Abstract Model of IPS Input/Output at Detection Stage [129]  
Generally, the IPS model takes the input as random variable X, where X = 1 
represents an intrusion, and X = 0 represents normal traffic. Meanwhile, the output of 
an IPS is modeled as a random variable Y, where Y = 1 indicates an alert of an 
intrusion, and Y = 0 represents no alert from the IPS. The assumption here is: there is 
an IPS output result matching to each input. The exact encoding of X, Y is related to 
the unit of the input data stream, which is in fact related to unit of analysis. Most of 
the network security systems consider the unit of analysis as a packet. The abnormal 
behavior packets are predetermined as X = 1. The IPS inspects each packet to classify 
it as abnormal behavior Y = 1 or normal behavior Y = 0. From the point of view of 
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detection input/output, we can construct an abstract model of IPS input and output as 
shown in Figure 7.1.The abstract model shows that: 
 Preceding probability of intrusion, the input event data is inspected by IPS: 
𝑃 𝑋 = 1 is the base rate and is denoted by B.  
 
 An intrusion event has a probability: 
𝑃 𝑌 = 0 𝑋 = 1 , if considered normal behavior by the IPS. This is the false negative 
rate FN is denoted as β.  
 A normal behavior  has a probability: 
𝑃 𝑌 = 1 𝑋 = 0  of being misclassified as an intrusion. This is the false positive 
denote by δ. 
To analyze the intrusion detection model using information theory, the declared 
model is practically helpful [129]. The metric of CID  is based upon input/output 
model and information theory. First, we need to define some terms of the information 
theory and theory itself. 
In self information theory, the entropy or uncertainty of random variable 𝑋 is 
given by: 
H X = − p x log p x x                                                         (7.1) 
The larger  H X  indicates a larger uncertain of X. 
If (X, Y) is distributed together as p(x, y), the conditional entropy of H(X|Y)is 
declared as: 
H X Y = −  p x, y log p x y xy                                          (7.2)  
H X Y = 0 if and only if the value of X is completely determined by the value of 
Y. 
Conversely, H X Y =  H X  if and only if X and Y are completely independent.  
Conditional entropy H X Y has the following property: 
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 0 ≤  H X Y ≤ H X  
Consider two random variables X and Y with a joint probability mass function p x; y  
and marginal probability mass functions p x  and p y . The mutual information 
I(X; Y) is [135]: 
I X; Y =   p x, y log
p(x,y)
p x p( y)yx
                                    (7.3) 
Then the mutual information and entropy: 
I X; Y = H X −  H X Y =  H Y −  H Y X                           (7.4) 
Guofei Gu et al. [129] defined Intrusion Detection Capability metrics 𝐶𝐼𝐷 , which 
is simply the ratio of mutual information between IPS input and output to the entropy 




                                                                               (7.5) 
For a realistic low base rate, 𝐶𝐼𝐷  is more sensitive to changes in δ i.e. false 
positive rate than changes in β i.e. false negative rate. 
In our study, we have considered both traditional and 𝐶𝐼𝐷  metrics in the evaluation 
of the proposed system. The parameters of the classification algorithms, which are 
used in the simulation tests and mentioned in chapter 6, are tuned to optimize the 
accuracy of classification between normal and abnormal behavior  that automatically 
affect the metrics of the false positive, false negative, true positive and detection 
capabilities. Moreover, the window of detection is one of the aspects used as 
performance metrics.  
The new metrics were used to measure the detection capability for all different 
simulation runs and the results are shown in Table 7.1. These metrics are sensitive 
and are affected by both the false positive rate and false negative rate. As 𝐶𝐼𝐷  is close 
to =1 for DoS, Probe, R2L and Process behavior tests, this shows that the system 
detection capability is perfect. The perfect result was obtained when the system was 
used to detect the U2R abnormal behavior. The other results, indicate that the system 
is perfect since the min value for detection capability is 0.975 which is also an 
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excellent result as the value of 𝐶𝐼𝐷  close to 1. The details of calculating this metrics 
are explained in Appendix C. 
Table 7.1: Detection Capability Results 
Test Dataset Class The Detection Capability 




Process Behavior 0.975 
7.3 Prevention Response and Self-healing Event Tracking - New Benchmarking 
Metric 
 The main responsibility of IPS is to investigate whether to prevent the input data 
or to permit them into the network system; it is necessary for the system to have high 
predictability trust to be sure that the data can be prevented if they are 100% 
abnormal behavior. In the case that the prevention response is not trusted, the healing 
must be triggered. Using this philosophy, the IPS is constantly keeping track with the 
self-healing system. Figure 7.2 illustrates how the IPS keeps track with SH. The 
threshold values are an important value in this case. Two new methods to calculate 
the metric for prevention predictability trust coefficient, which depends on the nearest 
centroid in the abnormal behavior subclasses of the classes to the input data (e.g. data 
packet), are introduced in the classification algorithms of the proposed IPS system. 
This feature is mapped from the immune system when the DC reaches maturation 
affinity to bind the pathogen and to identify types of pathogens by T-helper through 
the antigen types then co-stimulate the T-killer. 
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The affinity binding is mapped to the nearest distance between specific features of a 





Figure 7.2: Scheme of Trusted Data Classification to Ensure System Stability 
and Continuity 
 
The first method uses all the distances between the input data and the 
representatives of each class as exhibited in Figure 7.3. The value of the Prevention 
Predictability Coefficient (PPC) can be calculated from equation (7.6):  
















                                                                      (7.6)     
where; 
𝑑1 < 𝑑2 < ⋯ < 𝑑𝑖 < 𝑑𝑖+1, 
𝑑1, 𝑑2,… , 𝑑𝑖  is the smallest distance from the same class, 





Figure 7.3: First Method to Calculate Prevention Predictability Trust Coefficient 
(PPC) 
The second method depends only on the two nearest representative data to the 
input data as exhibited in Figure 7.4. The value of the Prevention Predictability 
Coefficient (PPC) can be calculated from equation 7.7:  
PPC = 1 −
𝑑1
𝑑𝑖+1
                                                                           (7.7) 
where; 
𝑑1 < 𝑑𝑖+1 
𝑑1is the smallest distance , 
𝑑𝑖+1 is the first smallest distance from different class other than 𝑑1. 
 Both methods of calculating the Prevention Predictability Coefficient are used in 
the simulation. 
 











7.3.1 Prevention Predictability Validation 
The predictability trust is observed and calculated to estimate the threshold and 
affinity to get the confidence prevention response when an input data is classified as 
an intrusion. The value of threshold and predictably trust for each process is assessed 
by equations (7.6) and (7.7).  
The Prevention Predictability trusts Coefficient and thresholds for four datasets of 
KDD Cup classes and process behavior dataset are demonstrated for each dataset test 
individually. There might be some error positions in classification i.e. data record that 
has been incorrectly classified. In all of the figures, these are marked with red points. 
Figure 7.5 shows the Prevention Predictability trust Coefficient for each process 
data in the denial of services dataset test. In Figure 7.5, method 1 was used for PPC 
estimation. The simulation results show three error positions, two of them are false 
negative error and one is false positive error. The threshold of the trusted value is 0.8 
i.e. the data processed above the threshold are mostly predictability trust values, 
which give confidence to the decision be it to prevent or to permit the data. For the 
data below 0.8, the self-healing system must to be triggered to make correction for 
classification if any misclassification is captured.  
 
Figure 7.5 The Preventive Predictability Trust Coefficient (PPC) for the DoS 




In Figure 7.6, method 2 was used for PPC estimation. The simulation results show 
three error positions, two of them are false negative error and one is false positive 
error. The threshold of the trusted value is 0.65 i.e. the data processed above the 
threshold are mostly predictability trust values. The numbers of data that fall below 
0.8using method 2 are much more than the numbers of data using method 1 in the 
same range. This evaluation for the PPC confirms that method 1 gives a better 
estimation of the prevention response trustability. 
 
 
Figure 7.6 The Preventive Predictability Trust Coefficient (PPC) for the DoS 
data processed using method 2. 
Figures 7.7 and 7.8 show the Prevention Predictability trust Coefficient for each 
process data in the probe dataset test. Figure 7.7 used method 1 for PPC estimation. 
The simulation results show there is only one error, which is false positive error. The 
threshold of the trusted value is 0.85 i.e. the data processed above the threshold are 
mostly predictability trust values. For Data below 0.85, the self-healing system must 





Figure 7.7 The Preventive Predictability Trust Coefficient (PPC) for the probe 
dataset processed using method 1. 
Method 2 has been used to estimate the PPC for probe processed dataset in Figure 
7.8. The simulation results show only one error, which is false positive error. The 
threshold of the trusted value is 0.70, indicating that the data processed above the 
threshold are mostly predictably trust values. For Data below 0.7, the self-healing 
system must to be triggered to make correction for classification if any 
misclassification is captured. The data that fall below 0.85 are much more according 
to method 2 than method 1in the same range. This evaluation of PPC of the probe 
dataset gives another confirmation that method 1 is better for estimation of the 
prevention response trustability. 
 
Figure 7.8 The Preventive Predictability Trust Coefficient (PPC) for the probe 
dataset processed using method 2. 
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Figures 7.9 and 7.10 show the Prevention Predictability trust Coefficient for each 
process data in the R2L dataset test. Method 1 has been used for PPC estimation in 
Figure 7.9. Two error positions are shown by the simulation results, one is false 
negative error and the other is false positive error. The threshold of the trusted values 
is 0.9 i.e. the data processed above the threshold are mostly predictability trust values. 
For Data below 0.9 the self-healing system must to be triggered to make correction 
for classification if any misclassification is captured. 
Figure 7.9 The Preventive Predictability trust Coefficient (PPC) for the R2L 
dataset processed using method 1. 
Method 2 has been used for PPC estimation for R2L in Figure 7.10. Three error 
positions are shown by the simulation results, two are false negative error and one is 
false positive error. The threshold of the trusted value is 0.77. For Data below 0.77 
the self-healing system must to be triggered to make correction for classification if 
any misclassification is captured. The data that fall below 0.9 are much more 
according to method 2 than method 1 in the same range. This PPC evaluation also 





Figure 7.10The Preventive Predictability Trust Coefficient (PPC) for the R2L 
data processed using method 2. 
Figures 7.11 and 7.12 shows the Preventive Predictability trust coefficients for 
each process data in U2R dataset test. For PPC estimation in Figure 7.11, method 1 
has been used. The simulation results show that there is no error. The threshold of the 
trusted value is 1.0 i.e. all data classification are predictably trust values. 
 
Figure 7.11: The Preventive Predictability Trust Coefficient (PPC) for theU2R 
dataset processed using method 1 and 2. 
For Figure 7.12, method 2 has been used for PPC estimation and again the 
simulation results show that there is no error. The threshold of the trusted value is 1.0 
i.e. the data processed are 100% predictability trust values. This evaluation of the PPC 





Figure 7.12: The Preventive Predictability Trust Coefficient (PPC) for the 
U2Rdataset processed using method 2. 
The result of the Prevention Predictability trust Coefficient (PPC) is obtained 
from the process behavior dataset test. When PPC is estimated using the first method, 
the value of the threshold is 0.55 as shown in Figure 7.13. The processed data has a 
lower threshold compared to the other results. In the test, values of untrusted 
Prevention Predictability trust Coefficients are high when the second method was 
used. This untrusted result is due to two reasons: 
1. The training data available are not sufficient. 
2. The method of using the system calls sequences and frequencies as features to 
classify process behavior are not perfect to train agent for prevention, thus requiring 
some improvements. 
Although the result obtained show some weaknesses in the prevention trust of 
process abnormal behavior, still the detection accuracy is better than previous 
algorithms as will be explained in section 7.5, which discusses the comparative 
studies. For Data below 0.55, the self-healing system must to be triggered to make 




Figure 7.13 The Preventive Predictability Trust Coefficient (PPC) for the data 
processed using method 1. 
When using method 2, the numbers of untrusted values of prevention 
predictability coefficient are higher than the one used in method 1;the threshold is 0.5 
as shown in Figure 7.14. All process data above the threshold can be either prevented 
or permitted with trust. The data that fall below 0.55 are much more according to 
method 2 than method 1 in the same range. This PPC evaluation also confirms that, 
method 1 is more accurate to estimate the prevention response trustability. 
 
Figure 7.14 The Preventive Predictability Trust Coefficient (PPC) for the data 
processed using method 2. 
7.3.2 Prevention Response Solutions 
There is a diversity of techniques for responding to intrusion prevention.  In deciding 
the appropriate prevention response to a detected intrusion, there are a number of 
criteria that must be considered to determine an appropriate response.  
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These criteria are: timing, type of attacker, type of attack, implications of the attack, 
degree of suspicion, and environmental constraint i.e. legal, ethical, institutional, and 
resources [136]. The developers of the IPS system must specify the technique needed 
to precede the prevention events. The prevention techniques mostly used by IPS 
developers are: 
Disconnection of the source of attack from the network: For network-based 
attacks, disconnecting from the network is less draconian than shutting down the host, 
but it has the same effect. Network-based attacks can no longer affect the system, thus 
allowing the system at the training stage the appropriate time to respond to an attack. 
Disabling the destination of attacking ports or services: If a single service or a 
port is subjected to an abnormal behavior, either the service or the port will be 
disabled. This will effectively stop the attack without affecting any of the other 
services offered by the system, here the system can use the feature of the port 
number to response activate the prevention response. 
Block IP address: If the IP address of an attacking system can be identified from the 
features of the data packet, some network attacks can be neutralized by blocking, at a 
router, all traffics from that address. While this protection is often temporary if the 
attacker can change their IP address. The intelligent agent at the training stage can 
learn how to block the IP address in a significant time.   
Termination of user session: If a user is involved in intrusive behavior, the user's 
session should be terminated and the user's account locked to prevent future damage.  
7.4 Self–healing Evaluation Test 
The self-healing system is triggered when the predictability trust values for 
prevention or permission of input data are below the threshold values i.e. untrusted to 
either prevent or permit. Since self-healing system has been the highlight during the 
recent years, up to date, few researchers have introduced evaluation metrics for self-
healing performance. The mechanism of the self-healing system introduced in this 
research requires quantification of its efficacy and reason about trade-offs. In [66], 
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[67], [137], the researchers have discussed and introduced the evaluation of self-
healing benchmark and reliable metrics. 
To address this issue in our research, the problem of network system failure is 
simplified. The behavior of health system components are kept in a database and 
replicated three times as explained in chapter 5 section 5.6 in self-healing 
mechanisms. Reliability, availability and serviceability of the three copies of the 
database are used for the evaluation metrics. To present a metric, firstly failure 
injection to one component or more is needed; secondly, either the successful repair 
or failure of healing must be measured using mathematical modeling. Finally, the 
metric is derived from the point of views of reliability, availability and serviceability 
of the system. 
Reliability: The injected failure in the original system component is replaced and 
confirmed by the two replicated databases and failure repair is successful. 
Availability: The three databases are available and no failure in the databases 
themselves. 
Serviceability: The continuity of the network system is maintained since the self-
healing system is triggered within the essential time. 
In [138], the metrics derived from Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMCs) 
was introduced. These metrics are: 
1. Limiting/steady-state availability. 
2. Repair success rates (fault-coverage). 
3. Repair times. 
4. Yearly downtime. 
Due to the limitation of this research, which is static evaluation of IPS and SH 
system, only the first three of these metrics were considered when the self-healing 
system simulation test was being established. The fourth metric was not considered 
because it needs real time measurement. Instead of taking downtime, randomization 
of rejecting the failure in the original database components is used periodically. 
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The algorithm of the self-healing system has four check states as illustrated in Figure 
7.15. 
From Figure 7.15: 
O: Original database; 
R1: First replication of the database; 
R2: Second replication of the database; 
C1: Check the steadiness of the system components; 
C2: Check the availability of the system; 
Rs: Repair time; 
C3: Repair success. 
 
 
Figure 7.15: The States of Self-healing System Metrics Measurement 
 
From these components of evaluation, the metrics is introduced and the simulation 
test is executed. The grid network database published in [139] is used and tuned to 
take the failure of the CPU average usage time, used memory, required time, waiting 
time and run time as measurable components. 2826 random records for the different 
processes are used in the test. A sample of this dataset is shown in Table D3.1 
Appendix D. The test was analyzed to real time application by randomizing 100 
changes in the original components in the dataset periodically. The total time for 
keeping the system steady and available, repair time, validation of the repair and 
repair success percentage are the benchmarking metrics for evaluation. The state 
availability time was taken after 100 random changes and repair. The results are 
tabulated in Table 7.2. The results show that the system has high efficiency based on 
the benchmarking metrics. 
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This self-healing algorithm used very reliable static real dataset test. The self-
healing system is expected to work fairly good in real time, as well as static work, 
since the analyzing method is mostly the same as in real time work. The system main 
features are lightweight software and autonomous. The system was not tested on the 
datasets tested in some other related works because the results obtained would not be 
comparable since these metrics are new. Moreover, some of the researchers, for 
example in [140], used the metrics for different types of tests while the current system 
is more efficient for system repair and availability. The original and replicated 
datasets must be updated periodically by the network administrator or by adding 
training features to register the system component update.  
7.5 IPS and SH Integration Results 
The aim of the integration between IPS and SH is to improve the performance and 
keep the continuity of the network system. From the results achieved, the accuracy of 
IPS is recalculated after the SH has been triggered. The keep tracking with SH system 
is used to correct the error positions of classification which increases the final 
accuracy of the presented system. The error positions below the threshold are 
corrected for each test. The improvement in accuracy is significant especially for 
process behavior. In table 7.3, a comparison between the accuracy before and after 





Table 7.3: The IPS and SH Integration Results 
Dataset Accuracy before 
trigger SH 
Accuracy after Trigger 
the SH 
DoS 99.79% 99.86% 
Probe 99.92% 100.00% 
R2L 99.60% 99.80% 
U2R 100.00% 100.00% 
Process behavior  98.51% 100.00% 
7.6 Comparative Studies 
The comparative study for the IPS and SH system simulation results are constructed 
based upon three diverse criteria: firstly, between different current tests for validation, 
secondly between other AIS systems that have used the same standard datasets and 
finally, between features of the current system that are mapped from the immune 
system, and those of other artificial immune systems. 
The results of the simulation tests are presented in Table 7.4. The important 
comparison parameters are detection capability (CID ), Preventive Predictability trust 
coefficients (PPC), classification accuracy, and analysis and adaptation. The U2R test 
shows the highest results for predictability trust for prevention, detection capabilities 
and accuracy, which is 100%. The lowest PPC is obtained in process behavior for 
sendmail dataset and has a threshold of 0.55. The minimum value for analysis and 
adaptation error is achieved for U2R test, probe test and process behavior test, while 






Table 7.4: Simulation Tests Results for IPS and SH System 
Dataset Denial of 
Services 
Probe R2L U2R Process 
Behavior 
Detection 
Capabilities CID , 
0.990 0.993 0.991 1.00 0.975 
Predictability Trust 
threshold value 
0.80 0.85 0.90 1.00 0.55 
Accuracy 99.79 % 99.92% 99.60% 100.0% 98.51% 
Analysis and 
adaptation error 
0.446% 0.00% 1.17 % 0.00% 0.00% 
The second comparison is between three AIS systems and algorithms for intrusion 
detection; the first one is Multi-agent network intrusion active defense model based 
on immune (IMAAD) demonstrated by [82]. This system used multi immune agent 
for intrusion detection. This system was tested using the KDD Cup dataset. The 
second study was done by [141] where the adaptive and innate immune systems are 
integrated, and they used their own trace data for process behavior on FTP monitoring 
behavior of wuftpd. The last study was done by Julie.G [140]; she developed a 
dendritic cell algorithm (DCA) inspired from the innate immune system based on the 
danger theory concept. The DCA was tested using the same dataset as in [141].  
The results are tabulated in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 for comparison. Table 7.5 
shows the comparison among 4 classes of KDD Cup datasets tests. The parameters of 
comparison are true positive error (TP), false positive error (FP) and number of 
abnormal behavior categories plus the normal category. The comparison is between 
current system and the system presented in [82]. Most of the bio inspired immune 
systems for intrusion detection suffers from the rate of false positive, so these 
parameters are chosen to show the improvement in the false positive rates. The results 
shows a significant improvement in detection accuracy and the false positive errors 
are reduced to 0.0 in R2L and U2R simulation tests. These results indicate that the 
combination between AIS and pattern recognition test is efficient. 
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Table 7.5: Comparison between IMAAD and BIIPSS 
 




















5 7 97.2% 99.86% 2.8% 0.07% 
Probe 4 5 96.5% 100.0% 3.5% 0.08% 
R2L 3 5 95.2% 99.6% 4.8% 0.00% 
U2R 4 5 94.5% 100.0% 5.5% 0.00% 
 Results of the current system are also compared with [140], [141], and the 
comparison is established in Table 7.6. The results of [140], [141] are chosen for 
comparison because both works used the concept of danger theory even though the 
simulation tests were performed for intrusion detection only. Moreover, the two 
related works validated their algorithm using FTP monitoring behavior of wuftpd 
session dataset, which is considered as one of the process behavior datasets created by 
Twycross [141]. The parameters of comparison are true positive error and rate of false 
positive. Both systems used in the comparison have better results than the early 
negative selection algorithm that used UNM dataset. The comparison recommends 
that the current system is better than the system presented in [140], [141], which also 
ensure that the current system is also better than the techniques used by negative 
selection. These results strongly suggest that the danger theory concept for intrusion 
detection and prevention system integrated with pattern recognition classification 
algorithm is better for detection accuracy, scalability and low positive errors than the 





Table 7.6 Comparison between AIS Algorithms and BIIPSS 
AIS System Julie[141] Twycross [140] BIIPSS 
True positive 1.0 0.75 0.9851 
False positive error 0.83 0.15 0.0 
Since the current system integrates biological inspired system with machine 
learning and pattern recognition concept, it is necessary to validate the algorithms 
against some pattern recognition algorithms and AIS for intrusion detection system. 
Mahbod et al. [133] used specific arrangement of KDD cup dataset and implemented 
this arrangement on different intrusion detection dataset. Our system is simulated 
using the same arrangement for huge records of 21 categories of abnormal behaviors 
from all classes of attacks. The ratio between normal behaviors to abnormal behaviors 
is 1:1 i.e. abnormal behavior is not considered as outliers; and the accuracy attained is 
98.87% for detection. Figure 7.16 shows the result obtained by [133] and the current 
system. 
 
Figure 7.16: Comparison of Accuracy BIIPSS and Machine Learning IDPS 
Systems. 
98.87














The last comparative study is between the current system and other AIS systems for 
IDPS. This comparison is established on the design features and mechanisms inspired 
from the immune system. This study is summarized in Table 7.7. 















 √ √ √ 
Innate immune 
system 
√ √ √ √ 
Knowledge base √  √ √ 
Training base  √  √ 
Prevention 
mechanism 
  √ √ 
Self-healing 
mechanism 
   √ 
Standard antigen 
database 
√ √  √ 
Standard signal 
database 
√ √   
Processing signal √  √  
Multilayer system    √ 
Self adapting √ √ √ √ 
Diverse  √ √ √ 
Distributed   √ √ 
Autonomy  √  √ 
Lightweight  √  √ 
Self-Organized √ √  √ 
7.7The IPS and SH System Deployment 
The deployment of IPS and SH system is important to ensure the security of network 
systems. While it is common practice to defend against abnormal behaviors by 
inspecting traffic at the data centers and corporate headquarters using firewall for 
example, it is also critical to distribute the network-level defense to stop malicious 
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traffic close to its entry point, either at the branch or telecommuter offices i.e. the 










Figure 7.17: The IPS in front of the Firewall 
 
Network engineering designers have different options to choose from for 
deploying the IPS and SH system in the critical services network system. The 
deployment is based on many criteria. Basically, IPS deployment depends on the 
nature of the critical services and the levels of security required by the services, and 
the vendor of the IPS system. Since the proposed system is a hybrid, the system also 
can reside in each host for host-based security purposes. Since The SH is integrated 
with IPS, It follows the same IPS deployment criteria.  
However, the network engineering design issue has to be considered when IPS 
deployment is being established. Mainly four options for network engineering design 
and critical services network system vendor are available. The designer must tune the 
network design to optimize the security insurance for the network system. 
The first option as shown in Figure 7.18 is to reside the IPS in front of the 
firewall. This option puts the priority advantages of the firewall function, which is to 
ensure that traffic policies are enforced i.e. examination rules are configured to allow 










Fire Wall and IPS 
 
Figure 7.18: The IPS integrated with Firewall 
Meanwhile for specific network security reason, the priority is to check the 
misuse and anomaly abnormal behavior simultaneously. Network engineering 
developers are suggesting another solution to solve this problem, either by integrating 
firewall with IPS or by setting the IPS behind the firewall as shown in Figures 7.19 
and 7.20. These choices must be discussed between the designer and vendors because 
they may affect the latency of sending and receiving the data, bandwidth and other 










Figure 7.19: The IPS Behind the Firewall. 
Other issues in network design are:  memory efficient traffic scanning for attack 
signatures that will consume less memory on the router, capability to provide 
protection for larger number of common threats, and vulnerabilities which may also 
include the routing system and for accessing remote the data points. To deal with 
these issues, network engineering developers integrate the IPS with routing system as 
is clearly shown in Figure 7.20. 
 170 
 








Figure 7.20: The IPS Integrated with Routing System 
7.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduces new metrics for intrusion classification, Predictability trust 
for prevention, and self-healing reliability. The simulation tests for the proposed 
system have shown that the system has high performance for detection, prevention 
and healing mechanisms for all classes of abnormal behavior. The results also 
indicate a significant improvement in system accuracy compared to other results 
obtained by previous related works. The simulation test for process behavior shows 
significant improvements in reducing the false positive error to 0 while the true 
positive is value 98.51%. Comparative studies against other systems have also been 
done.   
Using self-healing system measurements, the metrics for prevention predictability 
response and self-healing reliability are introduced. The simulation results show that 
the algorithms used in the self-healing simulation test are highly reliable. Many AIS 
systems that are based on the danger theory have been compared with the proposed 
system from the point of view of the design features inspired from HIS.  
Finally, the deployments of IPS are discussed. The next chapter will present the 










CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Conclusions 
This research introduced a new intrusion prevention system for critical services 
networks that are integrated with self-healing mechanism to keep the systems secure 
from any intrusion and heal any damages caused by the intrusion. The main objective 
of this research was to present an autonomous system that reduces the intervention of 
network administrator i.e. using autonomous intelligent agents for intrusion 
prevention system. At the same time, the system accuracy must be kept maximized by 
minimizing the false errors in detection and predictability of prevention responses.  
The proposed system was inspired from human immune system based on danger 
theory. The second generation of artificial immune system inspired from the 
mechanism of innate immune system, which triggered when a danger signals captured 
by the innate immune cell mainly dendritic cell. Thus for the proposed system, the 
abstraction from the immune system is inspired from the integration of adaptive and 
innate mechanisms.  
The classification of data used pattern recognition and machine learning 
algorithms. The results obtained showed that the combination between abstractions 
from immune system and machine learning algorithm improves the intrusion 
detection and prevention algorithm. The false errors were decreased notably, reaching 
zero errors in the U2R abnormal behavior class test. The use of machine learning 
satisfies the requirement of autonomous system.  
To eliminate the defect caused by intrusion, the proposed system includes a self- 
healing system that keeps tracking damages caused by intruders when the 
predictability of the prevention is untrusted. In addition, the self-healing system has 
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the ability to investigate periodically the system components to preserve the system 
continuity and survivability. The combination between intrusion prevention and self-
healing system has been successfully achieved.  
8.2 Research Objectives and Achievement Evaluation 
The research problem raised in this work was to face susceptible intrusions by 
intelligent and dynamic abnormal activities in the network system, particularly for 
critical services. The main objectives of this work were specified at the beginning of 
the thesis are: 
 To develop an autonomous mechanism for intrusion prevention system that is 
effective for anomaly detection and prevention, based on artificial immune system 
and pattern recognition. 
 To design a network security system that combines the intrusion prevention 
system with self-healing mechanism. 
 To simulate the model for efficiency and robustness, and compare and 
contrast it with existing security models. 
An intelligent and highly accurate autonomous intrusion prevention system that is 
capable of ensuring secure network systems for critical services has been developed. 
The objective has been further extended to include a new layer for robust continuity 
of the critical services by incorporating a self-healing mechanism to overcome any 
failures that may be caused by the intruder. The main design features of the IPS has 
been successfully abstracted from the human immune system. In the next section, the 
specific objectives and relevant achievements are discussed. 
8.3 BIIPSS Model Specification and Design 
A specification for the proposed IPS and SH, as an application system using 
multiagent system, was needed to clarify the agent‟s role, function and 
responsibilities as well as the states and transitions of each agent towards realizing the 
agent‟s aim. In this research, a specification language has been developed to specify 
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the roles, functions and responsibilities of the multiagent system. The specification 
language was needed to describe in details the implementation role, each of IPS and 
SH.  
The IPS and SH specification language was constructed using set theory and Z-
notation symbols. Both Z-notation and set theory were considered as logic design 
tools. The new specification language has allowed for a strong system description. To 
analyze the design of the IPS and SH model, Petri nets as an analysis and modeling 
tool were used to fulfill all the states and transitions of the multiagent system model. 
The Petri nets for IPS and SH agents have been successfully designed and verified 
mathematically for specific features of multiagent model such as free deadlock, 
liveness and boundedness. The use of Petri nets supports to develop a robust 
autonomous system. The first and main objective of the research, which was 
autonomous system, was accomplished by verifying the Petri nets model for the 
multiagent system. 
8.4 BIIPSS Mathematical and Computational Model 
The second objective of the research was to minimize the errors in intrusion detection, 
therefore more possible accurate prevention responses obtained. The derivations of 
the mathematical and computational models of the bio inspired IPS and SH has been 
undertaken using the features of k-NN means cluster and Gaussian mixture. The main 
algorithm for detection used a nonlinear classification methods based on the k-NN 
cluster, k-means and Gaussian mixture. The integration of bio inspired abstraction 
features of HIS and pattern recognition algorithms was efficient for detection of 
intrusion and identification of corresponding trust prevention response.  
A highly accurate detection has been possible due to the nonlinearity features of 
the mathematical model of the classification derivation. The detection of intrusion and 
trustability of the prevention responses were tracked with the self-healing algorithm 
after the analysis and adaptation of the intrusion have been fully completed. The fully 
established mathematical and computational models of the IPS and SH multiagent 
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system, completed the development of the bio inspired intrusion prevention and self-
healing system for critical services network.  
8.5 BIIPSS Test Limitations and Validation 
The limitations of this work were primarily due to the conditions of the simulation 
test:  
 The test and simulation were implemented statically with specific real time 
standard datasets. 
 Due to limited availability of resources, the tests were also used as the 
samples of random record. The ratio of abnormal behavior records to normal behavior 
records was specified by the researcher. 
 Other effects  such as network engineering design and network traffic noise 
have not been considered  since this  research  has been focused mainly on the design 
of the IPS and SH algorithms as software development. 
To validate the system developed in this research, the IPS and SH were simulated 
and tested using two different standard datasets. The simulation results showed that 
the autonomous agents were highly accurate and fast in detecting the 4 classes of 
network intrusion with 23 different categories of abnormal behavior. The first 
simulation test used KDD Cup dataset. Four different tests for 4 different classes of 
abnormal behaviors were run. The accuracy varies from 99.6-100%, which was 
considered as very high compared to the results obtained by IMAAD. The false 
positive percentage error was reduced to the range from 0.0 to 0.08. Meanwhile, the 
false negative error percentage was minimized to the range from 0.0 to 0.4.  
The second test was specified for the sendmail dataset from UNM as process 
behavior intrusion detection and prevention test. The system developed in this 
research has shown significant increase in accuracy in process behavior classification 
for intrusion detection and prevention responses; 98.51 % accuracy, 0.0 for false 
positive error and 1.49% for false negative error. This percentage of false negative 
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error, which was considered relatively high, may be due to the small size of training 
and testing data.  
The results were also validated according to the parameters used in the 
classification algorithm such as subclass number, best extraction feature for best 
classification accuracy, and values of the best clustering classes and representatives 
for each class. The prevention positive and negative predictabilities and the 
throughput of processing data were also validated, which showed noteworthy results. 
Finally, analysis and adaptation capabilities were measured, which showed high 
performance in identifying the class and categories of the abnormal behaviors. 
The nonlinear classification algorithms have been verified as a new classification 
algorithm for diverse detection purposes such as cancer detection, image recognition 
and so on. This verification was obtained by simulation tests for cancer detection. The 
detail of this simulation test  provided in Appendix F. 
8.6 New Benchmarking Metrics 
This research has introduced a new benchmarking metrics and has used new detection 
capabilities metric. The new metrics were measured using the results obtained in 
chapter 7. For an ideal system, the values of the detection capabilities must tend to 1. 
The IPS presented in this research has a detection capability ranging from 0.975-1.0. 
These results showed that the IPS system works ideally when detecting a class of 
abnormal behavior.  
Moreover, a nonlinear classification algorithm for detection was used to define 
trustability of the Prevention Predictability, for which anew metrics for prevention 
was introduced. The new metrics measure the confidence of the system and how it 
was trusted to take the prevention response in the time of detection. In this research, 
two new benchmarking metrics were defined and compared, to show which was the 
best for calculating trust predictability for prevention. The values of trust 
predictability were used to determine the threshold that keeps track with the self-
healing system and triggers the healing process. These new metrics can be used in 
future related research work.  
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Autonomic computing and particularly self-healing systems were new fields in 
software engineering. Specific metrics to measure the performance of self-healing 
system were still not available even though some evaluation metrics has been 
introduced by a few researchers. In this research, the principles of measuring self-
healing system were simplified. The new metrics for reliable self-healing were used 
to measure and benchmark the self-healing system. The results obtained satisfy the 
requirements for keeping continuity of the system in static test. Tracking of the self-
healing system with prevention predictability trust and threshold were accomplished 
with intelligent training. As an enhanced safety measure, the self-healing mechanism 
can also be triggered periodically according to the setting by the system designer, 
regardless of whether an intrusion is present or not.  
8.7 Research Contributions 
The main contributions from this research were mentioned as follows: 
 Autonomous biological inspired intrusion prevention system. 
 Highly accurate IPS system for detection of intrusion with minimum false 
errors, and high predictability of trusted prevention response. 
  Nonlinear classification algorithms which can be used for diverse detection 
purposes rather than for intrusion detection solely.  
 A self-healing system that keeps tracking the network with prevention 
predictability threshold. 
 A new conceptual framework for developing AIS system. 
 Specification language for IPS and SH systems for use in network security 
system. 
 New classification metrics and benchmarking of intrusion detection 
capabilities and prevention predictability trust. 
 New metrics for self-healing systems. 
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 The presented system was a hybrid which can be used as network-based, as 
well as host-based intrusion prevention system. 
8.8 Future work 
For future work, researchers need to have a deep knowledge about the natural 
mechanism as rich metaphor for more system inspiration. This work has shown that 
the integration of HIS inspired model, pattern recognition and machine learning was 
able to bring significant improvement to the security of critical services network 
system. By following the same methodology, this combination can be extended to 
develop other security systems to gain a more reliable and secure network systems.  
The biological inspired system needs to be validated as a real time system to 
overcome any deficiencies that may arise when the system is implemented in real 
time. The accuracy of the process behavior showed lower value, this test needs a more 
reliable dataset and of sufficient size. The implementation and simulation test must be 
performed using other datasets to solve problems in other domains.  
In some tests, the false negative values were significantly higher than expected. 
Thus, the detection algorithms must be improved to keep both false positive and false 
negative rates minimized to 0. The nonlinear classification algorithm must be 
modified to find the Global minimum of variance instead of getting the local 
minimum variance; this is one of the problems of k-means cluster algorithm. Even 
though the use of the adaptation algorithm has shown excellent results, but a more 
detailed specification of the features of recognition and registration of anomaly 
intrusion is needed to allow for more diagnoses ability and particular damaged 
component identification rather than diagnosing all the system components for fault 
and test.  
For faster and accurate classification, selection of the features extraction i.e. 




    𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = min
𝑖,𝑗
  




   ,                                                   (8.1) 
where; 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖  is variance of the class i. 
In spite of the successful new integration between the IPS and self-healing system, a 
reliability feature can be added to keep the self-healing system itself healthy, in the 
case the self-healing system components themselves are the target of the intelligent 
intruder. Finally, the performance of the self-healing system in real time needs to be 
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A.1 Design Features 
 Autonomy: The IPS must not require outside management or maintenance i.e. it 
autonomously classifies and stops abnormal events. 
 Self-Repair: It repairs itself by replacing damaged cells. It will be progressively 
more important for computers to handle most security problems automatically. 
 Distributed: A distributed IPS can support robustness, configurability, 
extendibility and scalability. It is robust since the failure of one local intrusion 
detection and prevention process does not cripple the overall IPS. It is also easy 
to organize distributed IPSs when each intrusion detection and prevention 
processes can be simply tailored for the local requirements of a specific host. 
The addition of new intrusion detection process running on different operating 
systems does not require modification of existing processes, and hence it is 
extensible. It can also scale better, since the high volume of audit data is 
distributed amongst many local hosts and is analyzed by those hosts. 
 Self-Organized: A self-organizing IPS provides adaptability and global analysis. 
Without external management or maintenance, a self-organizing IPS 
automatically detects intrusion signatures, which are previously unknown and/or 
distributed, and eliminates and/or repairs compromised components. Such a 
system is highly adaptive because there is no need for manual updates of its 
intrusion signatures as network environments change. Global analysis emerges 
from the interactions among a large number of varied intrusion detection 
processes. 
 Lightweight:  A lightweight IPS supports efficiency and dynamic features. 
Furthermore lightweight IPS does not impose a large overhead on a system or 
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place a heavy burden on CPU and I/O. It places minimal work on each 
component of the IPS. The primary functions of hosts and networks are not 
adversely affected by the monitoring. It also dynamically covers intrusion and 
non-intrusion pattern spaces at any given time rather than maintaining entire 
intrusion and non-intrusion patterns. 
 Multilayered: A multilayered IPS increases robustness. The failure of one layer 
defense does not necessarily allow an entire system to be compromised. While a 
distributed IPS allocates intrusion detection processes across several hosts, a 
multi-layered IPS places different levels of sensors at one monitoring place. 
 Adaptability: The IPS needs to learn to detect new abnormal activities, and 
retains the ability to recognize previously seen abnormal activities through 
learned knowledge based. A computer immune system should be similarly 
adaptable as the immune system, both learning to recognize new intrusions and 
remembering the signatures of previous attacks. 
 Diverse: A diverse IPS provides robustness. A variety of different intrusion 
prevention processes spread across hosts will slow an attack that has 
successfully compromised one or more hosts. This is because an understanding 
of the intrusion process at one site provides limited or no information on 
intrusion processes at other sites. 
 Disposable: A disposable IPS increases robustness, extendibility, and 
configurability. A disposable IPS does not depend on any single component. 









A.2 Comparison Study 
Table A.1: Comparisons of Intrusion Prevention Techniques 










 Information gathering: identify 
hosts,.Oss, application and network 
characteristics.  
 Logging capabilities: time stamp, 
session ID, alert type, rating source and 
destination, protocols, payload data. 
 Detection capabilities: layer attacks, 
tuning and customization of port scan 
and alert setting. 
 Prevention capabilities: passive only, 











 Logging capabilities: data confirm the 
validity of alert,  time stamp, alert type, 
rating  payload data, event type IP, port, 
file names, user ID 
 Detection capabilities: code analysis, 
buffer over flow,  application and 
library list, traffic filter. 
 Prevention capabilities: prevent code 
from being executed, stop incoming 
network traffic, file system monitoring.  
 Other capabilities: removable media 
restriction, process status monitoring, 












 Information gathering capabilities: IP, 
OS. Provide services in IP,TCP and 
UDP port uses. Host communication 
services. 
 Logging capabilities: time stamp, alert 
type, rating source and destination, 
protocols, payload data, UDP port or 
ICMP types and code. 
 Detection capabilities: Denial of service 
attack, scanning worm, unexpected 
application services, policy violation. 
 Prevention capabilities: passive only, 






Table A.2: Comparisons of Intrusion Prevention Methodologies 











 Compare the current 
incoming activities to the 
list of signature using 
string comparison or 
signature database. 
 Little understanding of 
many network or 
application protocols. 
 Cannot track and 
understand the state of 
complex 
communications. 
 Cannot detect attacks 
that comprise multiple 
events if none of the 
events contains a clear 












 Has profile that represents 
normal behavior of user, 
hosts, network connection 
or application. 
 Monitors the 
characteristics of typical 
activity over a period of 
time. 
 Then uses statitical 
method to compare the 
characteristics of current 
activity to thresholds 
related to the profile. 
  
 Inadvertently including 
malicious activity as part 
of a profile is a common 
problem. 
 Building profiles  can be 
very challenging in some 
cases to make them 
accurate. 
 Produces many false 
positives because of 



















 Relies on vendor 
developed universal 
profiles that specify how 
particular protocols should 
and should not be used. 
  Identify analysis can 
identify unexpected 
sequences of command. 
  Analyze protocols that 
perform authentication. 
 Usually include 
reasonableness checks for 
individual commands. 
 Uses protocol based on 
standard from software 
vendors and standard 
bodies. 
 Very resource-intensive 
because of the 
complexity of  analysis 
and  overhead involved 
in performing state 
tracking for many 
simultaneous sessions. 
 Cannot detect attacks 
that do not violate the 
characteristics of 
generally acceptable 
protocol behavior . 
 Might conflict with the 
















and is assumed 
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)(  iclassxP  then , 
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 > 1 then; 
𝑃 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 < 1 − ∅ 1 = 1 − 0.84 
∅ 1 =0.84                                    // from cumulative standardized 
normal distribution 
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Positive predictive value (PPV): The probability of a chance that an intrusion 𝐼, is 
present when an IPS outputs an alarm and response, A. 
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑃(𝐼|𝐴) 
     =
𝑃(𝐼)𝑇𝑃
𝑃 𝐴 𝑇𝑃+𝑃 𝐼 𝐹𝑃
 
Negative predictive value (NPV): The probability of a chance that there is no 
intrusion ⇁ 𝐼, when an IPS does not output an alarm and response, 𝐴. 
𝑁𝑃 = 𝑃 ⇁ 𝐼 ⇁ 𝐴  
=
𝑃(𝐼  )(1 − 𝐹𝑃)






















D.1 Description of KDD 99 intrusion detection features 
Table D.1.1 the description of the features and data types from [132] 
Feature Description Data type 
1.duration. Duration of the connection Continuous. 
2.protocol type  Connection protocol (e.g. tcp, udp) Discrete. 
3. service  Destination service (e.g. telnet, ftp) Discrete. 
4. flag  Status flag of the connection Discrete. 
5. source bytes  Bytes sent from source to destination Continuous. 
6. destination bytes ytes sent from destination to source Continuous. 
7. land  1 if connection is from/to the same host/port; 0 
otherwise 
Discrete. 
8.wrong fragment number of wrong fragments Continuous. 
9. urgent  number of urgent packets Continuous. 
10. hot  number of "hot" indicators Continuous. 
11. failed logins  number of failed logins Continuous. 
12. logged in  1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise Discrete. 
13 #compromised number of "compromised'' conditions Continuous. 
14. root shell  1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise Continuous. 
15.su attempted  1 if "su root'' command attempted; 0 otherwise Continuous. 
16. # root  number of "root'' accesses Continuous. 
17. # file creations number of file creation operations Continuous. 
18. # shells  number of shell prompts Continuous. 
19. # access files  number of operations on access control files Continuous. 
20. # outbound 
cmds 
number of outbound commands in an ftp 
session 
Continuous. 
21. is hot login  1 if the login belongs to the "hot'' list; 0 
otherwise 
Discrete.  
22. is guest login  1 if the login is a "guest'' login; 0 otherwise Discrete. 
23. Count  number of connections to the same host as the 
current connection in the past two seconds 
Continuous. 
24. srv count number of connections to the same 




Feature Description Data type 
25. serror rate % of connections that have “SYN'' errors Continuous. 
26. srv serror rate  % of connections that have “SYN'' errors Continuous. 
27. rerror rate  % of connections that have “REJ'' errors Continuous. 
28. srv rerror rate  % of connections that have “REJ'' errors Continuous. 
29. same srv rate  % of connections to the same service Continuous. 
30. diff srv rate  % of connections to different services Continuous. 
31. srv diff host rate % of connections to different hosts Continuous. 
32. dst host count  
 
count of connections having the same 
destination host 
Continuous. 
33. dst host srv 
count 
 
count of connections having the same 
destination host and using the same service 
Continuous. 
34. dst host same 
srv rate 
% of connections having the same 
destination host and using the same service 
Continuous. 
35. dst host diff srv 
rate 
% of different services on the current host Continuous. 
36. dst host same 
src port rate 
% of connections to the current host having the 
same src port 
Continuous. 
37. dst host srv diff 
host rate 
% of connections to the same service 
coming from different hosts 
Continuous. 
38. dst host serror 
rate 
 
% of connections to the current host 
that have an S0 error 
Continuous. 
39. dst host srv 
serror rate 
% of connections to the current host and 
specified service that have an S0 error 
Continuous. 
40. dst host rerror 
rate 
 
% of connections to the current host 
that have an RST error 
Continuous. 
41. dst host srv 
rerror rate 
% of connections to the current host and 







D.2 UNM dataset sample of Sendmail data set for two different sequences [131] 






Process ID frequencies for the 
3794 1387 1387 1387 
2 1 1 1 1 1 
66 2 26 20 20 21 
66 3 8 2 2 3 
4 4 29 29 29 29 










System calls frequencies 
Process ID 
204 243 936 954 
2 1 1 1 1 1 
66 2 11 11 11 11 
66 3 0 0 0 0 
4 4 13 13 13 13 













UNM dataset sample of Sendmail data set for two different sequences 






System call frequencies 
Process ID 
1492 1575 1796 1863 
105 1 1 1 1 1 
104 2 38 92 25 25 
104 3 23 39 16 16 
106 4 22 22 21 21 












System call frequencies 
Process ID 
939 257 957 223 
105 1 3 2 0 2 
104 2 40 29 33 28 
104 3 11 10 6 8 
106 4 22 22 19 18 











D.3 Grid Dataset 















1 1851 1 9 59868 1 31980 
227 1852 1 8 57144 1 31980 
226 1852 1 8 59924 1 31980 
1 1851 1 8 59920 1 31980 
1 1850 1 9 57164 1 31980 
1 1850 1 8 57180 1 31980 
290 1852 1 8 57228 1 31980 
290 1853 1 8 59892 1 31980 
290 1852 1 8 57160 1 31980 
292 1850 1 8 59860 1 31980 
292 1850 1 8 59884 1 31980 
67 1850 1 10 59844 1 31980 
67 1851 1 8 59900 1 31980 
68 1851 1 8 59744 1 31980 
1 94872 1 94777 152676 1 259200 
1 95505 1 95396 152684 1 259200 
2 95104 1 95008 152708 1 259200 
1 94965 1 94869 152716 1 259200 
1 1850 1 9 57152 1 31980 
1 1860 1 9 57192 1 31980 
1 94762 1 94674 152648 1 259200 
2 68 1 25 88760 1 900 
1 85 1 27 88500 1 900 
2 1853 1 8 59908 1 31980 
2 1853 1 9 57164 1 31980 

















1 1851 1 8 59916 1 31980 
0 1850 1 8 57124 1 31980 
1 1851 1 9 59868 1 31980 
227 1852 1 8 57144 1 31980 
226 1852 1 8 59924 1 31980 
1 1851 1 8 59920 1 31980 
1 1850 1 9 57164 1 31980 
1 1850 1 8 57180 1 31980 
290 1852 1 8 57228 1 31980 
290 1853 1 8 59892 1 31980 
290 1852 1 8 57160 1 31980 
292 1850 1 8 57148 1 31980 
292 1850 1 8 59860 1 31980 
292 1850 1 8 59884 1 31980 
67 1850 1 10 59844 1 31980 
67 1851 1 8 59900 1 31980 
68 1851 1 8 59744 1 31980 
1 94872 1 94777 152676 1 259200 
1 95505 1 95396 152684 1 259200 
2 95104 1 95008 152708 1 259200 
1 94965 1 94869 152716 1 259200 
1 1850 1 9 57152 1 31980 
1 1860 1 9 57192 1 31980 
1 94762 1 94674 152648 1 259200 
2 68 1 25 88760 1 900 
1 85 1 27 88500 1 900 
2 1853 1 8 59908 1 31980 
2 1853 1 9 57164 1 31980 
2 1853 1 8 57136 1 31980 




Source Code  
% Best Feature Approximation Extraction 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Size of the data for each class 
class_Z=[80 19 50 100 100 100 2500];   
fid=fopen('DOS.txt','r'); read the data file 







% just the first time 0.5 but after you need to change it 
accordingly to important_features 





    meann(i,:)=mean(data_all((1+sum(class_Z(1:i-
1))):sum(class_Z(1:i)),:)); 













       min_var(j)=(meann(k,j)-
mean(meann(:,j)))^2/(0.0000001+varr(k,j)); 
end 
















% the new data it will be data_all1 
hole_data=data_all1; 
// End extraction feature part 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 




size_subclass=zeros(class_number,max(class_size));                       
 
%%%%%%111 class_size become max class_size%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
data_t=hole_data(1:class_size(1),:);                                             
for tr=1:(class_number-1) 
data_t=[data_t;hole_data(1+sum(class_size_t(1:tr)):class_
size(tr+1)+sum(class_size_t(1:tr)),:)]; %%%%%%111  50 



















while(check_part>0 &&incream<2)  
 
% check that the coefficient is never negative 
 
var1=sum(sum((data_t-
ones(sum(class_size),1)*mean(data_t)).^2));    
 














% there are two options you can use the function 
kMeansCluster or 









size_subclass(cn,:)=zeros(1,max(class_size));   
          [k1, k2]=size(c); 
for n=1:k1 
              [Rf,Cf,Vo]=find(b==n); 
size_subclass(cn,n)=sum(b==n); 









control=control+1;   
end 
if abs((var1-var2)/max(var2,var1))>= coefficient(cn)    
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% choose the treshold 
control=0;    
end 







































//End test Part 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
// distance Matrix 
function d=DistMatrix(A,B) 
% The distance matrix is distance between points in A as 
rows               
% and points in B as columns. 
% example: Spacing= dist(A,A) 
% Headway = dist(A,B), with hA ~= hB or hA=hB 
%         A=[1 2 3; 4 5 6; 2 4 6; 1 2 3]; B=[4 5 1; 6 2 
0] 
%  dist(A,B)= [ 4.69   5.83; 5.00 7.00; 5.48 7.48; 4.69   
5.83] 
% 
% dist(B,A)= [ 4.69   5.00     5.48    4.69; 






IfwA ~= wB,  error(' second dimension of A and B must be 











// distance Matrix 
//Data Control Part Analysis and Adaptation 




















































































0.1*abs(ones(m1,1)*data_control(ind,:))).^2) )'  ); 





















    occur=occur+sum(  class_assig(1+sum(class_size_C(1:u-











































while(accurrency<1.0 &h1<8)% change it to 20 or bigger if 

























End of training part 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Analysis and Adaptation Part%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
load-matprope.mat 





























































%% replication of data 
component_records=[2826]; 














x = floor(rand()*7); 
if x < 1 
    x = 1; 
end 
y = floor(rand()*2826); 
if y < 1 
    y = 1; 
end 
component_data1(y,x) 
% corrupt the records 
component_data1(y,x) = component_data1(y,x) + 
floor(rand()*10); 
component_data1(y,x) 
% check for corruption and repair it 




if sum(sum(component_data1 - component_data2)) ~=0 
for l = 1:7 
for k = 1:2826 
ifcomponent_data1(y,x) ~= component_data2(y,x) 
ifcomponent_data3(y,x) == component_data2(y,x) 








    m=1 




for y = 1:7 
for x = 1:2826 
ifcomponent_data1(x,y) == component_data3(x,y) 





    m=2 
end 
end 





Cancer Detection Simulation Test Results 
Cancer Dataset 
 Cancer dataset used in the simulation test has two classes: malignant and benign. 
This data set consists of 9 real-valued features F1,…,F9 computed for each cell 
nucleus. 569 instances were recorded for two types of diagnosis, M for malignant and 
B for benign. The class distribution of 682 instances indicated 444 benign and 238 
malignant, and there is no missing values. The features were computed from a 
digitized image of a fine needle aspirate (FNA) of a breast mass. 
 
The result is compared with other recent results and the comparison is as shown in 
Table F.1. The maximum accuracy is achieved with by using features with the most 
variance that affects the differences between the two classes i.e. the benign and 
malignant. These features are feature1, feature 2 and feature 3 as shown in Figure F.1. 
The accuracy is investigated at this point i.e. F=1, F=2 and F=3, α=0.92 and the 
change in accuracy according to the value of α is shown Figure F.2. 
 
Table F.1: Comparison between in breast cancer results 
 
Ref FR Accuracy 
[142] 5.63% 94.37% 
[143] 2.93% 97.07% 






















The best of the features



































































































αFigure F.2: Change of accuracy at F1,F2,&F3 with α
